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ABSTRACT 
This is a theoretical dissertation built on the premise that different 
people appreciate landscape in different ways. It takes a multi- 
disciplinary approach, and links findings made in several fields so as 
to attempt understanding of the phenomenon of rural landscape quality. 
A range of relatively modern explanations of the nature of landscape 
quality is examined and criticised primarily on the grounds of a 
tendency to confuse the abstract and uniform with the concrete and 
variable, that is, a failure to separate the general from the 
particular. A means of making this separation is then proposed and 
pursued for the remainder of the thesis. 
Discussion centres upon the activity of perceiving landscape. What 
does it involve? At the most abstract there are the structures of the 
senses and cognition inherited genetically and, with minor variations, 
common to all who perceive. At the most concrete there are the 
circumstances surrounding each individual engaged in the actual 
instant of perception. Between these two is the role played by the 
culture of the individual concerned. This thesis is slightly unusual 
in laying stress on the importance of the cultural inheritance as a 
factor contributing to differentiation and constant change in rural 
landscape quality. 
No firm conclusions are reached in what is essentially a work of 
experiment and speculation. 
References are supplied at the end of each section. 
Prpfarp* 
The overall aim during the course of study leading to this thesis has 
been to find out whether a non-positivist approach towards an under- 
standing of landscape quality is possible. The overall conclusion has 
been that it is, but such an approach reveals a phenomenon far more 
massive and complicated than initially expected, and far too rich to 
be given full justice within one volume. 
The direction that my investigations have taken owes a great deal to a 
thesis, ' written for an M. Phil. degree in Town Planning, which 
critically discussed the quantitative techniques used to evaluate 
certain qualitative aspects of the countryside for planning purposes, 
including landscape quality. I argued that positivistic assumptions, 
derived from the physical and numerate sciences which seem to hold 
powerful sway in decision-making circles today, were being inapprop- 
riately applied to values that had more of a social than a physical 
origin. From this theoretical standpoint, it was relatively easy to 
pull empirical landscape evaluation techniques to pieces, but, like 
many critiques of manifestations of positivism now appearing in 
various academic fields, my M. Phil thesis was almost wholly 
destructive and failed to suggest any more suitable approach to 
replace the one condemned. Subsequently, the post at Brunel gave me 
the opportunity to face up to the challenge of being more constructive 
and, in over-ambitious ignorance towards the beginning of my work 
there, I not only proposed to find an explanation of landscape quality 
in non-positivist terms, but to use this to produce prescriptions for 
the process of landscape planning. The latter proposal soon had to go 
by the board because, in pursuing research in the former area, so 
immense and involved a subject was uncovered that all the time 
* D-ýoronýoc U9 h1 nw 1 
available was consumed in trying to make some sort of sense out of it. 
Although completely falling to cross the theory/practice barrier, I 
would still contend, given my interests in rural planning, that this 
is a vital crossing to make, and still hope that others will be able 
to make it. 
The body of the present work endeavours to furnish a theoretical 
explanation of landscape quality; an explanation intended to be 
satisfactory in the light of personal preconceptions. One of the 
prime contentions of the non-positivist argument is that 
preconceptions are unavoidable and so it is better to make them 
explicit at once rather that pretend, as do the hated positivists, 
that they have been eliminated or never existed. Mine are rooted in 
the firm belief, which is not an uncommon one, that different people 
may enjoy the landscape in quite different ways, and that the various 
manners in which they do so must be respected and understood, not 
castigated as naive or incorrect nor reduced to one concrete component 
or set of components. Intuitively, there is something wrong, for 
example, when good quality landscape is held to have a changeable 
relief, 
2 if a Scotsman who has lived most of his life in the Highlands 
can say that the most beautiful scenery he has ever found was the wide 
open flat expanses of Norfolk where he was posted in the War. 
3 It is 
also suspicious when we are informed that everyone essentially 
appreciates landscape as providing the opportunity to see about us and 
to hide from others' sight, 
4 
although nobody actually realised this 
until recently. My prejudice against the idea of there being only one 
basic kind of landscape quality perhaps arises from the particular way 
I enjoy the countryside myself, which is mainly in terms of its 
geology and geomorphology, and has meant that I have always resented 
2 
the implication, put about by those with artistic leanings that I am 
not really appreciating the landscape properly, being devoid of a 
sense of form, space and colour. 
Coming from a planning background where the emphasis is necessarily 
upon emphirical work giving rapid practical results but lacking, in my 
opinion, any adequate theoretical foundation, it was at first 
disappointing to find that, in attempting to remedy this situation, 
there is no widely accepted tradition of thought about the nature of 
rural landscape quality, with the active lines of inquiry and areas of 
debate that usually accompany a defined academic discipline. Instead, 
there appeared to be only a small number of scattered t-hinke rs, a 
dozen or so in the eighteenth century and rather fewer in the 
twentieth, who have directly attempted to deal with the question of 
why the landscape has qualitative value and, moreover, none of their 
answers quite accorded with my own preconceptions. But they were of 
enormous assistance because among this tiny group, from say 
Shaftesbury to Appleton, one custom at least had become established - 
that of the amateur. Whatever the real character of landscape 
quality, it seems to demand a multi-disciplinary approach, forcing 
investigators into several normally separate fields where, in some at 
least, they are bound to be complete novices. The intrepid few stride 
in and out of philosophy, theology, anthropology, aesthetics, 
psychology, sociology, history, geography, painting, biology, 
landscape architecture, literature and so on; the present effort being 
no exception. 
3 
Almost total reliance has been placed upon the findings of others 
working within these disciplines. No new factual discoveries have 
been made, and so point by point very little originality will be found 
in the dissertation that follows. What is being offered is a 
speculative interpretation, demonstrating the connections to be made 
between diverse pieces of existing knowledge deemed relevant to the 
subject of landscape quality. Research proceeded by means of a 
literature survey of the fields mentioned. The frequent citing of 
references is meant to serve as recognition of one of the major faults 
of any multi-disciplinary study, which is not overcome here either, 
namely the superficial and possibly inaccurate treatment meted out to 
many of the individual contributory disciplines. Firstly, any field 
of inquiry that, unlike this sort of landscape research, has centuries 
of concentrated and extensive thinking behind it, will have attained 
highly complex and subtle levels of analysis which are often 
impossible for the amateur to fully comprehend, much less convey in 
brief overview. References constitute a reminder of where deeper 
specialist discussions may be found. Secondly, an academic discipline 
rarely presents a united front. Quite fundamental differences, over 
which there may be virulent controversy, often occur between opposing 
schools of thought within one field, but the monster multi- 
disciplinarian will select out the faction most suitable to the 
proposition in hand while ignoring the rest. For example, in dealing 
with psychological considerations, I have completely passed over 
Skinner's stimulus-response model, because I believe it to be 
antipathetic to an understanding of landscape quality, but within 
psychology it has been of great importance. The references given 
should indicate the faction within any discipline upon which the 
ensuing argument depends. 
4 
Given the inevitable drawbacks of crudity and naivety, only properly 
appreciated as my research progressed, plus the very strong common 
sense idea, often brought home to me, that the experience of landscape 
is something so intensely and intimately personal as to be only 
debased by explaining and writing about it, there is the question of 
why the present enterprise was not abandoned entirely. Apart from 
being unable to bear the thought of two years work going down the 
drain, the answer primarily has to be because, like the mountain, 
landscape quality is there. For a start, certain people - the 
evaluators and the amateur theorists - have thought fit to deal with 
it, but in ways that are often unacceptable because they afforded too 
little respect to the aforementioned personal individuality. As 
already stated, I felt that someone at least had to make the effort to 
dispute with the : "you may think your enjoyment of landscape is 
unique to yourself, but we are sorry to reveal that it all boils down 
to factor x" brigade. But, more importantly, in studying for my 
M. Phil. thesis, I had come upon the notion which, afterwards deployed 
when venturing into various specialist fields, disclosed quantities of 
material, already extant, concerning many aspects of landscape 
quality; material demanding to be sewn together. The notion, to be 
found in both the philosophy and psychology of perception, goes by 
several names, most commonly: 'conceptual scheme' or 'schema'. 
'conceptual framework' or 'frame of reference, ' and has the advantage 
of being so flexible, some would say so nebulous, that it may either 
be very general and abstract or very particular and concrete. As will 
later transpire, this feature assumed a central importance within the 
conception of landscape quality, but it also allowed such an amount of 
information to be located that I have been more or less overwhelmed by 
5 
the complexity and extent of the subject, while developing an 
awareness of the tremendous amount I do not know. 
Finally, there is something of a tradition among the miniscule 
community I am aspiring to join, of referring to the author's own 
profound feeling for landscape as an inspiration for their work. I am 
not sure whether this is true for me, as I seem to have been spurred 
on mostly by intellectual indignation, but, despite the gruelling and 
depressing times that always seem to accompany the manufacture of a 
thesis, I am now beginning to appreciate that I have been left with a 
lifetime's opportunity to find and explore the many paths to enjoying 
landscape. 
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PROLOGUE: * 
What is rural landscape quality? 
It would be convenient at the outset to explain what was meant by the 
term 'rural landscape quality', but as the whole thesis comprises a 
search for this explanation, no concise definition is possible. 
However, a few preliminary comments upon the subject are necessary in 
order to delineate the area within which the ensuing action is to take 
place. Of the three words, 'rural', for current purposes, presents 
the least difficulty, and the following discussion will specifically 
cover the countryside as opposed to the town. This need not 
completely exclude the concerns of the comparatively larger volume of 
work done upon the qualities of urban areas, 
' but architecture, 
community spaces, route networks and so on, are, of course, only one 
set of elements to be found in the countryside. 
'Landscape' is much more problematic, as indicated by the efforts made 
to define it which are nearly always found in the first few paragraphs 
of any work dealing with landscape. It requires the greatest care in 
making the initial interpretation because upon that will depend the 
scope and direction of all subsequent analysis. The word has long and 
complicated etymological antecedents which, with respect to the 
countryside at least, have left it with three distinct connotations. 
2 
The first two, which tend to be the more frequently cited, 
3 
are 
strongly pictorial being closely associated with developments in art 
history. From small beginnings in fifteenth century Italy and 
Holland, advances in painting techniques, among other influences, 
encouraged an increasing number of artists to depict the countryside. 
'Landskip', a painting term from the Dutch, was used to describe these 
* References p13 below 7 
representations both when they formed a background to the main 
subject, as was usual in the earlier phases, and when, as was common 
once the genre became established, they were the main subject of 
pictures themselves. The first book in English using 'Landscape' to 
mean a certain kind of painting came out in 1598,4 and the usage has 
continued to the present. 
5 But besides this, around the seventeenth 
century the word took on a new derivation. John Milton (1608 - 1674) 
seems to have been the first published figure to have extended the 
pictorial 'landscape' from art objects to the actual countryside. 
6 
Henceforth, there was a growing tendency, greatly reinforced in 
eighteenth century English aristocratic circles, to consider tracts of 
rural land as artistic compositions, as scenes, 
7 
and this usage too is 
still current. 
The idea of seeing the countryside as a picture has had enormous 
influence, an influence that has at once been theoretically beneficial 
and detrimental. Beneficial, because it calls attention to the 
presence of a human observer. For there to be a scene, a painting or 
nowadays a photograph, someone, whether artist or not, must choose the 
viewpoint and notice the constituent elements. 'Landscape', then, 
embodies an inescapable tension between the physically real landscape 
'out there' and the mentally real landscape 'in here' - between the 
objective and the subjective. 
8 However, as will later transpire, 
there is a certain strand of thinking which struggles to avoid this 
inherent tension, and in so doing, the detrimental side of an overly 
pictorial emphasis is sometimes brought out. In such cases, interest 
is focussed upon the purely visual aspects of the countryside, those 
aspects which are often incidentally important to a painter's 
technique, while ignoring the deeper implications that both a picture 
8 
and the countryside itself can convey. A narrow pictorial 
interpretation, for example, fails to encompass the historical nuances 
of W. G. Hoskins' use of 'landscape': 
9 
"I am concerned ... with the ways in which men have cleared the 
natural woodlands; reclaimed marshland, fen and moor; created 
fields out of wilderness; made lanes, roads and footpaths ... " 
or the ecological ones, which are drawn from the German 'landschaft', 
of Angus Hills': 
10 
"Landscape is the mosaic formed by variations in the many 
combinations of non-living and living systems which interact 
within the ecosphere encircling our planet; " 
or the geological ones of Frank Cunningham's: 
11 
"... the earth's physical constitution and its surface relief. " 
Likewise, as Jay Appleton remarks in his description of the way 
different disciplines approach landscape, 
12 'scenery' has been somewhat 
pre-empted by writers on physical geography and geomorphology. 
13 
Dudley Stamp, for instance, says that the purpose of his book, which 
is now something of a standard work, is: 
14 
"... to trace, step by step the building of the British Isles. 
By this means we are able to understand the structure or the 
build of its contrasted regions. We are, in fact, attempting to 
understand the structure and the development of the stage upon 
which the drama of British natural history is played. " 
To account for those many usages which are not strictly pictorial, 
attention should be paid to the third connotation of 'landscape'. It 
is much more ancient than the previous two, and probably provided the 
source of both the Dutch painting term and Milton's extension. In Old 
English, Old Saxon and Old Norse, landscipe/landskipi/landskapr denoted 
9 
a tract of land or province, often a district owned by a certain lord 
or inhabited by a certain group of people. 
15 This is the sense to 
which Dr Johnson (1709 - 1784), who was not very pictorially minded, 
16 
referred when he defined 'landscape' as: "a region"17, while modern 
dictionaries suggest and association of land- with -ship, the suffix 
indicating the state or condition of being something, as in 
'township'. The present work will lean towards this older, more 
abstract concept because it is so malleable, and will incorporate not 
only a narrow pictorial view but also all other aspects as well. 
Such an interpretation may seem slightly vague but, in comparison with 
the import of 'quality', it is crystal clear. 
The defeatist would define 'quality' as the indefinable. Etymology 
offers little help, 
18 
while over the centuries no established findings 
about the nature of this insubstantial phenomenon have been produced 
by philosophers. Here, then, the amateur fool rushes in where most 
professional angels fear to tread. One of the least obscure facets of 
'quality' is that it is never discovered alone, having no independent 
existence-19 Instead, quality always belongs to something, in the 
present case the countryside, and is appreciated by someone; a feature 
that ties in remarkably closely with a point already made about 
'landscape'. Indeed, the two are quite inseparable - 'quality' like 
'scape/ship' indicates the condition of land, what its essential 
character may be, whether, depending on how the countryside is being 
considered, that character be one of property, art, natural science, 
or whatever. But more than that, 'quality' implies a feeling of some 
kind for character, an attachment of value, on the part of the human 
observer, to the land observed. Emotional sensations, that being 
10 
either favourable or unfavourable are at the heart of valuation, spring 
up inevitably, and seem to be born of the tension between object and 
subject, 20 countryside and person, spoken of earlier. They are 
therefore integral to any examination of landscape quality, but pose 
the problem of striking a balance between sterilising them by over- 
rationalisation and sentimentalising them by over-emphasis, both 
longstanding traditions in the landscape arena. 
In addition, it is quite impossible to catalogue feelings for the 
countryside as they extend over an almost infinite range from a gut 
reaction of intense pleasure, to tranquil enjoyment, to cool, carefully 
judged approval, not to mention disgust, terror, depression and 
boredom. Moreover, these sensations appear in innumerable 
circumstances: the enjoyment of autumn colours in the dying light of 
the day; the enjoyment of an ancient field pattern complete with multi- 
species boundary hedges and ridge and furrow; the enjoyment of standing 
on a Millstone Grit edge looking down across a valley of shale to the 
hills of Carboniferous Limestone rising from beneath; and so on also 
add infinitum. In an attempt to cope with the complexities of this 
situation, Yi-Fu Tuan has gone to the extent of inventing a new word - 
'topophilia' - to cover: "all the human being's affective ties with the 
material environment. "21 However, although it provides a useful way of 
thinking about, and referring to, landscape quality, the present work 
will not employ 'topophilia' because the introduction of more 
specialised terms than absolutely necessary is inadvisable when 
impinging on several different disciplines. 'Landscape quality', on 
the other hand, is sufficiently nebulous to provoke little disturbance 
when brought into contact with various specialised interests. 
11 
The dangers of becoming too technical are well exemplified-by what has 
happened to the word 'beauty'. As a common-place, or as in the often 
quoted definition of St Thomas Aquinas (c1226 - 1274): "Let that be 
called beauty, the very perception of which pleases", 
22 it would be 
ideal for current purposes, along with 'ugliness'. However, 'beauty' 
was once so closely defined by certain commentators on landscape 
value, 
23 that the effect was to produce a widespread reluctance to use 
it except in a specific aesthetic manner, and even there it has now 
largely been rejected. 
But what is rural landscape quality? To go beyond superficial 
semantics, that can provide only the broadest of answers, and to ask 
why pieces of countryside are valued, is to enter an immense and 
difficult terrain. Fortunately, explorations have been made there 
before and so the area is not uncharted. Consequently, in looking for 
any deeper answers, it would be well to consider some of the latest 
work that deals with the subject. There now follows a review of a 
selection of twentieth century literature which has taken rural 
landscape quality as its direct and primary concern. 
12 
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I THE CONTEXT* 
The range of literature 
In contrast to its eighteenth century counterpart, which perhaps with 
hindsight appears to have centred around two more-or-less definite 
philosophical positions, ' the body of modern analytical literature 
lacks cohesion. Although relatively few in number, twentieth century 
writers have not adhered to any prevailing theoretical approach, and 
sometimes even seem hardly to be aware of each other, which means that 
there is little agreement between their explanations of the nature of 
rural landscape quality. The field, if such a collection of amateurs 
may be so called, being a disparate one, is difficult to review 
systematically. Here it has been arranged into a loose kind of 
continuum, similar to one often used by aestheticians, 
2 
stretching 
from objective to subjective emphases. 
3 
Eight positions along the continuum will be distinguished, each of 
which represents an alternative way of understanding landscape 
quality. While varying in the extent of support they have received, 
none have (yet) become widely accepted, and to demonstrate why this 
should be so, some of the criticisms that may be levelled at each 
type of analysis will be mentioned. In addition, each position will 
be characterised according to a set of factors that become 
substantially modified as the range is traversed, the most basic of 
these being the role that perception is given to play. 
If the phenomenon of landscape quality embodies a tension between the 
landscape 'out there' and the landscape 'in here', then the process of 
perception somehow mediates between the two. Landscape only enters 
* References P64-68 below. 
14 
people's awareness through their perceptual faculties, and an idea of 
what these faculties are like must be present in any analytical 
discussion, if only implicitly. Further, any interpretation of the 
nature of landscape quality is contingent upon the model of perception 
employed, and across the range of literature different models may be 
found. The treatment perception receives is, then, a kind of 
touchstone for the reviewer especially as many other factors arise out 
of it, including: the level of detail an author is prepared to ascribe 
to actual manifestations of landscape quality; how far such 
manifestations are thought to vary; whether prognostications as to 
'good' and 'bad' landscape are provided; and the extent to which 
cultural considerations are permitted to penetrate the analysis. 
The spectrum of literature discussed below begins at a position where 
qualitative value is considered to be solely the property of the 
physical landscape, the countryside itself. When mentioned, 
perception, which does after all belong to the subject not the object, 
is rendered in so straightforward a manner as to make possible the 
direct registration of qualities inherent in the landscape 'out 
there'. As the continuum proceeds, however, the models of perception 
become progressively more complicated. The next four positions 
explain landscape quality in terms of: the workings of the eye; shapes 
in the visual cortex of the brain; sexual fixations; and national 
culture - all of which are concentrated more closely upon the 
perceiving subject. But their proponents still maintain an interest 
in the objective by arguing that these psycho-perceptual mechanisms 
produce the same landscape 'in here' for the whole of humanity, or in 
the fourth instance, everyone of the same nationality. Finally, there 
are three positions which understand landscape quality from the point of 
15 
view of biological instincts, cognitive structures, and phenomenology. 
They take an almost completely subjective stance and give validity to 
at least a certain degree of variation between landscapes 'in here', 
thus taking on board a feature of landscape quality that other 
positions usually dismiss as distortion namely, individual and group 
bias. But to return to the case most hostile to such tolerance. 
Physical standards 
The difficulty in examining this first type of literature for any 
answers to the question: 'what is rural landscape quality? ' is that it 
is almost exclusively concerned with the estimation of the degree to 
which quality is present, and explanations as to how or why the 
material being estimated comes to be present are rarely offered. 
4 
Most, but not all, landscape evaluation techniques5 fall into this 
category, and although it is a little unfair to look to them for any 
deep analysis, since they were usually devised rapidly under the 
pressure of some immediate planning purpose, they necessarily ential 
certain unspoken assumptions which appear to be relatively common 
among those making a first, or brief, encounter with the problems 
posed by landscape quality. 
The motivation behind landscape evaluation techniques was the effort 
to discover a set of specifications which would enable planners to 
conclusively demonstrate that some areas within their jurisdiction 
were qualitatively better than others; apparently a useful exercise 
especially in a structure planning context. 
6 A typical example is 
the technique devised by the landscape architect C. R. V. TandY7 and 
applied in West Sussex8 in the early 1970's. Briefly, it consisted 
of: identifying the amount of arable land, grass land, heath, scrub, 
16 
trees, undulation, water and artificial structures within one 
kilometre squares of countryside; allocating a score to each of these 
physical characteristics, and to the same characteristics seen in 
views out of the square, on a scale of -2 (intolerable) to +2 (highly 
desirable); and then computing the scores to obtain a figure which 
indicated the landscape quality of the whole square. But where was 
the qualitative value this final figure represented supposed to come 
from? Presumably it resided within the vegetation, hills, rivers and 
buildings that were so assiduously counted judged, measured and 
mapped, and could be directly and unproblematically perceived by 
whoever was engaged in these activities. Qualitative value was being 
pictured as a sort of magic ingredient inside the physical features 
making up the landscape (or 'components' as they are sometimes called) 
that would automatically stimulate an appreciative response in any 
observer, irrespective of their personal characteristics. 
Early approaches of this kind met with considerable criticism not, 
perhaps surprisingly, in the main for their unthinking acceptance of 
the objective existence of landscape quality, but, paradoxically, for 
being 'too subjective' about it9 in that they openly relied upon the 
judgements of one or two assessors who were not necessarily capable of 
proper appreciation. One of the greatest stumbling blocks for the 
evaluators has been the complete absence of any independent device, 
like a thermometer or litmus, to measure landscape quality. 
Ultimately, estimations of value have to be based on someone's 
reaction to landscape and these reactions are never as consistent as 
thermometers' are to temperature or litmus to pH, so the question of 
whose reaction is involved always remains. Barrie Needhaml° neatly 
demonstrated that when four groups, with five planning students in 
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each, applied the same evaluation technique to the same area they 
arrived at different results. Results also differed when slightly 
different techniques were used on the same area. But it was still 
felt, in certain circles, that an evaluation technique could be 
devised which would standardise reactions to landscape in a way that 
was 'as objective as possible'; a recurrent phrase which not only 
implies that landscape quality might be assessed neutrallyll but that 
it is an intrinsic property of the object in question. 
Who, then, are the people able to perceive the qualitative property of 
landscape most clearly? Who are likely to make estimations of 
landscape value which, although probably not in total agreement, are 
sufficiently close together to be consistent and reliable? Long 
before landscape evaluation techniques appeared, members of certain 
professional groups had tended to believe themselves especially 
endowed through their training and experience with the ability to cut 
through the superficial and variable kind of reactions exhibited by 
lay people to the real and constant values beneath, and this argument 
was taken up in some of the second generation techniques. The most 
sophisticated of these was developed over five years at Manchester 
University, 12 and in the report of this exercise may be found, at 
last, some explicit indication of the mode of understanding landscape 
quality and the model of perception upon which the proposed technique 
is based. 
The Manchester method approached landscape quality on two related 
fronts - expert estimations of value and physical components. At the 
heart of the technique, almost buried beneath an enormously 
complicated statistical analysis that had replaced the few simple sums 
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of the first generation and cast a suitably scientific aura, were the 
judgements of landscape quality to be made by people with "experience 
and insight": 13 
"... it is suggested that useful and acceptable assessments of 
visual quality can be obtained if observers are selected from 
among those people with a high degree of training and experience 
in the visual arts and appreciation of landscape. " 
The environment and landscape design professions - planners and 
landscape architects - and painters and writers were mentioned, while 
individuals with a known attachment to the survey area were 
excluded. 
14 The assessments made by a group of such experts were 
used, via intricate statistical operations, 
15 to place fixed values 
upon a series of landscape components; and then according to the 
amount of each component mapped and measured within kilometre squares 
of countryside, overall landcape quality was predicted. In comparison 
to the first generation of techniques, many more components were 
itemised while each tended to be more specific. When the method was 
applied in Cheshire, 
16 for instance, 44 components were listed, three 
of which dealt with physical relief. 
The drawbacks to using components with fixed values as a means of 
arriving at an estimate of total landscape quality were well 
recognised both by the Manchester group and by the report of the 
application of the same method in Clwyd. 
17 Firstly, even with a 
computer to cope with extensive lists of components "it is impossible 
and inefficient to include 'everything"'; 
18 it is impossible to 
recognise evey single component with its qualitative contribution, and 
if they are not recognised what kind of contribution are they making? 
Oddly enough, in a technique that employed landscape experts, 
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'intangible components' such as texture, colour and spatial 
relationships, which landscape architects often consider to be of 
central importance, 19 had to be omitted because they could not be 
defined quantitatively as area, length or number present. Secondly, 
the authors decided that an increase in the amount of a 'good' 
component need not necessarily produce a corresponding increase in 
overall quality: 20 
"For example, deciduous woods and parkland stood out as factors 
contributing to high value and the greater proportion of those in 
a tract the greater the predicted value. In practice, values 
would increase up to a certain proportion but would then level 
off. " 
Thirdly, it was found that specific components with fixed worth tended 
to change in character from place to place in ways that changed their 
contribution to landscape quality but which could not be accounted for 
by simply measuring the amount of a component that was present: 
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"Area cover is the measurement used for woodlands: the 
implications of this are that the same coverage of woodland in 
similar situations will always make the same contribution to 
landscape quality. In practice the impact could be rather 
different -a tract of farmland containing one rectangular block 
of woodland would probably be much less attractive than a tract 
of farmland with several smaller and irregularly outlined clumps 
of woodland of the same total acreage. It must be admitted that 
this is a weakness in any method using standardised values as a 
basis for prediction. " 
When the attempt is actually made, then, to enunciate the number and 
nature of particular physical features donating their qualitative 
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value to landscape, inconsistencies stand revealed which surely serve 
to undermine the objectivist assumption central to such an endeavour. 
Probably the only recent occasion upon which this assumption has been 
made quite explicit is in the Manchester report, where it is 
unequivocally stated that one of the criteria which must apply if the 
defined set of components is to be acceptable is: 
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"That the most important contributions to the visual quality of 
landscape are all to be found within the landscape, and not 
within the observer. " 
Even the authors of the earlier chapters of the report carefully steer 
clear of this position because no substantial or independent 
justification of either the existence of these contributions or the 
manner in which they may be ascertained is forthcoming. Given the 
obvious variability in lay opinion the implication is, as already 
mentioned, that only those who have been properly trained will really 
know about the essential qualitative ingredients in landscape. In the 
past, it was quite acceptable to argue that only a sensibility refined 
by years of learning was capable of a proper appreciation of the 
quality, or beauty, in landscape that had been put there by God and 
was also akin to some Platonic ideal-23 In fact, the best exponent of 
the proposition that the trained alone are fully acquainted with the 
detailed physical standard existing independent of their knowledge and 
to which the landscape 'out there' either does or does not conform 
(this being the import of any exercise that specifies expertly valued 
components) is the eighteenth century amateur artist, traveller and 
clergyman, William Gilpin (1724-1804). 24 Although the theoretical 
backing he furnished for his arguments was brief, it was far more 
meticulous than anything produced by a modern writer taking a similar 
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stance, perhaps because a more concrete foundation than the God-given 
ideal, that Gilpin relied upon, is expected of the latter. No one, as 
yet, has provided such a foundation, although Eric Newton, 
25 
the art 
critic, has gone some way towards it by suggesting that beauty in 
nature is related to the inherent functions of natural patterns and 
forces. The most beautiful nettle leaf is the most efficient nettle 
leaf, and the oak tree most efficient at producing acorns would be the 
most beautiful oak tree. This does, however, still leave the question 
of who decides what constitutes efficiency, and Newton's point that 
mountains formed mainly by stratification have too many straight lines 
and are therefore unsatisfactory, would probably be disputed by 
geologists. Newton also confusingly mentions that humans ascribe 
differing levels of beauty to different natural phenomena, for 
example, preferring horses to pigs because of their speed and strength 
which humans desire for themselves, thus bringing in a concept of 
associations which does not cohere with his functional approach. 
This is not to say that today, as long as an explanation is not 
pressed for too closely, reliance is never placed upon the superiority 
of expert judgement with respect to landscape, presumably in the 
belief that it is tapping the values resident there; a belief which 
possibly owes something to Gilpin's impact on thought about landscape 
quality. And, especially following the tedious convolutions of 
statistical evaluation techniques, a systematic division of the 
landscape into components is no longer considered a necessary adjunct 
to this kind of analysis, since, as is often argued, 
26 
the qualitative 
value belonging to the whole landscape is greater than the sum of the 
value belonging to the parts. The Countryside Commission for 
Scotland, for example, recently selected forty of "the very best 
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scenic areas for particular care and attention as part of the national 
heritage"27 on the basis of straightforward assessments made by a group 
which included: "members with acknowledged expertise in the fields of 
assessment of scenic quality and rural land use. "28 Colin McKerchar's 
review of this exercise began: 29 
"You have to have experienced the torments of systematised and 
'scientific' appraisal methodologies, either by reading them or 
preferably by trying them yourself, to be able to see the value 
of a simple solution. The Commission, having themselves been 
through the agonies with their previous document 'A Planning 
Classification of Scottish Landscape Resources' prepared for them 
by Land Use Consultants, 30 have emerged from the gloom of 
dissection, enumeration and reassembly into the light of 
simplicity and directness. Their approach is based on the idea 
that they know what attractive landscape is and they know how to 
recognise it when they see it. " 
At present there seems to be no way in which the sentiments expressed 
in that last sentence can be logically refuted, as they are internally 
quite consistent - if you are an expert and you know what the true 
value of a landscape is, then anyone who differs from you must be 
wrong. It would, however, be most helpful to provide outsiders with a 
properly worked out explanation of the purely objective nature of 
rural landscape quality, although the possibility of doing so is in 
doubt as even McKechar complained that distinctively Scottish cultural 
and historic aspects, which are essentially subjective, had been 
omitted from the valuation of Scotland's scenic heritage. 
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A certain amount has, of course, recently been written to substantiate 
expert opinion, but is is noticeable that when such work displays any 
depth of enquiry, landscape quality is never considered to be wholly 
the property of the object. The third chapter of the Manchester 
report31 is a case in point. Here the purely objectivist position is 
rejected, on the vaguely mentioned grounds that an opposing school of 
aesthetic thought places beauty entirely within the mind of the 
observer, in favour of the idea that high visual quality in landscape 
may be equated with32 
"... landscape beauty which derives both from the object, and the 
eye and mind of the observer - both sources interacting to give 
pleasure to the senses. " 
In discussing the properties of the object, first of all, the report 
puts considerable emphasis upon "inherent formal qualities" - shape, 
proportion, colour etc. - and the relationship between them - spacing, 
scale, composition etc. - and remarks: 
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"It is usually believed that there must be a degree of order and 
unity in a formal relationship to produce pleasurable aesthetic 
feeling.... A landscape may be perceived as beautiful if objects 
are in an ordered relationship to their setting, eg. a large 
well-landscaped reservoir in the uplands, where there is no 
conflict of scale between the reservoir itself and the 
surrounding landscape. " 
The characteristics of the human observer are discussed next - 
physiological faculties, cultural background and personal attributes 
such as temprement, education and upbringing. Little is said about 
physiology, but much about cultural and personal factors, probably 
because once these are referred to within the context of landscape 
quality, a great deal of potential variability: comes flooding in; 
indeed, so much so that C. R. V. Tandy, who had once advocated landscape 
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evaluation, 34 has recently been arguing against the application of one 
simple standard because of the 'anarchy' in landscape tastes 
prevailing in modern society. 
35 Taste, fashion, preferences, 
"aff_ectation, novelty, whimsy and caprice"36 are the ephemeral sources 
of variation arising from cultural changes and personal bias, including 
close attachments to particular places. They are lumped together in the 
Manchester report under the heading 'associational factors'. It then 
goes on to suggest that, as far as possible, the influence of these 
factors must be reduced in making assessments of landscape quality, 
and since: 
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"It seems inevitable that associational responses will have 
greater effect on the judgement of observers who have less 
capacity for perceiving beauty, " 
trained observers should be used because they are able to exclude most 
personal considerations from their evaluative judgements of landscape. 
Most, but not all - the report accepts that expert opinion on landcape 
quality will be affected by some "cultural and other influences, " but 
as these cannot be separated out on any one assessment, 
38 
they are 
subsequently ignored. 
However, the work of Kenneth Craik, 
39 
an American psychologist who has 
gone one step further, is cited briefly because he has argued that 
even lay people can distinguish between two kinds of landscape 
appreciation: firstly, the 'preferential judgement' which is subject 
to inter-cultural, intra-cultural and individual variations, and 
expresses an entirely subjective appreciation; secondly, the 
'comparative' or 'esthetic appraisal' which is much more consistent 
because it judges landscape with respect to some implicit or explicit 
standard that is kept and renewed by landscape aestheticians and 
professionals. No one trained in the philosophical discipline of 
aesthetics has actually produced an aesthetic standard of landscape 
since 1805,40 but despite this, independent support for the existence 
of such a standard is said to be obtainable as when lay people are 
requested to do so, they are able to make judgements similar to those 
of experts. However, this was not borne out by a small exercise 
recently conducted by D. R. Helliwell. 
41 On the whole Craik's 
substantiation of expert opinion appears rather coercive, an attribute 
which comes out in the following statement: 
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"If an observer were forced to adopt a certain psychological set, 
his assessment would reflect the values that he ascribes to a 
larger group. The variation in responses of several individuals 
would be less than the variation in preferential judgements of the 
same individuals. Therefore... comparative appraisal may be more 
useful in public decision making. 
In other words, when you have been made to think like we do (refer to 
a common standard) all these aggravating differences of opinion 
(personal bias) will go away and we can get on with our job. 
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But to put aside these objections for a moment, if landscape quality 
is not solely the property of the object, nor properly derived from 
the cultural and personal characteristics of the subject, where does 
it come from? Neither the Manchester report or Craik's work are 
specific about this, but, as they tend to equate landscape quality 
with visual quality, it may perhaps be assumed that they are relying 
upon the one set of attributes of the subject that are left, and which 
are also broadly the same for all, namely, the physiological structure 
of the eye and brain which facilitates the process of visual 
perception. The next two positions in the range of literature to be 
described will cover approaches made in the twentieth century towards 
landscape quality through investigations of the physiological nature 
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of perception. From this point in the range onwards, at least 
something of the characteristics of the perceiving subject are held to 
be involved in any consideration of landscape quality. The perceptual 
process itself thereby becomes problematic and has to be explicitly 
analysed in some way, and although standards are sometimes provided 
for estimating 'high' or 'low' quality landscape, they are slightly 
less exact, not being couched in terms of actual trees, rivers, hills 
and other components. 
The workings of the eye 
In this very small category may be found those who have taken the 
adage: 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' quite literally. On 
occasion there are hints of it in works that concentrate mainly upon 
cultural and historical aspects of appreciation, although the link 
between culture and the physiological functioning of the eye is 
usually left unclear. R. L. Heathcote, 
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mentions that because of the 
limited angle of vision of human eyes a broad panoramic view tends to 
be unattractive unless it also has vertical depth, before going on to 
discuss the scientific, romantic, colonial, national and ecological 
visions of Australia which developed among European settlers as they 
came to terms with a strange landscape. In the same way, Paul 
Shepard45 suggests that the eyes automatically abstract vertical and 
horizontal lines from the surroundings because they evolved in 
arboreal conditions when our primate ancestors were leaping from 
branch to branch, but does not pursue this when tracing the eighteenth 
century revolution in landscape tastes, or the effect of Christianity 
upon Western attitudes to landscape. 
46 
The one great advocate for the workings of the eye being the sole 
explanatory factor, was the physical geographer and photographer, 
27 
Vaughn Cornish (1862-1948), who was inspired by a speech given by the 
President of the Royal Geographical Society47 to develop a 'science of 
scenic beauty', and who published several books on the subject. 
48 
These proposed the theory that there are two sources of pleasure in 
the visual aspect of scenery: the association of ideas; and the 
'physical satisfactions of the eye' which occur before the observer 
has time to think and either have a predisposing influence upon mental 
associations or appeal directly to the emotions. As the second source 
is basic, landscape quality may be analysed by a system of 
'physiological optics', one of the most important factors involved 
being colour, which is a true pleasure of the eye as an organ of 
sense. Here is Cornish's exposition on the colour green: 
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"I have sought amidst the colours of the natural scene for a line 
of division between those which exercise soothing and exciting 
effects. The green of the young leaf is certainly a cheerful 
colour, some tints verging upon the exciting, as that of larch. 
The darkening foliage of the late summer, whether we regard it as 
soothing or dull, is certainly quiet. Thus the demarcation 
between the soothing and exciting halves of the gamut of colour 
in the natural scene does not come between blue and green, or 
between green and yellow, but mid-way in the band of green. " 
The appreciation of line and form is held to be slightly more 
complicated. According to Cornish: 
50 
"... the more the eye takes in vertically the more it takes in 
horizontally and the less impressive are both dimensions. If one 
may speak of the eye as an organ possessed of personality, I 
should describe this personality as of the kind that can only 
attend to one theme at a time.... By a theme I mean in this 
connection a visual category, and the categories with which I am 
dealing... are height, breadth, distance and area. " 
28 
This means that scenes which fulfil one theme, such as the round- 
topped woods of southern England in their characteristically 
undulating landscape, are visually satisfying, while those which 
offer, say, confusion of vertical and horizontal themes, are not. In 
addition, two kinds of landscape are especially important - woodlands 
and cliffs. Woodlands, because the stereoscopic effect *of trunks 
and boughs greatly enhance the theme of distance; Cornish recommended 
that the New Forest be made a National Park. Cliffs, because these 
offer impressively distant prospects over the sea, especially those of 
100 feet or over in height with a sufficiently sloping cliff face to 
enter into the base of the field of vision so emphasising distance; 
Cornish used cliff height and slope to select lengths of coastline 
requiring preservation. 
Cornish's explanation of rural landscape quality was given at a level 
of detail, then, to enable him to decide quite specifically what were 
'good' or 'bad' landscapes. Of course, he and his supporters did not 
expect that everyone would agree with his assessments, but put any 
lack of consensus down to ignorance of the real beauties of scenery. 
F. W. Gilbert, a geographer, for example, remarked that: 
51 
"... the fact that the countryman does not always appreciate the 
natural beauty of the landscape which surrounds him is not 
surprising: he has not been educated to see it. " 
Paradoxically, it was thought that for the educated their 
sophistications, specialisations, fashions and creeds gave rise to an 
excessive amount of associations of ideas which overlay and perverted 
the true pleasure of the eye and could only be eliminated by learning 
to appreciate the external world directly, as Cornish did. 
52 They 
therefore had to learn to unlearn. 
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But if all knowledge and experience on the part of the observer is 
eliminated leaving only the instinctive reactions of the eye, would 
anything he seen at all? It is now well known that when people who 
have been blind from birth recover their sight (usually by an 
operation to remove cateracts) they initially see a chaos of 
brightness and 'colours. * Only by a- long and arduous effort can their 
brains learn to* distinguish and make sense of shapes and distance, 
some patients failing to do so because they find the difficulties of 
learning insurmountable and become frustrated, depressed and finally 
apathetic, returning to a blind existence although physically their 
eyes are functioning. 53 Moreover, the kind of environment in which 
people learn to see seems to have an influence upon their mode of 
vision. Visual illusion tests have shown, for example, that plain 
dwellers are far more likely than forest dwellers to infer long 
horizontal distances from short vertical drawings. 
54 And even 
something that seems so direct as colour perception has to be mediated 
by mental processes which have been found to categorise the visible 
spectrum according, to some extent at least, to the language that has 
been learnt. For example, English has two separate terms for 'blue' 
and 'green', but only one term for all intensities of 'black' short of 
'grey', while Navaho does not have separate terms for 'blue' and 
'green' but has two terms for different kinds of 'black' . 
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Apart from Cornish's now unacceptable habit of extending a few 
personal experiencies of scenery, carefully described, measured and 
sketched, into general rules goverening landscape quality, his major 
failing was to avoid completely any anatomical consideration of the 
workings of the eye. He assumed that, within certain limitations such 
as the angle of vision and the visible spectrum, the image registered 
by the eye, which stimulated immediate emotional reactions, was a 
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perfect replica of the landscape 'out there'. This is not the case, 
and the eye has been found to be incredibly inefficient in comparison 
to artificial optical systems. 56 The image projected onto the retina 
is distorted by: the different refractive indices of the film of 
tears, the cornea, the aqueous humour, the lens and the vitreous 
humour; the impurities within each of these layers; and aberrations, 
which are not corrected for, due to their spherical shape and 
flexibility. The pupil is constantly subject to three kinds of 
involuntary movement so that the image inverted by the lens is never 
still, and the most sensitive part of the retina is not exactly in 
line with the central axis of the lens where the refractive distortion 
is least. The receptor cells, the rods and cones, are in the deepest 
instead of the uppermost layer of the retina so that the image is 
further warped by nerve cells and blood vessels through which it must 
pass, and the receptors themselves have their vertical axes parallel, 
instead of at right angles, to the light rays. The rods and cones are 
stimulated by the image they finally receive to produce a pattern of 
electrical impulses which go through a series of recoding proceses 
before an extremely vague correlate of the external world reaches the 
visual cortex of the brain. 
Given these deficiencies, no one after Cornish has attempted to 
completely separate the workings of the eye from operations carried 
out by the brain which must decode the nerve impulses it receives if 
visual perception is to be achieved. Neither have the physiological 
reactions of the eye, for example, the dilation of the pupil, been 
found to give any indication of the emotions experienced when looking 
at landscape. 57 As already mentioned, even those writers who have 
more recently remarked upon the physiology of the eye, have paid far 
more attention to culturally derived knowledge. But before considering 
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the integral affect that this subjective factor might have upon 
landscape perception, two positions in the range of literature will be 
discussed which ground their explanations upon the decoding operations 
in the brain that are held to be automatic and universal. 
Shapes in the visual cortex 
The electrical impulses that are generated when light rays impinge 
upon the retina are passed along the optic nerve to an area at the 
back of the cerebral hemispheres known as the visual cortex. Injuries 
to this area of the brain result in blindness, even if the eyes are 
left undamaged. 58 But how does the visual cortex effect a translation 
of incoming nerve messages in a way that allows the perceiver to 
register anything of the landscape 'out there'? One answer to this 
problem was suggested by the Gestalt school of psychology which 
developed in early twentieth century Germany. For a time it had 
considerable influence upon art criticism in Europe and America, and 
has occasionally been extended to theories of landscape quality. 
Among the propositions of the Gestalt school was the idea that the 
visual cortex of the brain consists of a three-dimensional complex of 
electrochemical force fields that embody simple, regular visual 
patterns of shape, colour and space. Depending upon the philosophical 
position taken, these fields were thought to be either inherent, or 
built up in childhood through an association of tactile and visual 
experience. The stimuli arriving from the retina are said to 
be released into the cortical complex and then spontaneously become 
organised to conform with the electrochemical field holding the 
pattern closest to the content of the incoming impulse. 59 go. 60 
" only to the extent to which the confused panorama [a 
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landscape of trees] can be seen as a configuration of clear-cut 
directions, sizes, geometric shapes, colours, can it be said that 
it is actually perceived. " 
Obviously, the physical landscape itself is rarely arranged into neat 
geometrical patterns, but certain scenes give rise to nerve impulses 
from the eye which conform more easily than others to the electro- 
chemical shapes in the visual cortex. The forms of organisation in 
such scenes are 'better' as the brain gravitates towards them because 
they have 'goodness of configuration' or 'good Gestalt'. 
61 Sometimes 
it has been argued that the most appealing configurations are those 
mimicking human posture and behaviour, 
62 for instance, the weeping 
willow hangs passively in a gesture of despair, while the oak towers 
in strength and dignity. But unusually the shapes involved are 
considered to be quite abstract, Gestalt psychology once having been 
used as a critical tool in the discussion of abstract art. 
According to the art critic Rudolf A rnheim, 
63 
the visual configuration 
perceived as a result of the Gestalt process is the psychological 
counterpart of the physiological forces active within the visual 
cortex, and these forces are experienced as properties of the external 
world itself. The subjective operations of the mind are held to take 
place in a physiologically objective manner, and this point has been 
strongly emphasised by AV Trowbridge, 
64 
a psychologist, who argues 
that 'psycho-physiological' or 'bio-rhythmic' codes built into the 
brain resonate with similar codes of order within the outer physical 
appearance of any material environment. This system of resonance, 
which is shared by all people regardless of cultural and other 
influences, makes them respond aesthetically to the autonomous harmony 
of the universe, and therefore constitutes the basis of aesthetic laws 
or a 'code of visual values'. Trowbridge, however, fails to specify 
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this code beyond a few abstract mathematical formulations, and it must 
be admitted that no one has made an explicit Gestalt approach to the 
detailed evaluation of landscape quality. Still, such an approach 
seems to lie behind a method of evaluation devised by Elwood Shafer, 
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director of environmental research with the United States Forest 
Service, as made apparent in a critical discussion of the technique by 
AA Carlson, 66 a philosopher. Although neither author actually refers 
to Gestalt psychology, inferences are made that are very similar to 
those of Arnheim and Trowbridge. Shafer was seeking an objective 
basis for evaluation, in order to facilitate objectivity in decision 
making, and he also replicated his results in Scotland to demonstrate 
the non-cultural nature of landscape quality. 
67 
Briefly, Shafer's technique was developed as follows. One hundred 
black and white photographs were taken in the wilder parts of western 
and eastern America, each then being divided into zones of vegetation, 
water, rock and so forth. These zones were measured by covering the 
photographs with a 0.25 inch grid, the number of squares and their 
edges being used to calculate the area and perimeter length of all the 
zones within each picture. In this way, 46 possible variables were 
obtained to describe the photographs which were next shown to campers 
and day visitors in the Adirondacks who were asked to place a score on 
each one indicating their level of preference for it. This 
information together with the 46 variables was analysed by computer, 
and an equation of six of the variables with several weightings was 
derived which explained 66% of the variation in preference scores: 
68 
34 
"Y = 184.8 - 0.5436 X1 - 0.09298 X2 + 0.002069 (X1 . X3) 
+ 0.0005538 (X1 . X4) - 0.002596 
(X3 . X5) 
+ 0.001634 (X2 . X6) 
- 0.008441 (X4 . X6) - 0.0004131 (X4 . X5) 
+ 0.0006666 X12 + 0.0001327 X52 
where: Y= preference score 
X1 = perimeter of immediate vegetation 
X2 = perimeter of intermediate non-vegetation 
X3 = perimeter of distant vegetation 
X4 = area of intermediate vegetation 
X5 = area of any kind of water 
X6 = area of distant non-vegetation. " 
It was then proposed to use this equation to predict landscape quality 
as part of the planning process. 
Carlson has properly pointed out that: 
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"The methodology of the landscape preference model is completely 
formalist in that this methodology presupposes that the 
'aesthetic quality of different landscapes' can be determined by 
means of measuring only formal aspects of photographs. The zones 
which are measured are initially identified in terms of content 
(eg distant vegetation) but only the measurements of the shapes 
of the zones, not their contents, figure into the calculation of 
overall value for the photograph. The measurements of perimeter 
and area of zones are essentially measurements of certain shapes 
and lines. Thus ... the 'elements within an environment', when 
considered aesthetically, seem to be for Shafer 'shapes, sizes 
and colours' rather than trees, shrubs, and rocks. " 
Now, to defend himself against the attack that Carlson proceeds to 
make upon the formalist assumption, Shafer might have depoloyed a few 
35 
Gestalt arguments, just as certain critics and aestheticians in the 
art world have substantiated their reliance on shape, line and 
proportion by referring to the brain's supposed tendency to seize upon 
patterns. 
70 Indeed, the Manchester group might also have mentioned 
Gestalt psychology when discussing the formal qualities of 
landscape, 71 but perhaps they did not do so because Gestalt ideas have 
suffered something of an eclipse in recent years. 
There are at least two grounds for criticising the idea that shapes 
are pre-programmed into the brain and act as the only means of visual 
perception. First, despite Trowbridge's72 suggestion that the inbuilt 
code of visual values might be studied through neural research of 
brain rhythmns, no independent evidence for the existence of 
electrochemical force fields within the visual cortex has been 
obtained. This lack of any electrical or chemical means of detecting 
such formal fields has been most damaging from a psychological point 
of view. 
73 But secondly, and more importantly with respect to 
landscape, quality does not always appear to be solely a matter of 
shapes and lines and the relationships between them. 
In the earlier stages of Gestalt theory, it was postulated that high 
qualitative value went together with maximum regularity and simplicity 
of shape74 since, according to Arnheim, 
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physicists had shown that 
all natural force fields strive to distribute themselves in the 
simplest way. Likewise, the forces in the visual cortex would seek to 
re-establish the most regular of formal patterns upon incoming visual 
stimuli, satisfaction resulting when total simplicity was achieved. 
This could be applied to some abstract art, but was difficult to 
maintain with reference to landscape where, from the eighteenth 
century onwards, there has been a strong aesthetic emphasis upon 
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irregularity of shape and line. Arnheim, however, later dealt with 
this objection76 by arguing that not only did the brain respond to 
'rational shape', governed by simple principles such as straightness 
and curvature: 
"The square is a rational shape for every person with an 
unimpaired brain... " 
it also reacted positively to certain 'irrational' shapes! Even though 
these were not geometrically regular, they could produce the 
impression of complete lawfulness, and when disturbed upset the 
balance of the whole. Arnheim illustrated the 'goodness' of 
irrational figures by referring to the controlled irregularity of 
Japanese gardens, but gave no specific examples of the shapes he had 
in mind. Perhaps Shafer could have said that he had described them 
with his equation. 
The problem is that as soon as attempts are made to get away from 
completely regular geometrical forms, considerations other than the 
purely formal can creep in. Even the delicate assymetry of Japanese 
gardens was a creation and expression of deeply held philosophical and 
religious beliefs. 
77 Gestalt psychology, however, attempted to 
operate within a cultural vacuum, developing under laboratory 
conditions where simple shapes, rarely to be seen in the environment 
outside, were used as experimental material. It was found that 
uncompleted figures were perceived as complete, for example, an array 
of equally spaced dots was seen as organised into columns and rows, 
and such tendencies were construed as general laws of perception, 
although subjects involved in visual experiments may produce variable 
reactions as soon as the material becomes less geometrically regular 
and closer to their usual environmental experience. To take one case, 
JW Bagby78 discovered that if subjects of different nationalities 
37 
were shown scenes from two different countries at the same time, one 
to each eye, they would see only the picture that had been taken in 
their home country, an indication that personal knowledge can be an 
over-riding factor in contrived situations of perceptual conflict. 
The part that this factor plays in shape perception becomes much more 
obvious once outside the laboratory. For example, Frank Cunningham79 
mentions that as soon as the pioneer concepts of peneplane remnants 
and constant slopes were advertised sufficiently widely, 
geomorphologists proceeded to see a rash of these forms in landscapes 
long familiar to them but which they had never noticed before. 
Similarly, Peter Howard, 
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a geographer, could not accept paintings of 
a Norweigan landscape he knew well which featured V-shaped wedges 
lying on their sides, until the artist had explained that these shapes 
were made by descending mountain ridges combined with their 
reflections in adjacent lakes. Howard had previously been looking at 
the shapes of the mountains alone. 
It is Carlson, in his critique of Shafer's strict formalism, who most 
tellingly demonstrates the inadequacy of considering rural landscape 
quality to be simply a matter of visual configurations. He points out 
that the significance certain landscapes may have - the austerity of 
deserts or the serenity of quiet meadows - which makes an important 
contribution to their qualitative value, cannot be wholly accounted 
for in analyses depending upon shape and line, and also that these 
terms can lead their protagonists into inconsistencies. Thus: 
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"... power lines often detract from the ... value of the natural 
environment. The loss of ... value, however, can neither be 
appreciated or evaluated in purely formal terms for, from a purely 
formalist point of view, such power lines are not only often 
aesthetically attractive in themselves, but in many cases 'fit' 
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within an environment such that the whole is an aesthetically 
attractive formal design. Sometimes a power line can even 
help to 
'frame' and/or balance a landscape view. " 
Unfortunately, Carlson does not explain why power lines are actually 
unattractive, why deserts are austere or meadows serene. He seems to 
think that these qualities are intrinsic to the landscape 'out there', 
and goes on to conclude that they may be only properly appreciated by 
'environmental critics' who are able to suitably temper formalism with 
their extensive knowledge and developed sensibilities; a return to the 
inviolability of expert judgement exhibited at the first position in 
the range of literature. 82 
Be that as it may, the proposition that landscape quality is 
exclusively visual quality has been challenged effectively. When 
accepted, as it has been in much of the preceeding work that has been 
discussed, the proposition seems to tempt researchers into simplistic 
models of perception where the terms shape, line and colour become 
all-powerful, and everything else is eliminated to a quite nonsensical 
degree. For a start, outside the controlled conditions of the 
laboratory and the art gallery, although perception may still be 
predominantly visual, it is informed by the other senses too, a point 
stressed by several authors. 
83 Thus, the perceived landscape 'in 
here' is usually made up of much more than what is seen through the 
eyes, being compounded of the sounds, smells and feel of the 
countryside - birds singing, muck spreading, wind freezing: 
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"... beauty in Nature resides not only in the eye of the beholder 
but in his nose, his ears and his finger-tips. " 
And it is noticeable that with less emphasis being placed upon vision 
and purely visual qualities, as occurs from this point onwards in the 
range of literature, greater importance is given to the significance and 
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meaning that is understood by the perceiver to be associated with 
landscape, which goes both behind and beyond the registration of shape 
and colour. As will transpire, there have been various explanations 
of how such meanings, other than the solely formal, are derived. One 
which posits a universal attribution of significance to landscape may 
be found in the following position on the literary continuum. 
Sexual fixations 
It was Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), of course, who declared that: 
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"... the concept of the beautiful is rooted in the soil of sexual 
excitment; " 
and, on occasion, this maxim has been applied to landscape quality. 
The implication is that humanity possesses certain inbuilt 
psychological tendencies which cause the landscape to be invariably 
perceived as being analogous to the human body, and to attribute 
sexual significance to physical features which makes them especially 
alluring. One of the main efforts to explain landscape perception in 
Freudian terms has been made by Paul Shepard86 who has argued that 
valleys, gorges, caves and hollows, which have widespread and 
persistent appeal, are seen as vaginas, and provide a primordial view 
of the relationship of man to his environment as being similar to that 
of a child to earth mother. But men seem to have certain complexes 
about their mothers, and Shepard87 suspects that in male dominated 
societies hatred of women spills over into hatred of mother earth 
which leads to her ruthless exploitation by man. Likewise, 
Yi-Fu Tuan88 mentions that for both Chinese traditionalists and Congo 
Pygmies, fire is male, phallic and conscious-giving while water is 
female, passive and death-bringing because it extinguishes fire and 
consciousness. Water and the feminine are therefore to be feared 
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although they are also, mysteriously, the source of fertility. The 
evidence cited in support of the Freudian hypothesis with respect to 
landscape is almost always of this kind, that is, it is drawn from 
anthropoligical literature dealing with the customs of pre-industrial 
societies whose religious beliefs often figure female deities of land 
or water. On the other hand, there is little evidence that all 
members of technologically developed societies directly appreciate the 
sexual connotations of landscape. Marghanita Laski, 
89 for example, 
was told by a Freudian psychologist that, in her study of the prime 
stimuli of ecstatic states, she would probably find that men were more 
moved by mountains and women by water, but this did not prove to be 
the case. It could perhaps be argued, in romantic vein, that modern 
cultures have somehow managed to repress the psychologically natural 
course of landscape perception, but a Freudian substantiation of this 
suggestion has not (yet) been provided. 
However, the most interesting point arising from the line of argument 
presented at this position in the range of literature is that it 
demonstrates the necessity of considering cultural traditions and 
knowledge as soon as any recognition is made of meaning attached to 
landscape which goes beyond the visually formal-90 Even when a 
certain interpretation of landscape is held to be all pervasive, as in 
the present instance of inherent sexual fixations, it is only found to 
he manifest in society through the medium of culture, which is why the 
illustrative examples in this case had to he drawn from pagan 
religious beliefs, not to mention nineteenth century Viennese 
inhibitions. But this is the only position at which a detailed 
uniformity of culture across social groups is assumed. From now on, 
the literature displays both an acceptance of culture as an integral 
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part of landscape perception, and of the fact that culture is a 
variable phenomenon which, in turn, gives rise to at least some 
degree of variation in the nature of rural landscape quality. 
Thus, a conspicuous break in the objective-subjective continuum. occurs 
here. Previously, efforts have been made to exclude notions of 
relativity, the process of perception being conceived to be governed 
almost automatically by a specified, concrete set of physical, 
physiological or psycho-physiological factors. These have been taken 
to explain landscape quality more or less for all times and places, 
and could have been used to justify internationally applicable 
landscape evaluation techniques, the need for which has occasionally 
been expressed. 
91 Of course, such exact specifications set 
the requirement that any signs of divergence from them, as for example 
the strong aesthetic dislike felt for mountains by the upper classes 
until the eighteenth century, have to be treated as facile, perverted 
or mistaken. From this point on, however, the introduction of 
cultural considerations produces less rigid interpretations of 
landscape quality within which differing schemes of values are allowed 
to co-exist. The next position on the continuum accepts that there is 
a variable cultural effect upon landscape quality, but can be seen as 
a last ditch attempt to confine the element of relativity so 
introduced by assuming that this effect is homogeneous within national 
boundaries 
42 
National Culture 
To return briefly to the first position in the range of literature: it 
will be remembered that early landscape evaluation techniques were 
criticised for using assessments of value made by a small number of 
people whose judgement was not necessarily reliable. 
92 One proposed 
solution was to ensure henceforth that the judges involved had been 
trained in proper appreciation; having been stripped of cultural and 
personal bias they were capable of perceiving the physical or 
physiologically real landscape quality correctly. But this approach, 
too, received criticism from those who were noticeably not landscape 
architects, and who had developed quite a different understanding of 
the nature of landscape quality. They reversed the argument which 
gave expert appraisal a greater validity than public preference, 
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maintaining that the latter was the proper indicator of landscape 
quality. Accordingly, the assessments made by an expert: 
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"... cannot be guaranteed to be typical of the population as a 
whole or even of any sizeable sub-group. " 
Nor need a consensus among several experts match the population's 
spread of taste, for example, landscape architects tend to like fussy 
planting. 
95 Landscape quality is assumed therefore instead to be a 
product of public opinion, and, because of their specialised training, 
experts cannot be taken to represent that opinion. 
96 
Given this premise, the question then becomes one of which 
'population' or 'public' generates qualitative value, and Peter Clamp, 
a psychologist, definitely refutes the idea that such a public could 
be an international one: 97 
"The claim is frequently made that some particular 'objective' 
evaluation system is an appropriate method for a national or even 
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an international survey of landscape value. It is doubtful that 
a meaningful international survey of subjective preferences could 
be made, since, owing to distinct national attitudes to 
landscape, it is unlikely that natives of countries A, B and C 
will give similar assessments to the landscapes of A, B and C. " 
However, within national boundaries the population is culturally 
homogeneous, and thereby displays a sufficient level of consensus to 
allow the mean population response to landscape to be treated as 
though it were absolute quality. 
98 Both Peter Clamp and the 
economist, Colin Price (who takes a similar position overall, despite 
the occasional waver towards independent 'aesthetic princip1es'99) 
seek to ascertain impartially this average national response to 
landscape in their endeavours to assist planners in obtaining precise 
measurements of the value of pieces of countryside. To this end, Clamp 
applies statistical social survey techniques to assessments made of 
photographs by: "a balanced sample of the ordinary public, " and 
suggests that by using this method it would be possible to compile a 
complete map of landscape value for England based upon public 
reaction. Price on the other hand, argues that public preferences are 
expressed through the national economy, and may be estimated by 
economic analyses of market forces. Each claims to be measuring 
subjectively derived preferences objectively, but, putting aside the 
weaknesses that may be found in statistical and cost-benefit 
approaches in this field, 
100 Clamp and Price leave largely unexplained 
the mechanism by which national culture produces consensual landscape 
preferences; perception, although assumed to be influenced by certain 
social factors, is being treated as a 'black box'. It should perhaps 
be added here that the supporters of expert opinion have occasionally 
countered the argument for direct sampling of public opinion by 
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suggesting that certain professions are able to articulate nationally 
held landscape values, but they still fail to explain how these values 
are derived. 
What, then, are the means that bring about inter-cultural differences 
in landscape perception? -" Perhaps they might be of the kind that give 
rise to intra-cultural differences too, in which case the statistical 
or economic amalgamation of a whole range of public preferences into a 
single scale of landscape value is as suspect as taking an 
international average of reactions to landscape. It has already been 
admitted that a certain sort of specialised education can produce 
variations in preference within a society, expert versus lay opinion, 
so possibly other sorts of training also result in other differences 
in attitude on the part of particular sub-cultural groupings. 
Price101 remarks that cultural norms could derive from experience of 
the characteristic land use style of a country, such as the 
traditional agricultural landscape of lowland Britain which has not 
greatly altered for over two centuries. It is altering now, of 
course, and Price speculates that, as a result, a new kind of 
landscape will eventually become established as the attractive 
cultural norm. But, presumably, during the transition period some of 
the population will adhere to the old norm and some to the new. Thus, 
at present, there is a section of the population giving quite 
vociferous support to the traditional farming landscape while others 
are less convinced of its virtues. To merge both viewpoints into a 
culture-wide consensus would be to misrepresent each of them. Apart 
from this, the point most frequently made about British scenery is its 
diversity of geological form and land use. Not everyone, therefore, 
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has the same experience of the lowlands, and for example, 
Stephen Shuttleworth102 found that sixth formers brought up in the 
rural uplands considered lowland agricultural scenes more 'artificial' 
than did students from other areas in Britain. 
Still, if a common land use experience does not bind. a national 
culture together, perhaps the language held in common does so instead. 
James Hope103 has argued that language is an integral part of culture 
and embodies certain habits of perception which are passed on whenever 
it is employed. He maintains that the culturally based consensus on 
landscape value may be revealed by an objective analysis of the words 
respondents use to describe photographed scenes, and this would permit 
a national landscape survey to be carried out. It would entail, 
however, the assumption that the words involved meant the same thing 
and were used in the same way throughout one society, and although to 
a large extent this is true, otherwise communication could not 
proceed, there are many indications that finer interpretation of 
meaning can vary between members of the same society. Hope himself 
has remarked that 'solitude' may be construed in different ways, and 
Edmund Penning-Rowsell, in his questionnaire survey of public 
landscape attitudes, encountered a similar problem with words like 
'remote '. 104 Indeed, questionnaire surveys make differences in 
interpreptation especially evident, as for example a recent survey of 
farmers' attitudes105 in which respondents usually took 'wildlife' to 
refer to pests requiring extermination, rather than the interviewers' 
understanding of natural species to be conserved. Some farmers also 
remarked upon drainage and the importance of maintaining ditches when 
questioned about the effect of farming changes upon the landscape, a 
hint of yet one more connotation of that central word. 
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From this point on in the range of literature, the idea that 
landscape 
quality is manifested heterogeneously, both within and between 
national cultures, is fully accepted. With this acceptance goes a 
sharp change in the direction of analysis, so that another conspicuous 
break in the continuum occurs here. Up to now, the emphasis has been 
upon actual manifestations of landscape quality which, it has been 
argued, are of a uniform nature down to the most detailed level 
(saving the differences between nationalities). This conception has 
allowed single concrete estimations of value, whether stated in 
verbal, numerical or monetary terms to be fixed absolutely upon 
designated pieces of countryside - the Lake District is of very high 
quality, the Fens are of very low quality. Now, however, attempts to 
devise a system of landscape evaluation die out, as do approaches 
supposedly modelled upon scientific procedure. Landscape quality is 
no longer taken to be something belonging to the physical world, like 
temperature or pH, but is considered as a subjectively constructed 
phenomenon that belongs to the social world; a distinction of 
importance for certain social scientists. 
106 Conceptions of the 
perceptual process tend, henceforth, to be more complicated and 
theorectically more sophisticated, permitting a variety of landscapes 
'in here'. But the focus of interest goes underground. Authors are 
far more concerned with the general underlying foundation of landscape 
quality than with its particular manifestations at the cultural, sub- 
cultural and individual. level. These latter are viewed as the last 
variegated gloss upon some single, universal structure which can, 
however, only be illustrated through the examples they provide. In a 
way, then, the aim remains the same - to find the one, final 
explanatory solution to the problem posed by the existence of 
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landscape quality, but the solutions put forward now become more 
abstract; the development of a suitable theoretical explanation 
assuming a much greater importance than the offering of practical help 
to rural planners. The most notable recent British contribution of 
this kind is to be found at the next position on the literary 
continuum. 
Biological instincts 
In the post-war years, the discipline of ethology has come to have an 
increasing influence upon the understanding of behaviour. Originally, 
ethologists were concerned with animal behaviour and its 
interpretation as a product of moulding by the processes of Darwinian 
natural selection. They were able to show that, in addition to the 
basic drives for food and so on, complex patterns of behaviour had 
genetically evolved through continual interaction with the physical 
environment, such as the search for, and defense of, territory. 
Subsequently, certain ethologists, notably Konrad Lorenz and 
Desmond Morris, extended the concepts of ethology to human 
behaviour107 encouraging, perhaps, a rush to jump onto the ecological 
bandwagon and be biologically respectable in dealing with landscape 
quality. 
A Portmann108 provides an early example of this approach in his 
proposition that human beings are born with certain perceptual 
structures, especially visual ones, which allow them to identify the 
self-projection of other species - animals and plants. These 
structures, which are left unspecified, mature through direct contact 
with nature by the whole of society, but in the modern world the 
majority of a population experience only limited contact, and are 
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therefore illiterate in terms of appreciation. To achieve a 
satisfying existence they must conform more closely with their 
genetically inherited modes of perception. 
The overwhelming need to comply with the 'more primitive substrates of 
human behaviour' is also emphasised by B Greenbie109 who argues that 
all human beings genetically inherit strong biological imperatives, 
for example the territorial one, that are expressed through culture in 
diverse fashions and must receive due attention in environmental 
designs. He locates these fundamental imperatives within the 'limbic 
system' of the brain. It is to be found in all mammals, and governs 
their social behaviour as well as their ability to feel emotion. The 
higher mammals are characterised by the addition of the neo-cortical 
area, overlying the limbic system but not fully integrated with it. 
The neo-cortex allows cool, rational, abstract thought, and new 
cogntitive worlds may be constructed by the perceiving subject. 
However, human beings cannot stay in such worlds for long without 
falling back upon the intrinsic biological sources of behaviour and 
emotion that constitute the original base upon which they have 
evolved. 
The most complete exposition of these fundamental biological drives 
has been furnished by Jay Appleton, 110 Professor of Geography at Hull 
University, who, unlike Greenbie, has little to say about 
neurophysiological aspects. Instead, he has formulated a 'habitat 
theory' of landscape perception which asserts that: 
ill 
"... the relationship between the human observer and the 
perceived environment is basically the same as the relationship 
of a creature to its habitat. It asserts further that the 
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satisfaction which we derive from the contemplation of this 
environment ... arises from a spontaneous reaction to that 
environment as a habitat, that is to say as a place which affords 
the opportunity for achieving our simple biological needs. " 
Early hominids, like other hunting species, could only survive if they 
possessed an immediate appreciation of the facilities offered by the 
physical landscape that would enable them 'to see without being seen', 
a key phrase borrowed from Konrad Lorenz112 whom Appleton quotes 
extensively. The point being made is that landscape features which 
gave good prospect allowed the hunters to assess the potential of 
their surroundings, obtain forewarning of possible hazards and to see 
their prey, while features providing refuge were used for shelter from 
hazards such as predators and the weather - hence 'prospect-refuge' 
theory. Since this kind of sensitivity to the environment was a pre- 
requisite of physical survival: 
113 
"Any creature born without it would be less likely to live long 
enough to procreate its species and, by the principle of natural 
selection, such a sensitivity would continue to be a distinctive 
attribute of surviving members of that species. " 
The present human population is only 200 generations away from the 
Stone Age and therefore still retains the genetically determined 
perceptual mechanism that was then necessary for survival. However, 
current civilisation has made the prospect-refuge mechanism redundant 
for survival purposes, permitting people the luxury of gratifying 
their biological inclinations in isolation from exposure to the real 
hazards faced by their ancestors. This gratification is at the root 
of all pleasurable experience of landscape although its actual 
manifestations are variable as from one historical period to another, 
one culture to another, and from one individual to another different 
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'mixes' of prospect-refuge features are found to be preferred. 
For 
example, traditional Japanese gardens lay more emphasis upon 
'refuge 
symbols' than their 'prospect-dominant' western counterparts; 
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and 
while Adolf Hitler "seems to have had an exaggerated desire for 
refuge"115 in that he spent most of the war inside the deep, dark 
Prussian forest, Paul C&anne: 116 
"... was driven by his pre-occupation with Mount Sainte-Victoire 
to paint a series of landscapes dominated by this potent prospect 
symbol. " 
In addition, the same feature may carry a different symbolism for 
different people, or even a combination of symbols for the same 
person. Thus a wood may be seen to afford: prospect from the tops of 
trees; refuge behind the leaf cover; prospect-refuge because one could 
peep out from behind the tree trunks; or hazard because the dense 
vegetation impedes locomotion. 
117 
The problem with a strictly ethological explanation of landscape 
quality is that, as Uvedale Price once remarked of William Gilpin's 
approach, it is: "at once too vague and too confined. "118 It is so 
vague that anything can be interpreted into prospect-refuge terms, by 
force if necessary, which results in difficulties when seeking some 
kind of empirical confirmation of the theory. 
119 It is so confined in 
that the terms used seem to be overly narrow and fixed in comparison 
to those that were probably employed by many primitive peoples coping 
with a diversity of habitats across the world. Citing evidence from 
anthropological literature, Ian Brotherton maintains that: 
120 
"Man has not gained supremacy throughout a whole range of 
environments with a standard pattern of behaviour. Rather his 
superior memory and learning abilities have enabled perfection of 
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a range of behaviours appropriate to a range of environments, 
prey species and purposes. Man is extremely versatile, both 
physically and mentally and this is reflected in the variety and 
complexity of behaviour patterns that hunters use to achieve 
success.... Not all of these methods, by any means, involve 
behaving so as to 'see without being seen. '" 
Appleton's theory is also confined in that, although cultural 
influences are taken to be an integral part of landscape perception 
through which prospect-refuge is expressed, the theory cannot be 
extended to explain how and why such a characteristic of humanity 
evolved. Culture is seen as being 'superficial', and derived from 
something other than prospect-refuge tendencies. 
Finally, there is the question of whether any deep hereditary response 
to former habitat would necessarily be experienced with unalloyed 
pleasure. Like other romantically inclined ethological advocates, 
Appleton121 argues that modern people, in their artificially created 
environments, are constantly harking back to the simpler, more direct 
relationship with nature experienced in their evolutionary past. But 
Paul Shepard122 had previously made the point that such primordial 
experience might just as well bring out a deeply ingrained anxiety as 
a survivalist satisfaction, an anxiety and alarm that could be far 
more overwhelming than Appleton's limited conception of hazard. 
Indeed, Yi-Fu Tuan, in his latest book, 123 has catalogued the 
varieties of fear that landscape may arouse, and includes the 
suggestion that Stone Age hunting groups probably felt a considerable 
degree of fear and antagonism towards an environment that was often 
very hostile and insecure. Certainly, people like the Eskimo, who 
have continued the hunting way of life into modern times, display 
52 
anxiousness and fear towards the landscape. Tuan argues that an 
element of fear is always present whenever landscape is apprehended, 
although it materialises differently from one society to another. 
This argument is part of an overall theoretical approach that Tuan has 
been developing for the past decade, and which bears closer 
relationship to structuralist, as-opposed to ethological, thinking. 
Cognitive structures 
Structuralism is a diffuse movement that has evolved mainly across the 
fields of child psychology, social anthropology and linguistics. 
124 Its 
concern in these disciplines has been to analyse the ultimate basis 
from which variety is generated, and Tuan, in applying it to the 
perception of the environment, has set out the structuralist argument 
as follows: 
125 
"The perceived world is almost infinitely complex, varying as it 
does with the difference in individual physiology, experience and 
intention. At a higher level of abstraction, we learn to see 
similarities in the personal worlds, for they reflect the 
constraints placed upon individuals by a common culture. The 
values and beliefs of cultures vary greatly, and yet they appear 
to share certain themes. It is nature that places limits on the 
range of cultural variation, and, by nature, the structuralist 
means not only the biological needs for food and procreation 
common to all mankind, but also the character of the human mind 
which apprehends reality. " 
At an abstract level, then, the intelligent human mind is 
characterised by a specific and ascertainable set of genetically 
inherited structures, or cognitive nuclei, that are common to all 
perceiving subjects. Structuralists are rarely concerned with the 
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precise evolutionary origin or neurological nature of these inherent 
psychological structures, but see them acting as general frameworks 
upon which each individual actively constructs their own mental worlds 
to mediate between themselves and external reality. 
126 These personal 
constructions may be built out of environmental experiences as 
individuals pass through the stages of childhood and/or by learning. 
the language and myths of the society into which they are born. 
As already noted, Tuan has recently discussed fear as an ever-present 
ingredient in landscape perception, drawing upon many different 
examples from child psychology, anthropology and medieval history. 
127 
He has also treated the concept of space and feeling for place in a 
similar manner, arguing that both are: 
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"... shared traits that transcend cultural particularities and 
may therefore reflect the general human condition. " 
The posture, structure and relations of the human body, for example, 
provide a universal pattern for coming to terms with space. 
Front/back, left/right, up/down give the cardinal directions, binary 
oppositions like these also being a central structuralist idea, and 
the body is a template when it comes to extracting further meaning 
from the landscape: 
129 
"... man has tried to integrate multi-faceted nature in terms of 
the intuitively known unity of his own body.... The Dogon of West 
Africa see rock as hone, soil as the interior parts of the 
stomach, red clay as blood, and white pebbles in the river as 
toes. Certain North American Indian tribes take the earth to be 
a sentient being made of bones, flesh and hair. In China 
popular lore has it that the earth is a cosmic being: mountains 
are its body, rock its bones, water the blood that runs through 
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its veins, trees and grass its hair.... In the European Middle 
Ages the idea of the human body as macrocosm was common place. " 
And in his first book in this subject area, 130 which might well have 
been entitled 'landscapes of pleasure', Tuan itemised many of the ways 
that landscape is enjoyed - sensually, aesthetically, patriotically 
and so on - along with yet more of. the varieties of significance 
ascribed to it by different cultural groups, mostly non-technological 
ones. 
There is much of value in the structuralist approach which will be 
pursued later, but at least three points are left unclear. Firstly, 
how does any particular mental world, say of the Dogon or the Chinese, 
knit together with the derivation of fear, pleasure or whatever from 
the landscape? Tuan implies that the sensations themselves are common 
psychological structures, but the link between this very general 
conception, the more specific structures such as that of the body- 
template, and the many anthropological examples cited, is obscure. 
This leads to the second point. Although culture is mentioned on 
nearly every page, Tuan provides no straightforward theoretical 
explanation as to how it relates to the inborn cognitive structures. 
Does he agree with the anthropoligist Lbvi-Strauss, who has argued 
that culture is a direct outgrowth of these structures, or with 
Piaget, who started as a biologist and considers culture as something 
quite separate from the structures underlying the course of 
intellectual development? Thirdly, there is some ambivalence over the 
position of the researcher, the one who specifies and describes the 
finite set of structures. If these are universal, then the researcher 
is also presumably subject to them, but, perhaps as a result of 
concentrating upon children and 'primitive' societies, structuralists 
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often seem to assume that their theoretical grounding enables them to 
step outside the cognitive structures they believe to be inherent. 
The leading structuralists take refuge in 'logico-mathematical' 
formulations which Piaget131 argues are on the highest of thought- 
planes and in complete harmony with the real world; they are, of 
course, highly abstract. On a somewhat lower plane, Tuan, who is 
Professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota, although 
recognising that science is one of the "cocoons that humans have woven 
in order to feel at home in nature"132 often takes geographical 
knowledge as the touchstone of physical reality. Thus, there may be a 
tendency to see "the earth as the human body writ large"133 but modern 
geographers have successfully challenged this and other such child- 
like/primitive modes of understanding-134 Similarly, he lists with 
respect and sensitivity many manifestations of attachment to place, to 
a homeland, but does so as if they have an almost mythological 
status. 
135 
There is a tendency among those engaged in explaining landscape 
quality to take themselves to be outsiders and somehow omniscient. At 
this position in the range of literature, the assumption is reinforced 
by the fundamental assertion that the cognitive structures involved 
have an ultimate basis within the genetic inheritance. This means 
that they can only be discovered by researchers and not invented at 
some point in time by the people being analysed. However, there has 
been a reaction against the idea of the researcher as a distinct 
entity looking in onto certain pre-ordained paths of perception, and 
this is displayed in the final position on the literary continuum. 
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The phenomenological approach 
Phenomenology is as diffuse and complicated a movement as 
structuralism, but one of its clearest assertions is that in order to 
reach a proper 'understanding', this being a central conception, of 
people's mental worlds of beliefs, attitudes, intentions, preferences 
and so on, their 'life-worlds', the researcher must seek to enter 
fully into their way of thinking and come to terms with it from the 
inside. This approach stresses the autonomy and flexibility of the 
'life-world' and, instead of aiming to reduce it into a defined set of 
explanatory components, proposes that it should be accepted in all its 
richness and complexity. These propositions are in overt opposition 
to the usual stance taken in scientific investigations, and it is 
among the phenomenological literature that numerous critiques of 
positivism and the scientific method may be found. 
Although it is having a growing impact in several disciplines, 
relatively few authors have taken a phenomenological approach towards 
landscape duality, one of these being David Lowenthal, an American, 
now Professor of Geography at University College, London. He has 
argued136 that landscape perception is conditioned by each 
individual's private world view which is to some extent unique. But 
these personal milieux contain concepts that are shared by other 
members of the group and are profoundly influenced by society and 
culture, especially through the medium of language. Geography itself 
is one of these shared world views, but there are a plurality of such 
worlds varying from the specialist to the common sense. All are 
subject to historical change. Lowenthal has gone on to state with 
Hugh Prince, 137 another geographer, that more holistic modes of 
analysis are required if the often incommensurable `provinces of 
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meaning' involved in landscape perception, at the core of which 
is an 
affective response, are to be understood. 
Lowenthal and Prince also suggest that as the physical landscape 
becomes modified by human activities it begins to accrete certain 
provinces of meaning; a point echoed by P. T. Newby: 
138 
"Landscape is more significantly the embodiment of cultural 
heritage and of social values, rather than a form or surface 
provided by nature; and any theory of landscape quality that 
seeks to reverse this situation can only be of limited value. " 
The Canadian geographer, Edward Relph, who has probably taken the most 
overt phenomenological approach towards environmental perception, has 
stressed the same message. 
139 In pushing it to the extreme, he 
maintains that as landscapes are transcriptions of various cultural 
and individual endeavours, deep appreciation only comes with a 
recognition of their unique historical identities, and this somehow 
leads to a recognition "that universal truths are embedded in the 
unique identities of particular landscape. -140 
The nature of these truths, however, is not immediately apparent, 
probably because although Relph's work is theoretically meticulous, it 
is at such an abstract level that little of concrete substance is left 
within grasp. As D. W Meinig has remarked, 
141 
the kind of geographical 
literature which puts emphasis upon cultural behaviour tends to be 
philosophical or polemical and rarely mentions specific localities or 
actual modes of perception and understanding. He later sought to 
correct this lack of concreteness by conducting an imaginary 
exercise 
142 in which a varied company were taken to the same viewpoint 
and asked to say something of the meaning of what could be seen. 
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Meinig discussed ten possible ways of appreciating the scene - from 
landscape as wealth, as ecosystem, as history, to landscape as 
aesthetic - so as to illustrate that: 
"... even though we gather together and look in the same 
direction at the same instant we will not - we cannot - see the 
same landscape. We may certainly agree that we all see many of 
the same elements... but such facts take on meaning only through 
association; they must be fitted together according to some 
coherent body of ideas. Thus we confront the central problem: 
any landscape is composed not only of what lies before our eyes 
but what lies within our heads. " 
But how are these bodies of ideas, meanings and associations 
constituted? Lowenthal and Prince, again, have been almost the only 
authors to go beyond the generalised answer of 'culture' and discuss 
the influence of one specific culture - that of the English. In their 
seminal paper143 they asked "how do the English people look at 
England? " and went on to analyse the affect of varied land form, moist 
climate and centuries of occupation and domestication upon the English 
life-world. Strangely, they later wrote144 that unlike the diversity to 
be found in American modes of appreciating landscape, the English 
display a high degree of consensus, having a fondness for the old, the 
rustic, the picturesque and the tidy, a view to be challenged later in 
this thesis. Interestingly enough, Lowenthal, like Relph but in less 
abstract fashion, has recently paid far more attention to the 
historical construction of the English landscape and the history of 
ideas associated with it, 
145 
which brings the search. for an explanation 
of landscape quality into close contact with the history of art and 
literature; disciplines where something similar to the 
phenomenological approach has existed for years. 
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In conducting an analysis of ideas held in a previous age, it is 
necessary to enter into the spirit of that age and to think as the 
people then thought. This enables the evolution of world views over 
time, the impact of individual innovations in thought, religious 
tenets, scientific advances, economic circumstances and the many other 
aspects of culture, to be seen in appropriate perspective. On the 
arts side, there is a considerable amount of material dealing with 
ideas that have previously been held about landscape, especially in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century England, although these specific 
discussions of artistic and literary modes of understanding are rarely 
tied to any general theory of perception. Occasionally, however, this 
has been attempted. Paul Shepard's book, 
146 
somewhat of a precursor, 
has already been mentioned, with its rather uncomfortable leap from 
the physiological structure of the eye to Christianity and landscape 
gardening. In the same way, it is difficult to connect 
Christopher Tunnard`s147 detailed exposition of the Chinese influence 
upon English landscape gardening, for example, with his broader 
statements about the plural nature of landscape perception today. 
Here, then, the problem of linking a general theory of landscape 
quality with particular instances of its manifestation stands fully 
revealed. 
Matters arising 
In conducting this review, the intention has been to discover an 
answer to the question: 'what is rural landscape quality? ' A range of 
suggestions have been considered, but each was found to be inadequate 
in some way. It might be possible to work towards remedying at least 
a few of these deficiencies and, in attempting to do so, the salient 
features of the preceeding discussion will serve as guidelines and 
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must therefore be kept constantly in mind. However, rather than 
repeating them all at this juncture, a few further observations about 
the literature may be made, the most outstanding of which is the way 
that the general and the particular aspects of landscape quality have 
been handled. 
At the beginning of the range of literature, where landscape quality 
was held to be an objective attribute of the landscape 'out there', no 
differentiation was made between its universal explication, holding 
for all times and places, and its specific occurence at one time and 
place. This amalgamation of the general and the particular allowed a 
highly concrete conception of qualitative value which could be covered 
by a single, detailed, all-embracing standard. The lack of a 
satisfactory theoretical justification for this standard encouraged 
the incorporation of perception, an obviously subjective ingredient, 
into analyses of landscape quality. Initially the perceptual process 
was considered to operate in a more or less uniform manner down to the 
individual level, thus producing the same landscape 'in here' for 
everyone. This meant that a degree of objectivity was retained and 
completely impartial discussion permitted. Landscape quality was 
again explained in terms of one generally applicable set of 
characteristics which, although slightly less specific than those used 
in the first position on the continuum, were still set out, or could 
have been set out, quite concretely; the general not yet having been 
separated from the particular. This separation was achieved later in 
the range of literature when it was recognised that, given the 
evidence of studies on perception, culture had an important part to 
play, resulting in different kinds of perceived worlds, landscapes 'in 
here', at the group and individual level. The emphasis was now put 
61 
upon the subjective nature of landscape quality, but it was felt that 
lying beneath its actual variegated occurences there was some 
universal foundation. This became the focus of interest for those 
inclined towards ethology and structuralism, however their 
descriptions of it continued to be concrete and detailed enough to be 
open to the charge of lacking sufficient flexibility. The general 
explanation of landscape quality was still too specific and, moreover, 
its relationship with particular manifestations by different cultures 
and individuals was difficult to fathom. The first of these 
difficulties was solved in the final position on the literature 
continuum by providing a general analysis of landscape quality that 
was completely abstract, but within the universal phenomenological 
framework attempts to descend from the heights of abstraction and 
homogeneity to the concrete particulars of cultural and individual 
heterogeneity were less successful. 
It seems, then, that an approach towards understanding landscape 
quality might be made by the very careful separation of the 
general 
universal from the 
uniform 
abstract 
particular 
specific 
diverse 
concrete 
But these are two sides of the same coin, and must therefore be 
distinguished in such a way that an easy and reasonable connection may 
be established between them. 
Some indication of how this connection could be made is available in 
the literature under review. In a certain light, the range is not a 
linear one, but comes full circle as the phenomenologically inclined 
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begin to pay attention to the history of art, literature and ideas 
about landscape. This is bound to include such figures as William 
Gilpin, the best proponent of the physical standards approach, and 
could also be applied to the formalists, the ethologists, the 
structuralists and the phenomenologists themselves. In other words, 
if the phenomenological standpoint were fully exploited it might 
provide not only the general theoretical base from which to explore 
landscape quality, but the means to encompass other attempts that have 
been made at explanation by placing them in their particular 
historical and social context. The phenomenological approach, then, 
contains most of the clues for the development of an alternative mode 
of understanding landscape quality in which the general and the 
particular are both separated and connected, although further 
substantiation at the abstract level and greater elaboration at the 
concrete level is required. 
Such a goal, of course, leads one into deep philosophical waters but, 
as the review had demonstrated, any discussion of landscape quality 
entails contact with the eternal problems of the substance of reality 
and truth, the constitution of knowledge, the mind/body question, 
nature versus nurture and so on, which become increasingly urgent as 
greater account is taken of of perception. This, in itself, might 
create a suspicion that the appreciation of landscape has something to 
do with the fundamentals of human intelligence and thought. Be that 
as it may, how or whether these longstanding debates will ever be 
resolved is far beyond the compass of the ensuing argument. But, if 
it is to advance at all towards the goal of explaining landscape 
quality, it must come down on one side or another in these debates, 
just as previous attempts have done. 
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II AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE* 
Grinding the lens 
The overall aim of this thesis is to find out whether it is possible 
to formulate a reasonable explanation of rural landscape quality which 
is tolerant of the diverse nature of the phenomenon. The starting 
point is an intuitive belief that the rural landscape may be 
appreciated by different people in qualitatively different ways, and 
also that the same person may be capable of applying different modes 
of appreciation on different occasions. The problem then becomes one 
of how at the general level such diversity and flexibility arises, and 
whether it is feasible to detail some of the particular ways that 
landscape pleases or displeases. 
As the relevant literature indicates, a consideration of perception 
is vital to any discussion of landscape quality, and a useful means of 
tackling the problem has been suggested by W. J. Hippie in the 
following passage where he argues that beauty is only perceived: 
l 
"... through the terms in which we describe it, the categories to 
which we refer it, the inferences by which we interpret it. The 
purpose which leads us to the objects of our contemplation, 
the presuppositions which have equipped us with vocabulary and 
prepared us to distinguish some aspects of the object and to pass 
over others, our habits of reasoning, these circumstances make up 
that prism or lens through which we view reality; what our lens 
brings into focus, we see. Different lenses are of use for 
different purposes, to be sure, and we can grind our lens to fit 
the application; but dispense with it we can not. " 
* References p86-87 below 
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The quotation is doubly apt because it both summarises a model of 
perception which can provide a suitable approach towards landscape 
quality while typifying, in reflexive fashion, the approach itself. 
To take up Hipple's analogy, this must consist of grinding a lens to 
focus upon the range of lenses that are focussed on landscape. 
What is required of this lens, and how may it be ground to fit the 
application? The primary need is for a set of general explanatory 
terms that are sufficiently comprehensive to account for, and give an 
understanding of, all the differing circumstances under which 
landscape quality is perceived, without grossly distorting the 
particular categories, inferences and presuppositions involved in 
specific circumstances. Hippie has already listed these general 
terms, and they may be viewed collectively as describing the pursuit 
of order in the landscape 'out there' on the part of the perceiver. 
Now the idea that order is closely associated with beauty has been a 
theme within philosophy since the time of Plato, 
2 
and it can also be 
said to come through the previous explanatory accounts of landscape 
quality. But the majority of these accounts display a tendency to 
latch on to one kind of order, for example, formalism or prospect- 
refuge, rather than conceiving of a basic multiplicity of orders. 
This is made possible once the ordering process is located firmly 
within the autonomous individual, as Hipple has done. He is not, of 
course, alone. As has already been seen, the phenomenologists have an 
equivalent for his 'terms, categories, inferences' etc. in their 
concept of the life-world, but perhaps the discipline which has taken 
the most definite and elaborate view of the mental ordering entailed 
in perception is that of environmental psychology, a growing field 
especially in the United States. 
3 
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As there is no established discipline dealing with rural landscape 
quality, it is noticeable that those engaged with the subject 
frequently borrow the vocabulary and direction of their analyses from 
some discipline, often a popular or up-and-coming one of the moment, 
which does not usually take the appreciation of the countryside as a 
central concern. Explanations have been couched in terms of 
physiology, ethology, structuralism, phenomenology, and the ensuing 
effort, being no exception, will rely heavily upon the tenets of 
environmental psychology, 4 although to complicate matters this 
latter discipline could be considered to encompass at least some 
aspects of all the others. To complicate further, the field of 
environmental psychology, which has mainly been directed at urban as 
opposed to rural landscape perception, is without a properly cohesive 
theoretical background, especially with respect to the meaning and 
significance of the perceived environment. However, underlying most 
research in this field is a basic assumption that the nature of the 
environment cannot be apprehended directly but only through a highly 
developed interpretative process which acts as a scheme for 
discovering a meaningful order within the environment, and that the 
constitution of these mental schemes may vary from one person to 
another. 
5 
The rendering of the landscape 'out there' into the landscape 'in 
here' is therefore to be conceived as taking place within a perceptual 
scheme or framework constructed of the categories, inferences, 
purposes and presuppositions which enable the perceiving subject to 
detect some kind of recognisable order within the perceived object. 
Hippie has stressed that these schemes or frames of reference are 
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quite indispensible to the process of perception, so it seems better 
to consider them as 'lenses' focussed upon reality rather than as 
'filters' of reality, a tendency among many environmental 
psychologists, because 'filter' could imply the possibility of 
removal, just as coloured filters may be taken off a camera lens. 
Likewise, the perceived environment, the landscape 'in here', is often 
denoted by the word 'image' which may suggest that to a certain degree 
it is illusory and somehow open to ultimate correction once the 
filtering mental schemes are removed. The term 'image', then, will 
also be avoided, and each differing landscape 'in here' will be viewed 
as having captured certain facets of reality, which means that an 
equal general respect and theoretical validity will have to be 
afforded to all the particular ways of perceiving landscape, 
6 from 
animism to aestheticism. 
Taking this position has immense implications for the ontological 
status not only of the lenses focussed upon landscape, but of the lens 
focussed upon those lenses. To be brief, the concept of perception as 
a process of schematised ordering owes a great deal to Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804) who also propounded the idea that although things-in- 
themselves may possess their own essential order, this could never be 
fully comprehended by human beings. 
7 The selection and organisation 
required if perception is to serve a particular purpose means that no 
one ever sees the whole reality of landscape-in-itself, only limited 
perspectives of that reality. Operating within a similar 
philosophical framework, Martin Heiddegger (1889-1976) has given the 
following example: 
8 
"A distant mountain range under a broad sky is. Does it disclose 
its being to the traveller who savours the landscape, to the 
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distant meterologist preparing his weather chart, to the farmer 
who makes his living in its shadow? 'To all and none', replies 
Heiddegger. It may well be that each of these viewers is 
perceiving some aspect of the mountain range. But the sum of 
these aspects cannot be said to constitute the being of the 
object. This being is felt to lie 'behind' or 'within' the 
complex of aspects. What, then, is it? " 
Heiddegger's attempt to reply to this question of ultimate being is of 
such abstraction and complexity as to be quite beyond the everyday 
perceptions of the mountain range. In addition, just as people's 
perceptions of landscape distinguish certain aspects and pass over 
others, the explanation of that perceptual process must have its own 
selected foci of interest. Landscape quality is taken to be a 
subjectively derived phenomenon, but the terms and inferences used to 
understand it cannot, at the general level, be the same as any of the 
particular categorical apparati actually employed in perceiving 
landscape9 because the purposes and presuppositions involved are 
different. In other words, the real landscape-quality-in-itself is 
also beyond direct apprehension, all that can be offered is a 
perspective on that reality, 
10 
a lens fit for its application. 
The focus on landcape quality 
The quality of the rural landscape is rooted both in its character and 
emotional significance. These two are fused together in the process 
of perception which makes the externally real landscape internally 
real. Humans are intelligent beings and perceive the landscape 
intelligently. They seek some pattern, some order, there which makes 
sense to them within their own terms, and this activity itself 
possesses a qualitative dimension. 
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At the general level, perception may be described as the selection, 
classification and interpretation of the stream of sensory stimuli 
generated by the external landcape according to some conceptual scheme 
held by the perceiver. This constitutes the basis upon which 
structured presuppositions are built that will either be fulfilled or 
denied by the sensory information picked up from the landscape 'out 
there'. If fulfilled, the very success achieved in establishing a 
meaningful pattern, finding a character, in the landscape can be a 
source of pleasure, as may be the opportunity to explore disorder and 
extend the pattern further. But a positive reaction to the discovery 
that an expected order is present is not invariable because it also 
depends upon the connotations a particular order has for the 
particular individual, connotations that are the product of past 
experience. 
Perceptual activity takes place within a temporal frame". It 
involves the future, because it proceeds by the confirmation or 
contradiction of expectations, and it involves the past, which 
conditions the conceptual scheme giving rise to expectations. Whether 
a particular order is greeted with delight or dismay is often a matter 
of previous personal experience of landscape together with the 
knowledge acquired in the course of living as a member of society, 
knowledge derived from the experience of other members that can go 
hack many generations. 
To understand the qualitative connotations of a particular frame of 
reference therefore requires a detailed examination of the cultural 
and personal background informing the terms, categories and inferences 
which constitute that frame. In addition, the historical context is 
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of vital importance because the particular concepts that facilitate 
landscape perception rarely remain static for long periods of time. 
The people who use them tend to add to them, adapt them, modify and 
reform them to meet changing circumstances. Moreover, if a particular 
order becomes over-familiar and boring or unsuited for the purposes in 
hand, creative individuals are likely to react against it and 
construct something different, which can be exciting and inspiring 
both for themselves and their audience. 
It seems possible, then, to find an answer to the question: 'what is 
rural landscape quality? ' on two planes. Generally, the quality of 
landscape is an inevitable concomitant of human intelligence which 
acts in an active, constructive and flexible manner as landscape is 
perceived. But this kind of universal answer is somewhat trite and 
empty. More definite are the myriads of particular ways in which 
intelligence is manifested as actual landscapes are perceived at 
specific times and places. Here, at the level of the particular and 
the concrete, an almost infinite number of answers to the question are 
available, each within its own historical and cultural context. 
The general and the particular 
At a time when the notion of some commonly agreed standard of 
landscape excellence has been gaining ground, at least in rural 
planning circles, 
12 
a position is being taken in this thesis from 
which the qualitative value attached to the countryside appears as far 
too vast and complicated a phenomenon to be reducible into a single 
set of concrete criteria. The acceptance of inherent diversity stands 
in sharp contrast to the assumption that landscape quality is 
something unitary, explicable in terms of particular yet generally 
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applicable factors, for example, at the extreme, the presence of 
certain physical components or specific formal and spatial 
relationships. 
A number of circumstances have contributed towards a tendency, 
especially among those encountering the subject briefly, to make the 
assumption of unity and general consensus, one of the most salient 
probably being a harking back to what might be called the golden age 
of landscape aestheticism. There seems to be an underlying 
recollection embodied in English culture of the time in the eighteenth 
century when 'everyone' subscribed to the same aesthetic standard. 
The details of this standard will be discussed later as one of the 
particular schemes employed in landscape perception, 
13 but even in the 
eighteenth century it was not as universally applied as might 
superficially appear. 'Everyone' actually meant the majority of the 
small upper class of aristocracy and gentry who constituted a close- 
knit elite holding a dominant economic position in society. 
14 Their 
education was oriented towards the classics, they greatly admired a 
few Dutch and Italian landscape painters, they read the same books and 
periodicals. A strongly cohesive and well articulated understanding 
of landscape developed among them which was most obviously 
demonstrated in their gardens and parks. But these specific binding 
influences no longer have a very active hold upon any group in modern 
society, and only a rather vague notion occasionally surfaces to the 
effect that somewhere a definite standard of landscape quality lies 
waiting to be discovered. 
When it does surface, however, there is a chance that it will be 
reinforced by certain writers seeking to explain landscape quality 
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scientifically. Scientific concepts have had an enormous impact upon 
Western thought in the last three hundred years, 
15 
and they tend to 
place a strong emphasis upon homogeneity and objectivity rather than 
the heterogeneity and subjectivity, this approach being most useful in 
investigating physical, natural phenomenon. While attempting to adopt 
a natural scientific mode with respect to qualitative 'value,. A. V. 
Trowbridge, 16 for example, has expressed his irritation with those 
who maintain that beauty is an entirely subjective experience with a 
different meaning for every individual, because this hinders the case 
for a single objective scale of aesthetic value. Such a case has 
strong attractions for individuals who shelter in the belief that the 
only ultimately valid knowledge is objective scientific knowledge, and 
who are repelled by the slightest hint of relativity. 
In recent years, scientifically based approaches to landscape quality 
have interested certain rural planners exactly because they provide an 
opportunity for fixing upon the one precise qualitative value of each 
piece of countryside. 
17 It would be useful and convenient, in making 
planning decisions, if landscape quality could be scientifically 
assessed against particular criteria because then there would be valid 
grounds for avoiding, or even settling, the conflicts of opinion that 
can arise between different interest groups. A single definite 
specification of what constitutes 'natural beauty', a phrase beloved 
in legislative documents and indicating not only the presence of flora 
and fauna but qualities that should naturally be recognised by 
everyone, would be most serviceable in the national plan for the 
countryside currently being mooted in some quarters, 
18 
and in 
environmental impact statements19 that may soon be a statutory 
requirement for any large proposed development. 
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The difficulties encountered in accepting any closely specified 
description of landscape quality come not with regard to whether it is 
absolutely right or wrong, but with respect to any claims made for its 
ultimate generality. If nothing else, a particular specification of 
excellence is likely to be employed by the person who devised it, and 
perhaps by some wider social group, but to argue that everyone should 
subscribe to it, or actually does so beneath any personal bias, is 
unsatisfactory both in the wider scientific and political sense. The 
need is for a general framework within which particular variable 
instances are accepted and understood. 
Form and content of landscape perception 
If the vast and complex phenomenon of rural landscape quality is to be 
made at all comprehensible, it has to be approached through an 
understanding of how people perceive landscape. Only by the process 
of perception can the physically real landscape 'out there' become the 
intellectually real landscape 'in here', and from the compound of 
meaning and emotion, knowledge and sentiment, implication and feeling 
that perception appears to entail, emerges the mingling of character 
and value which constitutes the quality of landscape. But how does 
this come about? The perception of landscape is likewise an extremely 
difficult subject to tackle, not least because, whatever the 
operations involved, they occur all together in an instant wherein 
much is unconcious and taken for granted. Such rapidity is obviously 
essential to perception, but it does produce a need to conceptually 
magnify that instant so as to discern the factors present. 
When a moment of perception is stretched out, for the purposes of 
investigation, it may be viewed as a progressive sequence of 
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establishing order, pattern or regularity in the landscape, always 
remembering that what are discussed as sucessive stages in the 
ordering process actually inter-relate and take place simultaneously. 
The general idea of perception as a struggle to create order out of 
what would seem to be chaos is a common one that has formed the basis 
of many theories about the nature of human intelligence. Karl Popper, 
for example, upon whose work in this area the following thesis has a 
certain philosophical dependence although not always in complete 
accord with it, has observed that: 20 
"... we are very clever animals, precariously placed in a 
surrounding that differs greatly from every other place in the 
universe: animals that strive courageously to discover, by some 
method or other, the true regularities which rule the universe 
and thereby our surroundings. " 
And again, that humans have: 
21 
"... an immensley powerful need for regularity - the need which 
makes them seek for regularities; which makes them sometimes 
experience regularities even where there are none; which makes 
them cling to their expectations dogmatically; and which makes 
them unhappy and may drive them to despair and to the verge of 
madness if certain assumed regularities break down .... The need 
to try to impose such regularities upon our environment is, 
clearly, inborn and based on drives, or instincts. There is the 
general need for a world that conforms to our expectations... " 
The derivation of these expectations and the manner in which they are 
either fulfilled or denied by the external environment are to be 
considered in a series of steps towards some detailed pattern that 
makes sense to the particular individual; the progression gradually 
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brings the landscape into focus until its significance becomes fully 
clear to them. 
To begin with the landscape 'out there': it does not, of course, 
bodily enter people's heads. Instead, more indirectly, it reflects 
and sometimes produces electromagnetic waves, generates air 
vibrations, emits air-borne chemical substances and can exert various 
mechanical contacts, all of which envelop people in a sea of 
information about the physical landscape around them. Having been 
structured by this landscape, such waves, vibrations, chemicals and 
contacts are not without inherent order, 
22 but the range and quantity 
of information thus made available is so enormous that no one could 
possibly take everything in, and would indeed be swamped by its 
apparent chaotic state if somehow they were able to do so. 
23 That 
they cannot, is first of all governed by the absolute limits set upon 
the receptivity of their senses by their genetic make up. Human eyes, 
ears, nose and skin are only capable of being stimulated by a 
relatively narrow spectrum of light, sound, smell and touch which, 
together with additional neural limitations on sensitivity to certain 
events within that spectrum, * considerably reduces the amount of 
information about the external landscape that may be obtained without 
the aid of instruments. 
Even inside the fixed limits on sensitivity, a great deal of selecting 
and organising of stimulus information remains to be done. It has 
been said that if, for instance, people could be directly conscious of 
visual images as passively registered by the eyes and transmitted to 
* Rabbits, for example can see the sun moving across the sky. 
80 
the brain, they would probably see a shifting, flat, variegated 
confusion of brightness, darkness and colour. 
24 Normally, however, 
organisation is immediately and automatically imposed upon visual 
sensations as the brain strives to interpret their significance for 
the individual. Nor should the senses be regarded as passive 
receptors. 
25 Under the brain's direction, they actively search for 
pieces of information that will fit in with the pattern of 
organisation it construes. Relevant material is selected out while 
the rest, although falling within the span of sensitivity, is liable 
to be ignored. 
26 The workings of the brain, then, have been geared to 
locating order within the visual, auditory, olafactory and tactile 
information streaming from the physical landscape through the 
manipulation of the senses. But how is the process of selection and 
organisation carried forward? 
The essential form of the process can be conceived as being founded 
upon a strong and inherent urge towards classification. Humans are 
classifying animals, 
27 
who instinctively seek to break up the flood of 
sensory information - "segment the continua of nature, " as Yi-Fu Tuan 
remarks28 - and to arrange it mentally into categories, each with a 
network of associations. This intellectual capacity to reduce the 
huge diversity of potential stimulation into a restricted but 
manageable set of classes which make sense to the individual is 
fundamental to the perceptual process, and even something as 
straightforward as colour is treated in this fashion. When the smooth 
gradations of the colour spectrum are denoted by luminosity, dominant 
wavelength and purity of admixture, about 7,500,000 just noticeable 
differences may be discriminated by the eye, but the English language 
only provides 4,000 categories with specific- colour names and only 
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eight of these are used frequently. 29 Moreover, blobs of colour in 
the landscape are not simply blobs, but carry whole realms of 
association. Red, for example, indicates ripening fruit, autumn 
leaves, iron compounds in soil and rock, vivid dashes in an artistic 
composition, and so on, with all that follows. 
The formulation of mental classes and connections, whatever their 
actual content, probably occurs automatically due to the physiological 
functioning of the neural circuits of the brain as determined by the 
genetic endowment humanity hold in common; although it must be 
recognised that little is known in physiological terms about the 
relationship between neural circuitry and intellectual activity. 
Still, one point is perhaps reasonably clear: the scheme of 
classification employed is unlikely to be constructed from scratch at 
the instant of perception as it would be grossly inefficient to 
continuously go through complete reconstructions at ensuing instants. 
Rather, neurons within the brain would seem to be already in 
possession of certain sets of categories and associations that are 
brought into play when deemed appropriate. But where do these 
originate? Some schools of thought would argue that specific schemes 
have been genetically pre-programmed into the neural circuits, in 
other words, that both the propensity to classify and its realisation 
are governed almost wholly by universal physio-psychological 
characteristics. 
30 However, this position often leads to a serious 
underestimation of the scope, the flexibility and diversity of 
classificatory schemes that have been devised and may yet be devised. 
In taking account of such heterogeneity, it is perhaps more 
appropriate to seek to separate the overall propensity to classify 
from the differential ways in which that propensity comes to fruition. 
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The former consists of a fixed, genetically inherited ability to 
arrive at an intellectual ordering of the landscape, while the latter, 
being realised on the basis of remembrances of past experiences 
retained in the brain's memory cells, is more fluid. 
No one encounters landscape with a completely blank mind, forever 
isolated in the immediate present. Their inherent need to find 
pattern in it is satisfied by referring to categories and associations 
derived from previous encounters with landscape, and the past, 
therefore, has vital implications for each present instant of 
perception. Individuals obviously learn from their personal contacts 
with landscape over the years, but only very rarely are they left 
alone to rely wholly upon their own experiences. 
31 Humans are not just 
classifying animals but social animals too, and this gives them access 
to bodies of past experience and intellectual endeavour accumulated by 
fellow members of their society, both of contemporary and preceding 
generations. Myth, science, art, religion, technology are all 
manifestations of the culture thus created, 
32 
and, especially through 
the medium of language, they provide ready-made conceptual classes and 
connections that may be used in the perception of landscape. 
33 The 
simple example of the categorisation of the colour spectrum in English 
has already been given. 
34 Other societies have other means of dealing 
with colour, 
35 
one small indication of the inherent variability of 
culture between different social groups. In some instances cross 
cultural variation is especially striking, as in the case of the Yvrok 
Indians of North America who traditionally considered hills to be 
regions bounded by valleys as opposed to the widespread Western 
conception of valleys as regions bounded by hills. 
36 But the cultural 
contribution to landscape perception not only changes from group to 
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group, it also changes with time. Few Yvrok nowadays probably think 
of their land in the old way following the impact of Western 
civilisation. Culture, then, along with the individual's own 
experience, is naturally subject to variability and change, and this 
diversity of collective and personal pasts produces different kinds of 
classificatory schemes for selecting and organising stimulus 
information made available by the landscape 'out there'. 
In addition to reaching back into a heterogeneous past, the present 
instant of perception reaches forward into a heterogeneous future. 
37 
The specific cultural and individual content of the conceptual scheme 
used enables certain predications to be made about the likely 
character of the landscape. These predictions are tested38 by 
deploying the senses, and information thus obtained may confirm the 
existence of anticipated classes and connections, or it may prove them 
wrong, or it may reveal something unexpected. Whatever the outcome, 
the resulting landscape 'in here' embodies some facet of the landscape 
'out there' that the perceiver can grasp and act upon. Since the 
knowledge and traditions on which predictions depend will vary from 
one person and one social group to another, so will the final 
perceived landscapes. But none are any the less real, as each 
reflects an ordered aspect of the immensely complex external landscape 
relevant to the individual or society. 
The process of landscape perception, when seen as a sequence of 
ordering, ends with the arrival at the landscape 'in here'. In 
summary, it has been argued that the means which allow landscape to be 
perceived fall into two main categories -a fixed form and a variable 
content. The fixities consist of: the ability to use the senses to 
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obtain information; the ability to classify; the ability to rely on 
past experience; the ability to formulate expectations. These are all 
instinctive, integral to the structure and functioning of the senses 
and the brain as determined by the human genetic inheritance. They 
are, however, only abilities, propensities, forming the skeletal frame 
of the perceptual process which must be fleshed out by actual 
expectations, actual past experience, actual schemes of classification, 
actual sensory information. The input of a specific content comes 
from social and personal sources, and, since these are inherently 
diverse, the propensity to perceive is realised in different ways. 
The next two sections of the thesis attempt a closer analysis of the 
fixed and general genetic and cultural factors that enable the 
perception of landscape. The last two sections touch upon the 
variable cultural and individual factors that permit actual landscapes 
to be perceived. 
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III THE GENETIC INHERITANCE* 
An evolutionary standpoint 
In pursuing a general theory of rural landscape quality, it is 
necessary first of all to consider those points which may be applied 
universally, to the whole of humanity, and then to work from these 
towards the individual who is ultimately responsible for landscape's 
character and value. This stems from their perception of landscape, 
and perception as practised by all human beings proceeds according to 
a common basic structure, or form, which, it has been suggested, 
consists of a highly intelligent capacity to discern order, to select, 
categorise and find meaning in the landscape. But how does such a 
capacity arise? Since the ability to perceive is taken to be 
universal, it is appropriate to look to the natural sciences for an 
explanation of the operations involved which are surely grounded in 
the physiological attributes of the senses and the brain. However, 
despite a great deal of research, the physiological functioning of the 
brain, especially, is as yet so little understood that no adequate 
neurophysiological theory has been provided that covers the complete 
process of perception from the external and physical to the internal 
and perceived. Nor has any other branch of biology been fully 
successful in this, perhaps the closest approach, to date, having been 
achieved by employing the arguments which have sprung from the study 
of genetics and evolution. 
The way the senses and the brain function must be under the control of 
the characteristically human genetic complement. Admittedly, 
investigations of how this complement was produced, through 
adaptations to the environment, have not furnished many insights into 
* References p116-117 below 88 
the physiological mechanisms of perception, but they have been 
directly concerned with the development of the capacity. to perceive 
intelligently. ' An evolutionary account is therefore relevant to any 
discussion of landscape perception, and it is additionally desirable 
as the current ethological and ecological climate of opinion2 dictates 
the need for an explanation of the genetic underpinning of any human 
attribute discussed. 
This is not to say that evolutionary theory itself is without 
difficulties. Almost as soon as Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published 
his version, based on the survival of the fittest and random 
mutations, a major problem was discovered that still awaits a 
satisfacory solution. 
3 How could the evolution of a complex organ and 
associated physiological mechanisms take place by a long series of 
small steps, each the result of a purely accidental mutation, and each 
on its own conveying no survival advantage? The example most often 
cited is that of the eye: 
4 
"But what use is a half-made lens? What use is a lens giving an 
image, if there is no nervous system to interpret the 
information? How could a visual nervous system come about before 
there was an eye to give it information? In evolution there 
can be no master plan, no looking ahead to form structures which, 
though useless now, will come to have importance when other 
structures are sufficiently developed. " 
Similarly, it is hard to explain how the ability to create conceptual 
schemes of classification, using knowledge and experience gained in 
the past, could genetically evolved through haphazard trial and 
error; 5 although this, as well as the eye, when completely formed 
confers tremendous survival advantages upon its possessors. 
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One resolution to the problem posed by Darwin's theory of natural 
selection has been the proposal that evolution could sometimes occur 
in one large random jump, rather than many small steps, as the fossil 
record occasionally displays quite abrupt discontinuities where 
gradual transformations 'might have been expected. Another, more 
heretical, suggestion advocates a neo-Lamarkian notion of evolutionary 
master plans, and seems to be favoured by one or two writers who 
regard perception as an ordering process. Following a lead given by 
C. H. Waddington (1905-1975), it has been argued that individuals' 
interaction with the environment can affect their genes within their 
own lifetime, allowing the inheritance of acquired characteristics; 6 
also, that internal propensities, such as to see, randomly evolve 
first but subsequently foster certain organ mutations that were 
previously useless. 
7 There is little evidence from geneticists to 
support any of these solutions, and to go into them any further would 
be to give up discussing landscape perception altogether. The pursuit 
of the 'how' and 'why' of landscape quality has to stop somewhere, and 
so a neo-Darwinian standpoint will he assumed as the most acceptable 
for the purposes in hand. 
These are to describe the inherent functioning of the senses and the 
brain that allows intellectual order to be established among the 
welter of information that the physical landscape makes available. 
Not all this information is sensory information because only a small 
proportion can possibly be registered as light, sound, smell and touch. 
Universally, perception must be carried out within fixed limits 
imposed by the human genetic inheritance. 
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Limitations on the. senses 
The absolute physiological limits on sensitivity have presumably been 
inherited from ancestral species adapted to being stimulated by that 
range of information from the physical environment bearing upon their 
survival in the ecological niches they inhabited. It should be noted, 
however, that this Darwinian argument is also deficient because the 
only way of judging the survival value of an adaptation is according 
to whether the mutant organism survives to perpetuate the new 
characteristic - "those that survive are those that survive. "8 But 
leaving aside this tautology, the human eye, for example, would seem 
to be the product of a diurnal existence in that it is adapted to 
accept wavelengths of maximum energy of sunlight as filtered through 
the atmosphere. 
9 Lacking immediate nocturnal ancestors, humans do not 
have the infra-red vision of rattlesnakes or the blindness of bats 
which rely on radar. To be precise, their eyes are capable of 
reacting to a narrow band of electromagnetic frequencies stretching 
from a wavelength of 4x 10-5cm., which produces a sensation of blue 
light, to a wavelength of 7x 10-5cm., which produces a sensation of 
red light-10 Similarly, with respect to hearing, the average young 
person's ears are sensitive to a range extending from 16,000 to 20,000 
cycles per second. 
11 If they were receptive below this range, 
individuals would suffer the annoyance of hearing their own heartbeat, 
while maximum sensitivity appear to correspond to the pitch of a 
child's cry. 
The habitat that has been the most important in shaping the 
physiological character of the senses is the arboreal one. 
12 Here the 
early primates developed an excellent visual sense in making nice 
estimations of distance while leaping from branch'to branch, and in 
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assessing from afar the places they intended to jump towards. So much 
so, that vision evolved as the main sense of the primates, hearing 
smelling and touch becoming subsiduary and acting to provide data to 
assist vision rather than taking major roles of their own. Thus, in 
comparison to other animal species, humans descended from these 
primates have a- poor sense of -smell, although their sense of touch is 
relatively good arising from the ability of primate hands to pick up 
and fiddle with objects. Vision, however, is primary, and as such its 
functioning will be discussed in the next few pages. In all 
probability, similar principles will hold for the other senses, but 
since until recently there were no independent disciplines dealing 
with them, studies of the physiology of hearing smelling and touch are 
lagging behind that of sight. 
13 
The structure and functioning of human eyes are vestigal remains of 
life in the trees where binocular stereoscopic colour vision enabled 
the anthropoid apes to focus clearly on the next branch, on distant 
coloured fruits among the leaves, as well as on what was in their 
hands. * Unusually for vertebrates, the eyes became positioned at the 
front of the head giving an overlap of 50% in their separate fields of 
vision, while on the retina in each eye an area under the lens, known 
* The following discussion relies primarily upon: 
Gibson, JJ 1983 The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. 
(Greenwood Press, London). First published 1967. 
But the operations of the brain are credited with a greater role 
in perception than that assigned by Gibson in accordance with the 
majority view among psychologists and physiologists 
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as the fovea, developed. that was best equipped anatomically for the 
discrimination of fine detail and colour. It has been said that to 
move from the centre of the human retina towards the periphery is to 
travel back in evolutionary time from the highly organised structure 
of the fovea, packed with colour sensitive cones, to a primitive 
region scattered with - rods which only-reacts to light, dark and 
movement. At any rate, the resulting total visual field extends 
about 180° laterally and 150° vertically, being sharply defined at 
the centre and progressively vaguer towards the boundaries. 
Indeed, a relatively larger area of the visual cortex of the brain is 
devoted to the fovea so that the point towards which the eyes are 
directed is 'spaced out' while the surrounding parts are 'compressed. ' 
But, and this is a vital but, visual perception under ordinary 
conditions does not provide a stationary oval-shaped image with one 
clear centre, rather, visual life is spent at the core of a shifting 
transparent shell that can be located at desired distances. The eyes 
are never still: they make small, continuous involuntary movements to 
preserve the sensitivity of the retinal cells which require ever- 
changing stimulation; they make scans of the visual field under 
voluntary control; and they make larger shifts when the head, which is 
rarely stationary for long, and the body are moved too. The active 
ingredient, then, must be introduced into the understanding of the 
visual system at this early stage. The co-ordinated voluntary 
movements of the eyes, head and body mean that information from the 
physical environment is generally obtained by, not imposed on, the 
perceiver. A stimulus is not a physical object, nor is it the 
reflected light waves which offer information. Only when the 
information is intercepted by the eyes and penetrates them, has 
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stimulation occurred, and this interception is most often the result 
of activity on the part of the senses. Looking involves searching for 
expected patterns of stimulation. 
Activity takes another form too. Once a stream of light waves has 
been intercepted and focussed on the retina, it is immediately 
transformed, by the photosensitive rods and cones, into a flow of 
electrical charges which are passed along the optic nerve, being 
recoded several times, to the visual cortex of the brain. The brain 
must reconstitute the electrical message if the individual is to see 
the landscape at the other end of this chain of reactions - the 
shapes, distances, colours and implications of the objects present in 
their environment. In addition, the visual cortex must compensate not 
only for the continual movement of the image over the retina as the 
eyes move, but also for the distortions resulting from the inefficient 
structuring of the eye as an optical instrument. 
14 
In organisms with simpler brains the mechanism which interprets 
nervous impulses from the eyes is relatively passive and straight- 
forward. For a start, many such creatures have eyes whose structure 
and functioning is far more sophisticated than those of the human, 
providing electrical messages more closely corresponding to stimulus 
information received and therefore simple to decode. Moreover, in 
these and other cases, the decoding operation always takes place 
fixed, instinctive, pathways when certain required stimuli are 
obtained. However, this kind of specialised apparatus can only deal 
with a strictly limited range of stimulation essential to its 
possessors' survival. For example, experiments have shown that frogs 
distinguish edible flies by two factors: black dots that dance in the 
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air. If surrounded by dead flies, a frog will die of starvation, as 
flies are only flies to a frog when they are moving. A relatively 
unspecialised, though defective, eye coupled with an elaborate brain 
brings greater freedom in selecting information and therefore a wider 
variety of options to exploit. But a complicated interpretive 
operation is needed, if reliance is placed on past experience, stored 
by the brain, instead of upon instinctive mechanisms, for the process 
of perception to be completed in the human. 
Physiological differences 
Before, however, discussing the activity of decoding carried out by 
the visual cortex, mention should be made of the differences in the 
physiological limitations on the sense organs that can occur. Up to 
this point, the limitations have been considered the same for all, 
but, being governed by the genetic inheritance, they naturally vary to 
a comparatively small extent between members of the same species. 
Almost nothing seems to have been written about the effect on 
landscape appreciation caused by differences in sharpness of eyesight, 
or hearing, smelling, and touch too, for that matter. Is it 
significant that the painter John Constable (1776-1837) possibly had 
extremely acute vision as his pictures of Dedham Vale accurately 
record, in minute dashes of paint, the position of objects, like 
churches, many miles distant? 
15 Or perhaps he was able to do this not 
because his eyesight was especially good, but, being familiar with the 
area since childhood, he simply knew where the churches should be. It 
might also be interesting to find out whether painters' eyes are 
extra-sensitive to colour, and, conversely, whether colour blindness 
detracts from an enjoyment of landscape, since 10% of the British male 
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population cannot tell the difference between red and green. It seems 
likely, however, that they do not suffer in this respect because 
colour is only one of the criteria on which objects are identified: 
16 
"We call grass green, though we have no idea whether the 
sensation is the same for different people. Grass is a certain 
kind of plant found on lawns, and the sensation of colour which 
it gives we call 'green', but we identify grass by other 
characteristics than its colour - the form of the leaves, their 
density and so on - .... We know it is supposed to be green, and 
we call it green even when this may be doubtful. " 
The colour blind, then, are probably rarely conscious that the grass 
they see may not be the same colour as that seen by the rest of the 
population. 
In some cases, of course, the sensory system is severely impaired by 
injury or illness, as well as by the inheritance of defective genes or 
harmful mutations. Again, little research seems to have been done on 
the impact on landscape perception of the complete elimination of one 
sense, although this must have an effect if only to provide evidence 
about normal functioning. In one American experiment, for example, 
17 
the noise produced by city streets was blocked out while subjects 
viewed them, and it was found that this gave rise to an urban 
landscape that was surrealistic in its peacefulness, but was sad, 
lacking in contrast and almost two-dimensional. How far this 
experience relates to people who are permanently deaf has not been 
explored, but it does reveal that hearing and vision usually work in 
conjunction. Still, the loss of one or even two senses does not 
appear to necessarily destroy the ability to appreciate landscape. A 
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blind man once told William James (1842-1910) that he thought few 
people could enjoy the view from a mountain top more than he, 
18 
while 
Helen Keller's (1880-1968) descriptions of landscape can be quite 
lyrical. 19 
In an attempt to discover how the-blind obtain information about their 
environment, an American architect20 interviewed six blind graduates. 
They had difficulty explaining their sensations to a sighted person, 
but were able to describe their sensitivity to air - its density, 
humidity, sound and smell. For example, they could feel thicker 
layers of air near water swirling around their knees, and hear the 
distinctive sounds refracted by layers of air over grass which were 
soft after rain and crisp on a dry day, and they could sense the 
denser outline of a tree when air was being held between the leaves. 
This indicates that blind people can develop an ability to receive 
ranges of information that tend, in certain aspects, to be quite 
beyond the sensory capacities of the non-handicapped. Quite 
different patterns of stimulation are being obtained, but once these 
have been conveyed to the brain as nervous impulses from the ears, nose 
and skin, they must be interpreted, just as messages from the eyes in 
the sighted must be interpreted, if a coherent landscape 'in here' is 
to be achieved. 
Active hypothesis testing 
To continue, for the moment, to concentrate on vision: conventionally, 
the translation of the somewhat ambiguous messages about the external 
landscape arriving via the optic nerve, is divided into two stages, 
both of which are widely regarded as being active and. constructive. 
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Firstly, there is the identification of shape* and space, and, 
secondly, the attribution of further meaning to objects so defined. 
Both operations are carried out by the brain, but precisely how they 
are done is a mystery. Research into brain functions is hindered by 
the fact that function is not reflected in structure t. o any great 
extent, the physical arrangement of parts. of the brain having little 
importance to the work they perform. However, the brain is obviously 
made up of interconnecting nerve cells. In some places these are 
randomly arranged, while in others they occur in layers or columns. 
Parts of the brain have specialised functions, and in the cortical 
area dealing with vision, the neurons are composed in regular patterns 
indicating ordered connections. 
In the initial reconstruction of shapes and spaces to be found in the 
surrounding landscape, the visual cortex appears to use the messages 
received from the eye to check hypotheses about the configuration of 
lines, surfaces, distances and depth present. The contours of 
objects, for instance are identified in all mammalian brains through 
the agency of 'feature detectors' - separate visual neurons, or groups 
of neurons, which each carry a separate hypothesis about the angle of 
orientation of lines, and which are 'fired' only when the sensory 
* The term 'shape' as opposed to 'form' will be used in this 
context because occasionally when 'form' is applied to objects it 
has lead to general and aesthetic 'formal' theories of 
perception, criticised on p32-40 above. 'Form' in the thesis is 
being used with respect to the general framework of the 
perceptual process, as summarised on p84-5 above. 
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input conveys their own specific angle. Experiments have further. 
shown that in the monkey's brain combinations of nervous activity from 
certain line-detecting cells lead to neurons which require more 
complex shapes, such as that of a corner, to make them communicate to 
the rest of the brain, thereby confirming the hypothesis they embody. 
Whether the results of neural experiments on 'monkeys are wholly 
applicable to the human brain is unknown, but human recognition of 
space seems to occur in a similar hypothesis testing fashion. Depth 
and distance 'cues', present in the optical messages, are used to 
determine the most fitting spatial hypothesis. Such cues include: the 
apparent decrease in the size of objects with distance; the hiding of 
parts of far objects by nearer ones; the angle of convergence as the 
two eyes pivot to focus on an object; and the disparity between the 
images obtained by each eye which produces the stereoscopic effect. 
The importance of these, and many other cues, is best revealed in 
experiments which provoke visual illusions. Cues may be provided, as 
in the Ames distorting room, in a way that encourages the brain to 
jump to inappropriate conclusions. One or two cues are selected out, 
in this case indicating that the room is rectangular, which support 
the most probable hypothesis, while others pointing to a different 
conclusion are ignored. The Ames room is built with a steeply sloping 
floor and a receding back wall. There is, then, a suggestion that 
the visual cortex seeks just enough corroboratory evidence to confirm 
expectations, and the rest of the available stimulus information is 
made redundant. Indeed, some nerve fibres seem to transmit impulses 
from other parts of the brain to sensory pathways which can inhibit 
messages passing along them. 
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However, given that a wide range of hypotheses about shape and space 
are encoded in the visual cortex, which actively sifts incoming 
optical messages for clues to the most likely pattern of contours and 
perspectives in the landscape, where do these hypotheses come from? 
Controversy rages over whether they are innate or learned, but, 
whichever is the most correct, environmental experience in early life 
has emerged as being vital for their development. Without it, either 
inborn neural mechanisms degenerate through lack of stimulation, or 
the basic neural potential to detect lines and distances is not 
fulfilled. The failure to develop this visual ability can be 
observed, for example, in blind people who newly recover their 
sight, 
21 
while a great deal of research has recently been done on its 
growth in babies and young children. 
A large proportion of the young's environmental experience with 
respect to shape is, of course, universal. Expectations about shape 
appear to be built up, at least in part, by watching objects being 
touched and manipulated by the hands, and, with a body that is upright 
(eventually), bilaterally symmetrical and permanently under the 
influence of gravity, everyone grows up with the same co-ordinates of 
up/down, front/back, right/left and vertical/horizontal, which are 
extrapolated on to space. In certain instances, however, the 
environment offers different kinds of stimulation, providing evidence 
of how important experience is in the development of hypotheses about 
shape and space. The example of the difference between plains and 
forest dwellers has already been mentioned, 
22 
and it has also been 
found that when the latter come out of their usual surroundings, they 
see far away objects as small, not distant, because they have little 
experience of distance cues in the forest. Similarly, people 
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belonging to non-Western cultures, who are less acquainted with 
rectangular rooms, are less prone to illusion when confronted with the 
Ames distorting room. Cultural factors have some impact, then, even 
at the initial stage of identifying shape and space. 
But this stage alone is quite insufficient to achieve the landscape 
'in here' as it is so very abstract. If humans could only perceive a 
landscape of spatially dispered, bright and dark, coloured shapes, 
they would hardly have survived the rigours of natural selection for 
long. To exploit the environment to their advantage, they have always 
had to be able to ascertain how its constituent shapes and spaces will 
bear upon their activities, which is one of the reasons why the idea 
of order in the landscape cannot be generally confined to one of 
geometry. Shape and space are immediately, if not simultaneously, 
enriched with further meaning, so humans, outside the laboratory and 
the art gallery, rarely see abstract compositions; they see fertile 
soil, old oak trees, waterfalls, home, and so on. 
This enrichment forms the second stage in the translation by the brain 
of nerve messages sent in by the eyes, and it, too, can be described 
as an hypothesis testing procedure in which the brain seeks to 
establish the most likely character of the objects present. In 
attributing more elaborate meanings to the shapes and spaces already 
identified, two additional sources of evidence are tapped. Firstly, 
the brain does not use visual stimuli in isolation. They may be the 
dominant providers of sensory evidence, but the countryside can be 
heard, smelt and touched as well. Stimuli obtained by the ears, nose 
and skin are of assistance in reaching conclusions about the 
landscape, adding dimensions beyond those of the purely visual - the 
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texture underfoot, the smells of a place, and so on. At this point, 
then, in discussing landscape perception, where the significance of 
landscape makes vast gains in richness and complexity, it becomes 
necessary to reintroduce the other senses. They work together with 
vision to furnish the most reliable sensory grounds possible for the 
construction of the. landscape 'in here'. 
The process of construction, however, is still a long way from 
completion even when the stimuli obtained by all the senses have been 
taken into account. A second source of evidence is required if, for 
example, a rustling, green and brown, vaguely round blob on a rough, 
vertical column is to be perceived as Quercus robur, the solid English 
oak, relict of the Wildwood, habitat of many moths, or whatever. Such 
concrete and detailed perceptions are derived by bringing into play a 
conceptual, as opposed to a directly sensory, kind of evidence that is 
not tied to the immediate moment, but, like the ability to apprehend 
shape and space, is built out of past experience. Perceiving and 
thinking are connected activities, and the framing of concepts is so 
powerful a force, in humans at least, that it could be said to have 
over-riding control of play. In fact the manner in which hypotheses 
about the whole significance of landscape are tested cannot be viewed 
as a chain of reactions occurring in one direction only. Stimulus 
information is fed in by the senses and used to check hypotheses, but 
the pieces of information which are selected and obtained are largely 
governed by the mental concepts which give rise to hypotheses. 
Conceptual schemes 
In one way, all animals could be said to perceive what their 
environment means to them by testing out hypotheses - the frog 
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postulates that flying black dots are edible - but, in many such 
instances, the process seems restricted, expectations being derived 
instinctively rather than creatively. This is of no consequence when 
a species is in possession of other efficient survival techniques - 
frogs are most successful, and would probably consider themselves to 
be at the top of the evolutionary ladder. However, among the 'higher' 
mammals especially, there developed a tendency to solve some survival 
problems by placing greater reliance on a mental flexibility in 
attributing significance to the environment which involved formulating 
expectations on the basis of remembered previous encounters. The 
advantages of this technique were perhaps nowhere more needed than in 
the case of the grounded pre-human apes who were without formidable 
physical abilities, and thus could only survive by vastly expanding 
the mental ability to weld past and future together into each present 
moment of perception: 
23 
"The arboreal environment had led to the development of excellent 
vision and a uniquely flexible response capability through the 
combination of upright posture and grasping hand. But a cleverly 
crafted plan and a cleverly crafted tool in the hand were 
necessary to take advantage of these natural assets. The 
planning and anticipating required for survival favoured the 
development of a larger more flexible information-handling 
capacity. " 
The pre-human (or now human? ) apes pursued a life of hunting and/or 
gathering which required extensive knowledge of where food and shelter 
might be found in the locality, of the habits of animals to be chased, 
and of dangers to be avoided. Strategies for hunting had to be worked 
out, and new opportunities continually discovered, whether in the home 
area or further afield. An ability to cope with, and preferably 
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exploit, changing conditions was needed, not least because this was a 
time of spasmodic glaciations that affected the climate world-wide. 
In adapting to such pressures, the intellectual capacity was 
selectively developed, an adaptation which brought increases in the 
range of survival possibilities open to the human species. 
24 It was 
now able to create solutions to problems posed by the environment 
which could be changed to suit different places, as well as when they 
no longer worked. 
But how to make the best use of information that might be obtained 
from the environment once its exact interpretation was no longer so 
instinct-bound? In the precarious existence of the early humans, 
there would not have been time to review all the information 
available, most of which would be irrelevant, before making a decision 
and acting upon it, nor did their brains have infinite storage space 
for an indefinitely large number of unique memories. 
25 
"... somehow the organism must operate on a more schematic basis. 
Out of the diversity and uncertainty the organism must be able to 
extract the essence of an object. In some sense the organism 
must have a prototype or ideal of an object, the instances of 
which are often poor shadows. Note, however, that this essence 
is presumably not an innate preconception of the object; rather 
it must be some sort of statistical summary based on many 
individual experiences. Efficient perception therefore depends 
on objects and situations having recurrent properties; that is, 
properties that occur together with reasonable frequency in the 
environment. Thus from an adaptive point of view, there appears 
to be a strong argument for... identifying the current situation 
in a way that capitalizes on past regularities and requires only 
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a relatively small amount of information out of the diverse and 
uncertain environment. " 
Humans evolved an ability to schematically organise regularities 
previously perceived in landscape which allowed specific hypotheses to 
be formulated that could he confirmed or denied by the senses checking 
a relatively small proportion of the total quantity of stimulus 
information available. The schemes, held in the form of intellectual 
concepts, could then be either reinforced, corrected or rejected, and 
the next hypothesis produced. A constant rhythm of perceptual 
activity thus came about which established meaningful order on the 
landscape; a rhythm that has been inherited and maintained by each 
succeeding generation. 
At the heart of this activity lies the conceptual scheme, and those 
who regard it as the driving force in human perception26 frequently 
emphasise that it is not akin to a photographic representation. The 
external landscape cannot be mentally reproduced verbatim, there would 
be little advantage in doing so. Instead, cognitive constructions are 
made on a few, particular aspects of the landscape which are 
considered applicable to the purposes in hand, and the mode of 
construction overall can be described as one of classification. Now, 
it has been argued, by some structuralists especially, that all human 
thought is binary; that the brain inherently functions in such a way 
as to always divide selected arrays of experience between two opposing 
categories, for example, natural/artificial, raw/cooked, 
wild/domestic. But although the brain does have a tendency to 
distinguish binary opposition, which is, after all, the simplest 
system of classification, it has been found to operate in a more 
complicated fashion as well, 
27 
when dealing with more complicated 
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realms of experience. The number of categories employed need not be 
restricted to two in all situations, nor need the relationships 
between categories necessarily consist of oppositions only. All that 
can be said, at this most general level, is that the human brain 
retains patterns of classes and connections through which the 
perceiver is able to come to terms with landscape. 
These schemes of classification are of a symbolic kind and, as 
Susanne Langer has put it, 
28 in spontaneously generating symbolic 
patterns, the brain is working as naturally as the kidneys, having 
been primed to do so by the course of evolution. Symbols are the 
basic material of thought, and thinking organisms are forever 
producing symbolic versions of experience. But the earliest humans 
not only began to think symbolically, they also developed a speech 
faculty which enabled them to communicate symbollically; the capacity 
to use language had evolved. Whether human thought is conceivable 
except as embodied in language is a chicken-and-egg question. Many 
structuralists would argue29 that it is by their language capacity, 
rather than their intellectual capacity, that humans are distinguish- 
able from other animal species. Be that as it may, the ability to use 
words to classify objects and situations, and to combine words by 
following grammatical rules indicating relationships, must have been 
of immense benefit in the struggle to exploit the environment and 
survive. 
30 Individuals could now learn indirectly about experiences 
of other members of species, avoiding mistakes that had already been made 
and profiting from successful options already discovered. They could 
acquire ready-made conceptual schemes for locating signficant 
regularities in the landscape, and, in this, the naming of things 
seems to have been, and continues to be, of vital importance. 
31 
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Words, then, carry the categories and associations that give meaning 
to the landscape, thereby allowing perception to be completed. 
However, the whole subject of language is far too difficult to be 
tackled in this thesis, and it will therefore he taken for granted 
that language and conceptual schemes are closely bound together, both 
belonging to the human ability to symbolise, and open to being treated 
as one. A study which concentrated on the use of language with 
respect to landscape would probably prove most interesting, but this 
is not the path to be followed here, where the stress is on the whole 
process of landscape perception. 
One point remains to he made about the genetically inherited part 
which the conceptual. scheme plays in this process. Perception has 
already been discussed as being managed in an inherently active way - 
the senses actively seek stimuli, the brain actively tests hypotheses. 
And once the grounds for making hypotheses about the significance of 
landscape were no longer instinctive but symbolic, an additional fund 
of activity was forthcoming, offering an advantage to accompany that 
of the opportunity to communicate. Now that the exact interpretations 
to be placed on landscape were not inbuilt, they had to be built up 
symbolically, and, in doing this humans seem to have become strongly 
motivated by curiosity. They had to he prepared for an active 
intellectual struggle to obtain concepts that would enable the 
landscape to he categorised and understood; an unceasing struggle 
because it would always be possible to extend symbolic systems of 
classification further, covering wider aspects and new aspects of the 
landscape. Conceptual schemes could be acquired and extended by 
making two related lines of inquiry: firstly, into knowledge 
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accumulated by other members of the species, through the medium of 
language; and secondly, into the landscape itself, by conducting 
personal explorations32 the results of which could eventually be 
passed on to others. Both lines of inquiry were biologically 
essential for the survival of humanity, but what encouragement could 
individuals receive to construct viable means of conceptualising 
landscape? 
The biological basis of emotion? 
Throughout this thesis it is being maintained that landscape 
perception is inevitably qualitative, combining understanding of 
landscape with feeling for landscape; comprehension and emotion being 
quite inseparable while the perceptual process is in action. When the 
process is dissected, the evolutionary and neurophysiological 
explanations of intellectual activity might seem tenuous enough, but 
an explanation of the basis of human emotion must be almost completely 
speculative. The natural sciences have had little to say about it. 
Moreover, there are dangers in becoming too involved with arguments 
which attempt to link feelings for landscape with the evolution of 
neural structures and functions, because this can lead back to 
something like the stimulus-response models rejected in the Prologue. 
But emotion, in the widest sense, permeates the perception of 
landscape, and cannot, therefore, be put on one side and ignored. 
A most helpful way of tackling this problem has been suggested by 
Jay Appleton. In developing, and to some extent relaxing, his 
original prospect-refuge theory, 
33 Appleton proposed that individual 
animals do not perform activities necessary for their, and their 
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species', survival for that fact alone, but for the pleasure they 
derive from such activities. In the case of the propensity to 
explore, for example, he has argued that: 34 
"We enjoy discovering the nature of our surroundings, and it is 
Tust as well that we do, because, in a state of nature, a 
creature's chances of survival are often dependent on its ability 
to exploit the environment to its own strategic advantage. We 
need the knowledge that comes from exploration, but we explore 
because it is fun. " 
The existence of emotion, then, is reasonable from an evolutionary 
standpoint as it would have encouraged the early humans in their 
efforts to pursue the constructive course of perception with which 
they had become endowed. There might he a pleasurable excitement in 
discovering something strange and apparently complicated, yet 
successfully creating the categories that enabled it to be understood 
and perhaps used beneficially. There might he satisfaction in finding 
that a landscape was easily recognisable in terms of concepts already 
devised, and that the features present could he named. There might be 
a quiet enjoyment in the security of the familiar. Equally, there 
might he fear of the over-complicated, disappointment when little was 
recognisable, boredom when things were so familiar that the urge to 
inquire was never challenged. A combination of positive and negative 
emotions thereby became a vital ingredient in the perceptual process, 
providing spurs, checks and rewards in the struggle to give landscape 
sufficient meaning and character to make its exploitation possible. 
At the same time as the capacity to derive symbolic systems of 
classification was selectively developed, linkages in the brain, 
between the areas devoted to thought and the centres giving rise to 
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emotion, must have either been established or, more likely 
strengthened in comparison to those of the immediate primate ancestor. 
By stimulating them with electrodes, centres of pleasure and pain have 
been found occurring close together and scattered throughout the human 
brain, and they seem to consist of units rather like the 'feature 
detectors' which codify hypotheses about shape. 
35 How they work is 
uncertain , but a good proportion have nervous connections with 
regions of the cerebral cortex where intellectual activity appears to 
take place, and perhaps the resultant electrical charges fire the 
neural units of pleasure and pain. 
36 
D. E. Berlyne, 37 who conducted extensive laboratory research on 
"hedonic value" by measuring evaluative responses to geometrical 
shapes, believed that the pleasure and pain centres are not activated 
by absolute amounts of electrical stimulation, the effect of which is 
known to wear off after a while, but by changes in the quantity of 
charge produced by changes in levels of interpretive effort. 
Complicated shapes demanded greater effort and were rated exciting; 
simple shapes were easy to interpret and were rated satisfying. In 
addition, he located cut-off points where levels of activity became 
"aversive": if the effort already being expended was high, a further 
increase could engender anxiety and confusion; alternatively, if the 
initial state of activity was low, a further decrease led to an 
experience of boredom and monotony. Berlyne's ideas have been applied 
to the perception of the urban landscape by the American architect, 
Amos Rapoport. 
38 He argues that in seeking a perceptual order, people 
like neither very simple nor very complex environments, and that 
somewhere between the two lies a peak of satisfaction where simplicity 
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and complexity are at an equilibrium, the landscape offering enough to 
be relied on and enough to be investigated as to promote maximum 
stimulation of the pleasure units. 
Yet although Rapoport recognises that learning can induce variation in 
what is taken as simple or complex, he gives the example of a botanist 
finding more complexity in a forest than a layman, there is a 
suspicion that he considers only one kind of classification to be 
possible, the one that is the property of the external landscape 
itself, and that individuals vary in the facility with which they can 
use it. This is probably a legacy of Berlyne's reductively geometric 
notion of order, but a forest in the landscape, say, produces a far 
greater range of stimulus information than a dodecahedron in the 
laboratory, and can also have much more of an impact on people. They 
must, therefore, be able to find a particular system of classification 
for the forest which is relevant to their own interests and 
activities, and, as such interests and activities will vary, so will 
the content of the categories and associations employed. Pygmies' 
conceptions of a forest will be of quite a different order to 
botanists', although both might appreciate high levels of complexity 
and be excited by them. As has already been emphasised, this 
flexibility in devising different kinds of conceptual schemes to give 
signficance to the landscape was of great survival advantage to humans 
and is now an inherited trait. It means that there is not just a 
single continuum from the simple to the complex in any landscape, but 
at least the possibility that several different continua will exist, 
depending upon the ways the landscape is classified by different 
individuals. A variety of particular classificatory schemes, as well 
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as a variety in the facility with which schemes are used, must be 
taken into account. 
1-lowever, to regard simplicity/complexity as the fulcrum of emotion in 
the perceptual process is still hardly sufficient to capture the full 
qualitative nature of the -landscape 'in here', that is, if there is 
any hope of capture. It has just been repeated that the conceptual 
scheme through which landscape is perceived must be a scheme with a 
particular content, consisting of a definite set of categories and 
associations which are inclined to vary between individuals in 
different circumstances. A scheme of symbolic classification never 
occurs in perception as that - as an abstract mental framework - there 
would be little benefit in it. When in operation, specific categories 
and specific associations are built onto the underlying framework, and 
some, if not all, of these particular schemes would seem to be 
attached to positive or negative connotations. Stephen Kaplan39 
proposes that through experience certain sets of "representations", 
as he calls them, become linked by nervous pathways in the brain to 
certain pleasure or pain units which are fired when the hypotheses 
they represent are confirmed. Presumably, for the early humans, this 
was another aid to survival, reinforcing their ability to immediately 
recognise a favourable or unfavourable pattern in. the landscape and to 
react accordingly. The actual reasons why such linkages should come 
into force, the kinds of experiences which might have established 
them, can only he explained within the particular contexts they 
appeared, and a number of specific cases will he discussed later in 
Section V of the thesis. But before the detailed content of a few 
conceptual schemes can be described, its sources must be investigated. 
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Beyond the gene 
So far, in concentrating upon the genetically inherited factors 
contributing to the process of perception, a series of rather empty 
generalities has been put forward with regard to landscape quality. 
However, this is in the very nature of things. During the Pleistocene 
period, a certain ape species evolved the survival ploy of relying on 
symbolic, instead of instinctive, constructions to find meaningful 
order in landscape. Physiological and neurophysiological capacities 
were developed for collating the experiences of a life-time into 
conceptual schemes of classification whose content was both 
communicable and changeable, and which generated the hypotheses to be 
tested by the senses. Paradoxically, this genetically inherited 
ability to symbolise cut the tie between the course of evolution and 
the genes on chromosomes in the body cells. For the species endowed 
with it, every adaptation to a particular niche in the environment no 
longer had to become part of physical make-up as, for landscape 
perception. at least, modifications could he made intellectually rather 
than organically. 
According to several humans, 
40 
the relaxation of the bond between the 
gene and the struggle for survival brought evolution to new heights, 
making it `exosomatic', and proving to he the most successful 
innovation ever produced by random mutation and natural selection. 
From an evolutionary standpoint, four biological advantages may he 
distinguished. Firstly, the course of human evolution became overtly 
goal-directed as individuals consciously sought for the symbolic 
schemes that would enable them to cope with the survival problems they 
knew they faced. Secondly, errors made in the search for a solution 
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to a problem did not have to be eliminated by the death of the 
individuals who made them, which happened when erroneous attempts were 
in the form of inappropriate, random, physical mutations. Symbolic 
modes of classifying the environment which turned out to he a threat 
to safety-could he modified or rejected by the-very persons 
experimenting with them, and life was preserved for finding a more 
suitable mode of approach. Thirdly, in consequence of being freed 
from the length of time required for the reproductive cycle and for 
favourable chance mutations to occur, exosomatic evolution could 
proceed at a much faster rate than genetic evolution. Adaptive 
techniques employed by humans could come and go within the span of one 
generation if necessary: refection of failures could be rapid, and 
quick capitalisation made of successes, which. might be taken to high 
levels of refinement within a comparatively short period. Fourthly, 
in addition to the easing of temporal restrictions, there was an 
easing of geographical restrictions, since, as frequently remarked, 
the ability to symbolise allowed a variety of adaptations to be made 
by members of the same species so that a variety of environmental 
types could be colonised. 
All these advantages, however, would have been cancelled out, and the 
first apes who possessed them much better off with fixed, instinctive 
mechanisms of interpretation, but for one other biological factor - 
they were social animals capable of exosomatic transmission41 of 
survival strategies among themselves. Individuals were not forever 
starting from square one in constructing useful symbolic systems for 
coming to terms with landscape because the anthropoid apes had already 
developed the habit of living in groups, and, almost from the day they 
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were born, they were the recipients of the particular adaptive 
techniques devised by fellow members of their own hand. The 
transmission of these techniques was no longer genetic, but in the 
form of language -a verbalisation of symbolic schemes - and 
experiences passed on in . 
this way could he accumulated into a body of 
adaptive customs shared by everyone in the social group; a body that 
was always open to additions, modifications and refinements from 
contributions made by succeeding generations. This cultural 
inheritance became just as natural to humanity as their genetic 
inheritance, being indeed a product of it, but, whereas the latter 
furnished only a relatively loose structure for the perceptal process, 
culture filled out much of that structure with more specific sets of 
symbols according to which the landscape could be categorised and 
understood. 
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lv rrir: UULTURAL INHERITANCE* 
The extent of the cultural contribution 
In any account of rural landscape quality, some consideration of 
culture is required precisely because there is a requisite cultural 
element within the process of perception from which springs the 
character and emotional significance of landscape. Humans live in 
social groups which are never merely collections of solitary 
individuals but consist of people communicating and interacting with 
each other according to the social arrangements and organisations that 
they have created and that bind them together. Culture is inseparable 
from social interaction, that is, from civilisation, and the 
perceiver's cultural inheritance makes an essential contribution 
towards bringing the landscape into focus, acting as a repository of 
schemes constructed in the past for finding what is relevant and 
significant there. Little is perceived by human beings without 
reference to this naturally derived yet artificially created domain. 
It is co-extensive with physiological and neurophysiological 
attributes, working in conjunction with them in the establishment of a 
perceived order in the landscape; a specific order which makes sense 
to the perceiver. But how does this come about, how is the cultural 
inheritance comprised? 
Looking back and picturing human societies on their initial 
development, it might perhaps have been easy to recognise as a 
cultural body all the knowledge they had obtained and shared amongst 
themselves. This knowledge, in the form of collectively owned schemes 
of classification, would have enabled members of communities to adapt 
to their particular surroundings: picking out the features and events 
* References p14O-141 below 
118 
important to survival; making the appropriate deductions; and then 
taking suitable action. However, even at the time when this 
exosomatic method of adaptation evolved, some individuals and groups 
were probably following up the opportunities it offered for 
diversification and elaboration. Very soon, the whole body of 
knowledge about the landscape held in common must have become so 
various and wide ranging that it would have been, as it continues to 
be, less easy to identify as a single cultural entity. In the face of 
such an heterogeneous phenomenon, all-inclusive descriptions of 
culture seem practically without point because in them the depth, 
richness and complexity of detail are lost. 
Nevertheless, while discussing the content of conceptual schemes in 
general, the cultural inheritance will be taken to embrace the entire 
range of human knowledge applicable to the landscape. It stretches, 
say from first century Celtic knowledge of the spirits dwelling in 
springs and trees, to twentieth century ecological knowledge of the 
vegetational cycle in beech woodland on chalk plateaux; each provides 
a way of focussing on an aspect of landscape. Thus, myth, art, 
religion, and science too, will all be regarded as manifestations of 
culture, and culture as an inevitable participant in the act of 
perception: 
I 
"Man cannot escape his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the 
conditions of his own life. No longer in a merely physical 
universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art 
and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied 
threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human 
experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines 
upon and strengthens this net.... [Man] has so enveloped himself 
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in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or 
religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the 
interposition of this artificial medium. " 
Further investigation of the cultural medium, from within the medium 
itself, of course, cannot be the concern of natural science. Given 
that a substantial proportion of the meaning attributed to landscape 
occurs within a social context (the rest being contributed by 
individual factors which will be discussed later2), and that this body 
of knowledge is necessarily liable to a much greater degree of 
variation than the structure and functions of the senses and the 
brain, the path of discussion must now turn towards the social 
sciences, the humanities. From the view that these can provide, 
culture still appears as it has been defined naturally - as adaptive, 
pluralistic and changeable - but much greater elucidation of these 
characteristics is possible in the light of material made available 
by, for example, anthropology, sociology and history. The former is 
especially useful in making the transition from genetic to exosomatic 
evolution because certain schools of anthropology consider the social 
attributes of a community to be responses to pressures exerted by the 
environment. 
3 
An agent of adaptation 
The idea that culture exists in relation to environmental setting can 
be traced back to the time when the Ancient Greeks first became aware 
of peoples living in different places with societies that differed 
from their own. 
4 However, although a deterministic stance was often 
assumed in the past, culture being seen as under the dictation of 
compelling environmental forces, modern anthropologists tend to 
advocate a more active and probabilistic interpretation. 
5 The 
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particular ecological composition of a place - the climate, relief, 
water supply, vegetation, animal life, and so on - would impose 
certain constraints, and also present certain possibilities for 
obtaining basic survival needs. How the community adapted to these, 
adjusting to the constraints and exploiting the possibilities, was a 
matter of selecting a package of solutions from among the range that 
could be devised to suit the particular circumstances. The cultural 
inheritance was not so much determined as determined upon, growing 
from the choices people made in tackling the problems posed by their 
environment, which were then passed on to their contemporaries and 
successors for further development. 
Nowadays, the adaptive function of culture is best observed in 
societies operating at, or near, subsistence level. 
6 Here, by 
definition, survival needs are just sufficiently covered: food comes 
from hunting and gathering or shifting agriculture; shelter is 
produced quickly, facilitating a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life. 
Communal knowledge and organisation would seem to be largely made up 
of techniques to simply stay alive in the natural environment, the 
cultural inheritance mediating the ecology for individuals by 
providing the conceptual categories and associations for arriving at 
an appropriate understanding of prevailing conditions. The example 
most frequently cited to illustrate this is that of the EskimOS7 whose 
immensley detailed knowledge of their land is encapsulated in rich 
vocabularies which name animal and plant species undifferentiated by 
outsiders, and which classify various kinds of winds and conditions of 
snow. They are able to travel across what appear to others as 
featureless snowy wastes guided by the direction and smell of winds 
and feel of ice and snow underfoot. Even though the majority of 
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Eskimos have now ceased full-time hunting, they are still, as might 
be 
expected, in receipt of at least a proportion of this adaptive 
tradition, often making long journeys over the snow and feeling drawn 
to a closeness with the land, the sea mammals and the caribou that 
they realise is slowly being lost as they become Westernised. In 
comparison, most resident Whites in the Artic usually stay within the 
settlements, passing only from building to building and shrinking from 
the fierceness of the unknown. It may be remarked that an exercise by 
Joseph Sonnenfeld8 indicated that this group much preferred American 
to Alaskan scenes, while Alaskan Eskimos tended to express a reverse 
order of preference. 
Similar examples abound, although many anthropological field studies 
have concentrated on internal social structure and treated the 
categorisation of landscape pursued in society as something of a side 
issue. One of the clearest expositions by an anthropologist of the 
connection between a group's traditions and their ecological setting 
has been provided by R. A Rappoport9 whose aim was to show how ritual 
regulated relationships with the environment. He spent a year with 
the Tsembaga people of Papua New Guinea, a group that had had little 
previous contact with Europeans. They occupied a mountainous inland 
region which above five thousand feet was covered in thick primary 
forest with a limestone cliff at the highest point, and which below 
five thousand feet was mainly secondary forest interspersed with 
dwellings and fields that were shifted every year. There were five 
clans within the Tsembaga grouping, each with a territory covering 
stretches of high and low land. Like the Eskimos, the Tsembaga had an 
elaborate nomenclature for the plants in the region, and one of these, 
a small tree called yu min rumbin, had special significance as 
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representing territorial claims. Each clan planted this 'men's souls 
bush' in their home area, and while it was in the ground no fighting 
could take place. During times of peace, food was accumulated by 
hunting, slash and burn cultivation and, most importantly, pig 
husbandry, the pigs being kept as pets and living in the women's 
houses. For assistance in these activities, the Tsembaga called upon 
the cold and wet 'spirits of the low ground, ' their properties in a 
tropical climate leading to softness and decay thereby contributing to 
soil fertility. A 'good' place in the low ground was where the 
spirits were beneficient and a quantity of food could be produced 
quickly. Once this had been done, usually to the point where the 
number of pigs was causing nuisance in the houses and gardens, a clan 
would begin festivities which involved the sacrifice and eating of 
many pigs. These would culminate in the uprooting of the clan's tree 
and war was declared on a neighbouring clan who then uprooted their 
tree with shorter ceremony. Both sides invoked the 'spirits of the 
high ground' who were men killed in past hostilities now occupying the 
virgin forest and who were hot, dry and hard conveying strength in 
battle. In addition, they appealed to the 'smoke woman' of the 
limestone cliff, who presided over the shamanistic ecstasies obtained 
when ritually smoking locally grown tobacco, and who was the ultimate 
spiritual arbiter. Battle would continue until a clan successfully 
invaded enemy territory, had been defeated, or had run out of food. A 
truce was then called, the clan trees replanted and the ritual cycle 
begun over again. So, Rappoport was able to discern in this cycle, 
and in the knowledge and organisations that accompanied it, a 
communal method of handling survival problems set by the conditions of 
climate, food availability, vegetation and territorial range, and 
which involved a certain symbolic scheme for classifying the landscape. 
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This brief glance at Tsembaga traditions brings to notice a striking 
point about the culture of subsistence societies all over the world, 
namely, their possession of spiritual ways of coming to terms with 
landscape. Living in close contact with the natural environment, that 
is, living relatively close to the borders of biological need, would 
seem t-o 'engender an awareness of the divine. For such peoples, the 
real world could be said to be the sacred world, 
10 
although 
understanding of sanctity might differ from place to place. Many 
groups hold, or once held, animistic beliefs akin to those of the 
Tsembaga. The Alaskan Eskimos, for example, traditionally defined 
features within their homeland according to the ghosts, trolls 
mermaids or giant beasts resident there. 
" Others believed in a 
single divine presence encompassing the whole of their surroundings; 
for example the Pygmies of the Central African forests would sing and 
dance the praises of the supreme forest deity, and scorned the beliefs 
of neighbouring village-based tribes who thought the forest was 
animated by a multiplicity of evil spirits. 
12 And similarly, perhaps, 
a pastoral society in the Middle Eastern deserts, some thousands of 
years ago, became aware of the one God. There has been a suggestion13 
that knowledge about the spiritual significance of landscape was 
gained, by groups living at subsistence level, through the recognition 
of their very close ties with the surrounding environment which 
encouraged them to project onto it concepts they had developed in 
their experience of social life. The human group belonged, together 
with the rest of the landscape, to the one great social body which was 
organised, maybe in an heirachical way, and made up of living beings, 
who might be human or non-human, and who might be creative or 
destructive. Still, whatever the connection, it is surely paradoxical 
that societies engaged in a continual struggle for survival should so 
often have possessed such strong religious inclinations. 
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A spiritual categorisation of landscape could be an agent of 
adaptation, as observed in the case of the Tsembaga. It could also be 
an expression of a group's ability to cope with a particular setting 
as, to cite another example, might be seen in the contrast between the 
Pygmies' love of the kindly deity presiding over the dense forest 
where they hunted and thrived, and the evilness attributed to the same 
forest by other tribes who were forever struggling to clear it for 
their villages and fields, and who were incapable of living inside the 
forest itself. 14 But although religion may have embodied many 
survival techniques, the knowledge thus supplied tended to go far 
beyond that obviously necessary for obtaining basic subsistence. 
Understanding was provided of things that would otherwise be 
inexplicable to the group, eg the reasons behind the occurence of 
water or sudden crop failure, as well as giving answers to wider 
questions such as why the land and its people existed at all. Some- 
times religious knowledge would even seem to have been a hindrance. 
Alaskan Eskimos once avoided certain lakes well-stocked with fish 
because they feared the resident spirits, and it was disbelieving 
Whites who eventually demonstrated the absence of danger. 
'5 So, even 
in societies where simply finding enough food and shelter to stay 
alive was of paramount concern, the cultural inheritance was not 
confined to strictly adaptive practices. Their religious under- 
standing broke the bounds of this evolutionary model, and tackled 
problems which were not always life-and-death problems, but sought to 
satisfy the inherent need to know, to explore, to classify and explain 
- an intellectual, rather than a purely biological, survival need. It 
is therefore likely that the description given of Tsembaga traditions 
is overly reductive, an outsider's emphasis on basic survival 
techniques, and, to mention a non-religious example, the Eskimos 
apparently distinguished many plant and animal species which were 
125 
never of any use to their subsistence activities-16 The cultural 
inheritance, while providing humanity with the means of adaptation to 
the natural environment, contained within itself the opportunity to 
venture occasionally into a state where the threat of extinction was 
less severe, that is, where "not all problems are survival problems"17 
in the narrow sense of adapt-or-die. 
The social environment 
The way that ideas of 'adaptation' and 'survival' are applied to human 
societies also has to be modified by the consideration that culture 
tends to reflect back on itself, producing a social environment to 
which members of the group must also adapt if they are to survive 
physically, mentally and spiritually. Perhaps with the exception of 
the very earliest societies, culture cannot be solely comprehended in 
relation to the natural surroundings because the shared knowledge that 
is built up in coping with these, the schemes of classification that 
give meaning to the landscape, also consitutes a surrounding which 
exerts influence of a symbolic kind over every member of society. 
Each person is coerced, through the medium of the spoken, written or 
printed word, into assimilating the categories and associations that 
have become communally established, although the effect on their own 
modes of perception may vary from complete acceptance to rejection and 
the derivation of new schemes. This gives an indication of the 
strange inconsistency between subjective and objective features which 
emerges whenever culture is discussed generally. 
18 Undoubtedly, 
culture only has existence in the individuals who create, employ and 
transmit it to one another, yet it also appears to be partially separated 
from the lives and minds of specific people, an objectified 
19 outside 
force which moulds their perception of landscape and which can sometimes 
be perpetuated without their fully conscious participation. An attempt 
126 
will be made in Section V20 to trace the connections between one 
individual, William Gilpin, founder of the Picturesque movement, and the 
cultural climate enveloping him, which he managed to change in certain 
respects and which retained evidence of his efforts long after his death. 
However, the present concern, in working down from the universal towards 
the individual, is with culture in the objectified state, that is with 
the semi-independent social environment, and this occurs in two related 
guises: material and organisational. 
A social group most obviously produces an environment of its own when 
its members make material alterations to the natural surroundings. 
Such alterations are now so extensive that only a small proportion of 
the world's land surface remains in an entirely natural condition. 
a greater or lesser extent, the rest has become socialised into a 
range of cultural landscapes (a phrase from geography) where the 
symbolic schemes, developed by the inhabitants in their search for 
orders of meaning in the landscape, have found some physical 
expression. 
21 Capitalising on their tool-making abilities, human 
societies have attempted to manipulate the physical. environment, 
implementing there the knowledge they share so as to satisfy 
biological needs and wider interests. Thus in many, but not all, 
cases, the conceptual order discovered in landscape has been 
To 
translated into a material one, objects being fashioned and placed in 
the environment which bear a reflection of symbolic patterns of 
thought, thereby, becoming recognisable as symbols themselves. And, 
in turn, those concepts that have been reinforced by objectification 
develop a hold over the community to which it must also find ways of 
adapting. Where an artificial, cultural landscape has been created, 
therefore, the relationship between the modified physical landscape 
'out there' and the perceived landscape 'in here' is extremely 
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, ever more so with the passage of time as the one 
rebounds on the other. 
A major complicating factor in this relationship must have been the 
invention of agriculture which had enormous implications both on the 
material and organisational elements of the social environment. In 
hunting and gathering societies, the most that was done towards 
creating a cultural landscape was likely to have been the 
identification of important places by a shrine or territorial marker 
and the beating out of a framework of paths between these places. 
Indeed, some groups may not have gone so far as this if they were in 
any way similar to the Australian Aborigines who, until this century, 
made no significant alterations to their land which they largely 
understood by referring to the mythological adventures of their 
Dreamtime ancestors. 
22 But once a society adopted agricultural 
practices as the accepted manner of obtaining subsistence, animals and 
plants were put to human uses which removed them from the realms of 
the natural. 
23 The agricultural community soon became surrounded by a 
given pattern of pastures, fields, tracks and so on, as well as the 
accidental results of their activities, such as the secondary forest 
produced by the Tsembaga. Certain groups went on to develop 
agriculture to the point where a more settled way of life could be 
adopted and the whole pattern of land use was given greater 
permanency. Fields no longer had to be shifted frequently and grazing 
followed a more regular cycle so that, for example, the hedges, walls, 
ditches, meadows and coppice woodlands became fixtures along with the 
houses, villages, roads and shrines. 
In addition, the turning away from nomadic or semi-nomadic habits 
would seem to have been accompanied by the production of food 
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surpluses, and gradually the societies involved ceased to operate at 
subsistence level. This, of course, had numerous consequences for the 
social environment, among them the eventual construction of towns and 
cities, where the physical environment has undergone substantial 
modification, and where non-subsistence, non-agricultural concepts 
could be created for finding meaning in the rural landscape. City 
dwellers might consider themselves fortunate to have escaped from the 
dirt, drudgery and dullness of the farmed countryside. Alternatively, 
it might offer them a retreat from the hectic pace of urban life - an 
idea that Yi-Fu Tuan has found mentioned in the Epic of Gilgamesh, 
composed in the third millenium BC by someone of the urbanised 
Sumerian civilisation. 
24 This latter interpretation could be pursued 
much further by the section of the population freed from continually 
working the land. They often belonged to that class of people who 
were rich enough and had time enough to design gardens, which gave 
expression to the new concepts they derived. It is perhaps within the 
highly controlled confines of the garden that symbolic schemes 
employed in perceiving landscape can be most fully realised as 
material objects. 
The advent of a non-subsistence type of economy thus placed at least 
some members of society in the luxurious position of being able to 
concentrate their energies on developing sets of categories and 
associations for understanding landscape with little immediate bearing 
upon the problems of just staying alive. It has already been observed 
that even in those social groups constantly faced with the struggle to 
find sufficient food and shelter, symbolic schemes of classification 
had been extended to cover aspects of the landscape which aroused 
interest but were not strictly relevant to basic survival. This 
tendency received a great impetus with the production of food 
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surpluses which eased the stringent conditions of a subsistence way of 
life and increased the opportunities to satisfy intellectual needs for 
some sections of society. So, again, the narrowly adaptive function 
of culture was exceeded. 
However, it should always be remembered that this relative freedom was 
gained-within the patterns of social organisation that were developed 
in producing and distributing the agricultural surpluses. A Marxist 
viewpoint is useful here, especially as Karl Marx (1818-1883) considered 
himself the Darwin of economics, because institutional arrangements 
can be seen as techniques for allowing members of society to adapt, in 
a wider sense, to whatever mode of production is employed. Once such 
techniques become communally established as the accepted way of doing 
things, they can come to appear as the only way, acquiring an 
objectified status that contributes to the social environment 
surrounding each individual: 
25 
"An institutional world, then, is experienced as an objective 
reality. It has a history that antedates the individual's birth 
and is not accessible to his biographical recollection. It was 
there before he was born, and it will be there after his death. 
This history itself, as the tradition of existing institutions, 
has the character of objectivity .... The institutions, as 
historical and objective factities, confront the individual as 
undeniable facts. The institutions are there, external to him, 
persistent in their reality, whether he likes it or not. " 
To take a brief example from a subsistence society, where the 
relationship between social organisation and mode of production also 
pertains, Paul Shepard26 has suggested that Jewish culture emerged 
among a group of people who had developed strict heirachical and 
patriachal institutions to enable them to extract a living from the 
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harsh semi-arid regions of the Middle East. The nomadic tribespeople, 
driven with their flocks from one temporary pasture to another, sought 
to subjugate the hostile land that God had put beneath them in the 
heirachical order He had created, an interpretation which was perhaps 
enhanced by contact with other communities who believed in the female 
character of the land, Earth Mother. Eventually, the concept of man 
versus the land was incorporated into the Old Testament, and thereby 
had considerable influence later on Western thought. 
Another example that may be cited, this time from a market economy, is 
that given by Raymond Williams27 in his discussion of the 
understanding of landscapes developed by eighteenth century English 
aristocratic landowners. Previously, these people had regarded their 
estates in feudal terms as an inheritance with certain duties and 
income attached. But with the invention of new agricultural 
technology and the rise of a new agrarian capitalism, the landowners 
came to feel about their estates in a more distant fashion as offering 
opportunities for investment and improvement, as sources of ever- 
growing profit. This distance enabled them, as it were, to take a 
step hack and cooly look at landscape as an artistic composition - 
'pleasing prospects' being a catch phrase of the eighteenth century. 
And because the landlords had gained a new confidence in their 
abilities to make the landscape move to their pre-arranged designs, 
vast landscape gardens were created where the artistic attitude was 
realised. They could complete their system of exploitation of 
agricultural land by imposing enclosure schemes, and the income from 
this could be spent on landscape gardens designed to provide pleasing 
prospects. Moreover, Howard Newby28 has argued that these gardens 
conveyed and exerted a dominating effect on the landowner' tenants and 
servants, symbolising power and wealth. 
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This illustrates three points about the social environment. Firstly, 
social organisation can be reflected in the material alterations made 
to the landscape. Secondly, social organisation entails social 
divisions. 29 These divisions probably had been present always, whether 
'between different levels in the heirachy, between the sexes, or 
between possessors of specialist skills, but the production of 
economic surpluses led to their enhancement and, of course, further 
proliferation occurred with the rise of complex industrial societies. 
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Thirdly, the social environment is subject to change. This is perhaps 
most easily seen where one set of material alterations, one cultural 
landscape, has been superimposed on another; for example where the 
boundary hedges of a feudal open field system encircle hedges planted 
during the Enclosure Movement, both having been partly removed to make 
way for the modern farming industry. It is in this respect that the 
English landscape, especially, has been called a 'palimpsest. ' 
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But however much the adaptive and survivalistic model is modified, it 
cannot encompass all the richness and diversity of a culture that has 
been evolving over many generations. There is something 
unsatisfactory, for instance, in the attempt to confine the whole 
ferment of artistic interest in landscape in the eighteenth century 
to modes and relations of production. The speed and complexity of 
exosomatic, cultural evolution, relative to genetic evolution, makes 
even the most refined adaptive and survivalistic explanations of a 
body of knowledge insufficient, at least to humans who are forever 
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entangled within culture, although the explanation might be quite 
plausible to a Martian biologist. Obviously, it makes evolutionary 
sense for a cultural inheritance to embrace a diversity of concepts 
and to be open to change so as to furnish as many solutions as 
possible to the problems of survival. 
32 But once the adaptive approach 
has demonstated that culture is neither monolithic or static, it has to 
be placed in reserve while a deeper investigation of the pluralistic 
and changeful nature of culture is conducted. 
Plurality and historical change 
However, exactly these characteristics obstruct much further 
discussion at the general level of the cultural contribution to the 
process of landscape perception. Throughout the preceeding argument 
about culture, particular examples have had to be cited constantly to 
show how the general framework becomes manifest in different ways at 
different times and places. But now, if the analysis is to be 
pursued, if the diverse pattern of conceptual schemes made available 
within society and their historical development are to be observed, it 
is necessary to descend altogether to the particular and concrete, and 
select out a specific cultural inheritance for closer examination. 
Selection is difficult because, given inherent diversity and 
flexibility, the limits to any one society are hard to distinguish. 
They may be more or less obvious in subsistence societies where a 
particular culture, as J. W. Berry argues, 
33 belongs to a particular 
group of people living within fairly definite geographical boundaries 
and interacting socially among themselves. However, with the onset of 
more divided societies where market and industrial economies promote 
various types and intensities of social interaction, as well as with 
the spread of communication networks and the movement of people and 
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ideas from place to place, the boundaries between one culture and 
another become more diffuse. 
34 It is equally possible, for example, 
to look at Western culture, British culture, English culture or 
English working class culture. In addition, social interaction may 
occur across geographical and national boundaries, as in the case of 
the scientific community. English ecologists, in certain respects, 
have more in common with their American counterparts than with English 
farmers or landscape painters. Still, the English do possess a 
characteristic culture of their own, and since a particular reference 
point is required for the purpose of discussion, the English cultural 
inheritance, as it pertains to landscape, has been chosen as the 
subject for the next section of this thesis where reasons for its 
selection are given. 
At this juncture, the direction of argument in the thesis must briefly 
go into reverse because, on the basis of the observations made later 
about English culture, a few finishing touches can be added to the 
theoretical framework with reference to the cultural inheritance. 
These consist of four main points that would seem to be applicable to 
other societies, although lack of infinite space in this volume 
prevents the provision of further detailed evidence in support of 
this assertion. 
35 
Firstly, any one cultural body of knowledge, at whatever scale it has 
been defined, contains within itself a repertoire of differing 
conceptual schemes for finding meaningful order in the landscape, 
rather than a single set of categories and associations to which 
everyone in society subscribes. Depending partly upon the extent of 
institutional divisions within society, a cultural inheritance 
encompasses a number of "segregated sub-universes of meaning"36 which 
134 
may, on occasion, be so diametrically opposed as to provoke conflict 
between fellow members of the group. A culture cannot, therefore, be 
safely characterised by some unitary mode of understanding, at least 
by anyone who examines it from the inside. What is distinctive is the 
particular distribution of knowledge entailed. But neither, to 
counteract the other extreme, can the various realms of knowledge 
covered by a characteristic distribution be regarded as completely 
divorced from one another. They are conditioned, although perhaps 
differently, by events happening in the shared physical and social 
environment, and similar historical circumstances may bind them 
together. Thus the repertoire is by the same composer, or school of 
composers, while each separate work remains in some way unique. 
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Secondly, however, this is not to say that all the works in the 
repertoire achieve equal prominence. Among the reasons why a 
particular cultural inheritance may appear unified is that one scheme 
for understanding landscape rises to a dominant position and gives the 
impression of being the only one in existence at the time. This may 
be because a sizeable majority of the population employ it, but, as 
Marxists would argue, 
38 
a set of ideas can also become dominant when 
propounded by the class of people dominating the institutional 
structure of society. In this situation, the elite may seek to impose 
their views on the rest of society, seeing themselves as the sole 
source of knowledge which eventually trickles down to the lower orders 
whose own, differing, subordinate views are discounted. It should be 
noted that since the elite are liable to obtain a virtual monopoly on 
books and paintings at periods when these are relatively expensive, 
printed and pictorial evidence cannot always be taken as 
representative of the concepts applied to landscape by all sections of 
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the population, some of whom anyway will be less inclined towards 
literature and art. 
39 Without a compensating recognition of the 
complete pattern of interlocking dominant and subordinate conceptual 
schemes, ideas that have assumed prominence will seem to have suddenly 
arrived from nowhere, although they may have been developed previously 
among less influential members of society over a long period. 
Likewise, when a dominant scheme falls from grace it may be thought to 
have disappeared completely, whereas it might be found hanging on in a 
subordinate position and still important to many people. A sort of 
'now you see it, now you don't' history does not take full account of 
the complexities of a cultural inheritance in which each constituent 
symbolic scheme of classification can only be adequately explained in 
the light of its historical development including those phases that 
occur in comparative obscurity. 
Thirdly, then, the ways in which landscape is understood owe a great 
deal to the historical past, having gone through a series of 
constructions and reconstructions to reach their present state. As 
has already been argued, 
40 
the whole process of landscape perception 
relies on the ability to use past experience to find meaning in the 
landscape and the emergence of culture enlarged this ability by 
allowing the transmission of experiences gained by both preceeding and 
contemporary generations. A particular conceptual scheme will reflect 
the path of development that it has followed within the social 
context, and signs of it can often be traced back into the remote past 
where their ultimate origins remain a matter of speculation. 
Clarence Glacken, for example, maintains that the philosophical, 
scientific and theological ideas about the earth characteristic of 
136 
Western society were all in existence by 30BC and most probably 
had 
been composed much earlier than that. 
41 But while perhaps retaining 
the same basic categories and associations, no conceptual scheme is 
passed on forever unaltered to the finest detail. As Glacken remarks 
of the Western concepts he examined: 
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"In their development, in the. changes and accretions coming about 
through time and circumstances, in their application at different 
times and places to different situations, they neither completely 
lost their original identity nor did they retain it. This 
process is typical of the history of an idea; it is like the 
history of a culture, which changes and innovates, accepting 
this, rejecting that, abandoning something held dear, each new 
synthesis preparing its own opportunities for further change, 
retention, or innovation. " 
So, fourthly, while historical change is actually brought about by 
particular individuals at particular times and places, the conditions 
for it have been set at the general level. There is the inherent 
propensity, emphasised before, 
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to extend, to elaborate, to adjust 
symbolic schemes of classification conveyed by the cultural 
inheritance, and to reject them when deemed unsuitable in favour of 
some innovative concept. But another factor that inspires and 
promotes change is the plurality of culture itself. 
44 Contact between 
separately defined societies, such as East and West, or the English 
and the Italian, as well as between different groups within the same 
society who adhere to dominant and subordinate schemes, gives added 
impetus to the tendency for communal knowledge to grow and evolve. 
An alternative way of finding order in the landscape poses a challenge 
to the accepted frame of reference, and reactions to the confrontation 
between them range from: defensive reinforcement of the accepted; its 
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modification through borrowing and assimilating selected aspects of 
the alternative; to a more or less wholesale revolution of ideas 
wherein the alternative both provides grounds for rejecting the 
accepted and for building its replacement. Linkages with certain 
previous modes of understanding can be traced even in the most 
innovatory concepts. They' rarely, if ever, come completely out of the 
blue, but consist of newly created versions, perhaps with major 
additions, born of the cross-fertilisation between differing 
conceptual schemes. 
Taken together, these four points - pluralism, dominance and 
subordination, historical background, historical change - serve to 
greatly enhance the complexity of the already complicated picture of 
cultural inheritance. Variation at the same time and with time is 
endemic. To return to the analogy made by Ernst Cassirer, 
45 
culture 
can be seen as a symbolic net or web woven of many strands of concepts 
about landscape, which are spun out as time passes, waxing and waning, 
sometimes separating into new strands; the intricate patterns created 
being in a constant state of flux, their edges difficult to see with 
the frequency of inter-cultural and intra-cultural ties. 
This does not exhaust the complexity. Taking a step closer reveals 
that the intertwining strands are spun of many individual fibres, each 
in some way different from the others. Cultural patterns owe their 
existence to individuals, to persons, and, at this finest level of 
detail, the plurality and changeability of meaningful orders found in 
the landscape is at its greatest. 
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To further examine the nature of rural landscape quality, then, this 
thesis must shift in focus from the general to the particular. So, 
Section V. which follows, looks at three selected strands within 
specifically English culture, while Section VI attempts to deal with 
the individual who receives both a genetic and cultural inheritance as 
a member of human society. 
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V ASPECTS OF ENGLISH CULTURE* 
Focussing on cultural content 
Discussion of the general form given to the conceptual schemes used in 
the process of. landscape perception by cultural inheritance was 
necessarily abstract and relatively short, as pointed out-towards the 
conclusion of Section IV. 
1 But this section in dealing with the 
detailed content that culture supplies for these schemes could be 
infinitely long. To prevent this, a selection of certain themes from 
the cultural repertoire must be made, which means identifying where 
one theme ends and another begins. Such an exercise is not really 
compatible with the nature of the cultural inheritance outlined in 
Section IV since it has been said to thrive on interaction and inter- 
linking of its diverse aspects. As Glacken has remarked: 
2 
'One does not easily isolate ideas for study out of that mass of 
facts, lore, musings and speculations which we call the thought 
of an age or of a cultural tradition; one literally tears and 
wrenches them out. There is nothing disembodied about them, and 
the cut is not clean. They are living small parts of complex 
wholes; they are given prominence by the attention of the 
student. 
These simple truths introduce a more difficult problem. Where 
and when does one stop? " 
The first cut to be made here is to select out for closer study the 
specific cultural inheritance belonging to the English. This is 
partly done because the present writer is English, and it is 
interesting to be able to explore the background to one's own 
perceptions. Partly, also, because the notion of nationality is 
* References p214-219 below 
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commonly ill-defined3 and therefore open to interpretation in 
accordance with the general characteristics of culture given in 
Section IV; whereas choosing, for example, a class-culture , would 
dictate closer association with other theories which have not been 
derived to explain the processes of perception as such. Examination 
of English culture should. be profitable, too, since the subject has 
not often been treated by the literature in the same way as Western 
culture, 
4 
or as the evolution of characteristic American and 
Australian traits5in relation to landscape. For some years there has 
been a good deal of discussion over the last two. This is mainly 
because, for both America and Australia, detailed written and 
illustrative records are available which display the reactions of 
explorers and pioneers from Europe on encountering the strange new 
countries. Culturally based preconceptions are thereby thrown into 
relief, and it is also possible to follow the various influences on 
settlers which subsequently led to the emergence of understandings of 
landscape adapted to their new circumstances. 
Looking at English culture, where decisive influences are often buried 
in distant history, if not prehistory, it is striking that foreigners 
tend to he more capable of attempting to specify what is typical 
about the English perception of landscape. For example, Lowenthal, 
6 
an American, and Pevsner, 
7 
a German, both pick out the temperate 
climate and very changeable weather as having a fundamental effect 
upon the English. People are brought out of doors but kept constantly 
active :8 
"Climate and morality are twin spurs to activity, constant 
encouragements to be up and about. 'The English climate is the 
best in the world', Charles II is reported to have said. 'A man 
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can enjoy exercise on all but five days of the year. ' And on most 
days he will feel more comfortable in vigorous motion than in 
sitting still.... in most seasons people prefer brisk country 
walks. For such walkers practically any weather will do. Fewer 
would laugh at the English pursuit of the midday sun if they 
realised how rare a phenomenon it is .... For Trevelyan, 'the 
fight against fiercer wind and snowstorm is among the higher joys 
of walking, and produces in the shortest time the state of 
ecstasy. This is a characteristically English response to nature 
in general. " 
Pevsner9 has argued that the relative moderateness of the climate is 
associated with a trait of moderation in English culture -a tendency 
to seek reasonable compromise over any problem by carefully examining 
each case upon its merits. He suggests that this habit of careful 
observation is linked to an English preference for looking at the 
landscape in factual or scientific terms, rather than going in for 
fanciful allegories. 
On a different track, Fussell, also an American, asks: 
10 
"What other nation supports through all the vicissitudes of 
modern economics and politics a periodical like Country Life, 
devoted very largely to the excitation of rural nostalgia? " 
This nostalgia, identified in Lowenthal's more recent work too, 
11 is 
for the pastoral with its emblems of hedgerows full of evocatively 
named wild flowers, of the first cuckoo, of the shepherd and his flock 
wandering in tranquility by clear streams. 
As may be seen, such blanket descriptions of the English cultural 
heritage differ widely from each other and can be in direct 
opposition. They are rarely more than superficial, yet evidence is to 
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be found in certain quarters to substantiate any one of them. It is 
just that this evidence cannot be applied reasonably to all members of 
English society, something that a foreigner with limited contacts 
might not realise for a while. 
The English themselves, of course, are not averse to making brief, 
overall prognostications about the nation's attachment to its 
landscape. Thus, Drabble's excellent book begins with: "The British 
have long been known for their love of landscape. "12 It may be noted 
that she then goes on to speak of English literature and English 
painting, and subsequently does not seek to trace landscape in 
Scottish, Welsh or Irish literature. These cultures have always had 
elements distinct from the English, partly because of their stronger 
Celtic heritage, and research for this thesis was not widened to 
include them except in so far as they have interacted with the English 
themes to be considered. 
The English, then, display a common pride in their sensitivity to 
landscape. Indeed, they are sometimes liable to consider other 
cultures lacking in this respect, 
13 
which may be attributed often to 
their own lack of awareness of foreign cultural idioms. Be that as it 
may, the English, like the Chinese and Japanese do seem to inherit a 
notably rich and diverse range of concepts for dealing with landscape. 
When the English comment upon themselves as a whole, they are 
frequently conscious of this diversity, expressed here at its simplest 
by Clark: 14 
"Almost every Englishman [sic], if asked what he meant by 
'beauty', would begin to describe a landscape - perhaps a lake 
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bluebells and silver birches, perhaps a little harbour with red 
sails and whitewashed cottages; but at all events, a landscape. " 
Clark's investigations are focussed on the history of painting, and 
historical studies of the arts have recently proved most fruitful in 
revealing sources of some of the concepts that the English may apply 
to landscape. Drabble, 15 for example, has examined the relationships 
between the pastoral, the aesthetic and the romantic in English 
literature. Other studies, such as that by Barrell, 16 show how 
landscape and literature conjoined over a particular interpretation at 
a particular point in time. 
So, there is a danger when pontificating about 'the English', of 
taking one aspect from within the diversity and idiosyncracies of the 
cultural inheritance, exaggerating it and applying it generally. 
Admittedly, at any period, including the present one, certain aspects 
will be more prominent than others because, for instance, they are 
better articulated. But the heritage is constantly undergoing change, 
and it is not satisfactory to take the predominant concepts of the 
moment as absolute. This has been done, for example, with 
aestheticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
and is liable to occur with the nostalgic interpretations of landscape 
current in the late twentieth century. 
From the complicated, shifting pattern of English culture, it has been 
decided to select three strands or themes for further examination; 
three particular and detailed conceptual schemes from the variety made 
available to members of English society. They are: 
146 
Paganism - understanding landscape and objects in it as 
having souls of their own or being inhabited by 
gods or the God. 
Utilitarianism - understanding landscape as useful, to be managed 
productively for the benefit of humanity. 
Aestheticism' - understanding landscape as form, line space and 
colour. 
The problems, already mentioned, that are to be encountered in 
focussing on a cultural content apply as well to the tearing out of 
these three strands from English culture. Their selection and 
definition has been done to facilitate and limit the progress of 
discussion. Other aspects have been passed over. It must not be 
assumed, then, that these three themes constitute the sum total of the 
contributions English culture can make to the process of landscape 
perception. A different student might have concentrated upon the 
concepts of natural science, romanticism, nostalgia, pastoralism or 
stewardship, and there are many more that might have been selected. 
However, the three chosen have each held a dominant position on one or 
more occasions during the evolution of English culture, and each have 
some kind of existence at present. 
The defining of boundaries around each of them has also been a matter 
of choice. But such distinctions do make it possible to observe the 
importance of interaction within the cultural pattern. Cross- 
connections between different aspects become apparent, for example, 
between the pantheism of a pagan interpretation of landscape and 
certain elements of romanticism. Moreover, larger cross-currents can 
be identified, which are not themselves exclusively concerned with 
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landscape, but have had substantial impact on several modes of 
perceiving it. These include Christianity, which held sway in England 
for over a thousand years, and the classical literature of Ancient 
Greece and Rome, closely studied by the literate section of society 
from medieval to Victorian times. Christianity and the classics have 
been exhaustively explored as themes in their own right by Glacken. 
17 
Finally, when considering the essential permeability of any cultural 
boundary, it should be remembered that those around nations are also 
to be crossed. The ensuing discussion cannot be patriotically 
chauvanistic because the English are indebted to many foreign cultures 
for developments in their understanding of landscape. After all, both 
Christianity and the classics had to be imported, and each of the 
cultural aspects to be examined has been involved in international 
contacts. 
Having decided to focus on a national culture and then on certain 
aspects within it, some mention of the method employed in focussing 
the lens to be used18 - becomes necessary. The key to the approach 
taken towards the three differing aspects of English culture is that 
it is not an evaluative one. No attempt is to be made to judge 
whether one theme is 'better' or 'more valid' than any other. This is 
crucial to remaining open to the fullest extent towards the content of 
each aspect, but how is it to be done? 
In Section I brief reference was made to the phenomenological 
approach, and to its proposition that to reach an understanding of any 
'life-world', the student must transcend their own and enter into the 
other completely; this being the approach that many literary and art 
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historians as well as linguistic philosophers attempt to adopt-19 
However, Gadamer, 20 who owes much to the early phenomenologists, has 
pointed out that there is no obvious reason why adherents of the 
school should claim unique exemption from the condition they ascribe 
to the rest of humanity. That is, the student can never abandon their 
own culturally and individually derived concepts. Rather, they must. 
be conscious of the dialogue that takes place between their own 
understanding and that employed in other life-worlds. 
The framework thus far constructed in this thesis has been designed to 
permit such a dialogue with a range of different understandings of 
landscape; to provide the equipment for getting inside and exploring 
separate aspects of the cultural pattern in a way that renders them 
equally comprehendable; to produce a lens that brings other lenses 
focussed on landscape into focus themselves. 
What are the particular categories that each of the three cultural 
themes entail? What features of landscape do they select out? What 
kinds of vocabulary and reasoning are employed? And to obtain answers 
to such questions, an historical perspective is vital, since only by 
following the formulation and reformulation of a theme - the 
conditions under which each particular lens has been ground out - can 
its content be properly appreciated. The past shapes the present, 
21 
if only to give a foundation for-rebellion. 
In order to follow the history of each aspect satisfactorily, the 
framework devised should have been applied at first-hand to 
contemporary, original sources. But, again, even with just three 
threads to follow, the work required would have stretched into 
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infinity, and such research for just one aspect would have meant 
foregoing the primary aim of this part of the thesis which is to 
demonstrate the genuinely diverse, detailed nature of the cultural 
inheritance. The three aspects chosen, then, have had to be treated 
summarily and, with mostly modern exceptions, have been drawn from 
secondary analytical and critical material. This may be considered 
problematic because a proportion of the literature consulted has been 
at odds with the non-evaluative notion of divergencies in 
understandings of landscape. 
A number of authors consulted have either assumed or suggested that 
the particular strand they are pursuing has the only claim to reality. 
This applies especially to literature dealing with what have been 
labelled here the 'aesthetic' aspects of English culture. Their 
argument has a tendency to run as follows: 
22 
until the end of the 
seventeenth century the landscape was hardly noticed except by a few 
outstanding Europeans such as the Younger Pliny and Petrach. Then 
there was a sudden burst of enthusiasm in England for scenery evident 
in the arts, philosophy and gardening which can be attributed to the 
growth in the fashion of taking the Grand Tour during which the Alps 
were crossed and the paintings of Lorriane, Poussin and Rosa sampled 
in Rome. This type of narrative tends to tail off somewhere in the 
nineteenth century with the aesthetic discovery of the upland of 
Britain, and largely fails to indicate how the English have been 
coming to terms with landscape since then. Likewise, the utilitarian 
interpretation of landscape common before the onset of aestheticism is 
not taken as legitimate -a position also assumed by some modern 
aestheticians who go to great lengths to exclude usefulness as a 
criterion of beauty. Indeed, the words 'beautiful' and 'value' have 
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been purloined to such an extent by aestheticians and romantics that 
they can hardly be applied now to landscape except in an aesthetic or 
romantic sense. 
Such predatory tendencies are evident amongst proponents of other 
identifiable themes. Hoskins, 
23 for example, implies that the 
landscape is only fully revealed when appreciated in terms of 
historical geography. But modern aesthetic and romantic historians 
seem especially prone to them, perhaps because, their absorption into 
the English aristocratic eighteenth century life-world becomes almost 
complete, and they cannot comprehend other concepts that the English 
have employed. 
The approach that has been superimposed when referring to this kind of 
literature is in agreement with John Constable's (1776 - 1837) 
argument that: "... there has never been an age ... in which the love 
of landscape has not been in some way manifested. "24 It also accords 
with Hepburn's statement that the temptation to work with a single 
supreme concept in the area of landscape appreciation must be 
resisted, and replaced by a cluster of related key concepts. 
25 This 
approach leads to an alternative historical perspective. Instead of 
presenting a sort of now-you-see-it-now-you-don't history, an attempt 
will he made to show how each of the three themes has been in existence 
for a long time but they have waxed and waned, so that at any one 
period one may he more obvious and subject to more rapid 
transformation than the others. For instance, at present, as 
already pointed out, nostalgia is one of the strongest themes, while 
utilitarianism which was once very important now plays a more minor 
role. 
151 
Another group of secondary sources present a slightly different 
problem in making their contribution to the ensuing discussion. This 
literature is built on the recognition that a variety of conceptual 
schemes may be applied to landscape, but labels some or all of them as 
'image. s'. Even Hipple26, whose terminology on lenses has been crucial 
to the development of this thesis, says that only images of beauty can 
ever be perceived, which may misleadingly imply that somehow the 
images are illusory and the lenses distorting. Several interesting 
commentators go down the path further, especially those of a Marxist 
persuasion, and identify 'illusions', 'ideologies' and 'myths' which 
must be dispelled so as to establish the true order of things. One of 
the best examples is Newby's detailed attack27 on what he calls the 
'myth' of rural retrospect' in the prologue to a sociological analysis 
of the agricultural worker. But, as Hipple emphasises and Section IV 
of this thesis has explained, some system of meaning is required for 
landscape to be perceived at all, and it has been widely observed that 
urban dwellers have long displayed a tendency to apply nostalgic 
concepts to the countryside. For some of them the rural landscape is 
an embodiment of an idyllic past, whereas among other sections of 
English society it is a productive resource. 
Description of three aspects of English culture, therefore, will 
depend on the proposition that none are illusory. Instead, they are 
seen as three aspects of reality; three true orders of things. 
Without such tolerance they cannot be entered and understood in their 
* It may be noted that the tensions in this paragraph are current 
in the field of anthropology, emerging too in the debate over the 
application of anthropological techniques within rural sociology. 
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own terms. To adapt an argument put forward by Gombrich: 28 it is 
important to be clear wherein illusion consists. It consists in the 
conviction that there is only one way of interpreting the world in 
front of us, and being blind to other possible configurations because 
they cannot be imagined. 
The pagan landscape 
*** 
"And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with joy 
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man, 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. "29 
*** 
The first inhabitants of what is now England arrived in the late 
Paleolithic period and lived by hunting and gathering. Only 
speculations are possible about the way these societies made sense of 
their surroundings, but for more recent cultures with a similar 
economy, the sacred world has been ascribed great importance. 
30 This 
may be linked with Piggot's suggestion that the Late Paleolithic and 
Mesolithic English practised a type of shamanistic or ecstatic 
religion. 
31 
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The experience of ecstacy has been studied by Laski, 
32 
and she gives 
many examples, drawn from literature and interviews, of triggers for 
ecstatic states which fall into one or other of the three categories of 
landscape under investigation here. ('nature' proving to be the most 
common stimulant of ecstacy). She concludes her survey with the 
observation that: 
33 
"... what men (sic) have worshipped since ecstatic experiences 
were known was their own creative and generalising capacity... " 
If this capacity can be taken to be coterminous with the conceptual 
frameworks necessary for perception, then one might fuel speculation 
by proposing that ancient peoples constructed a religious 
understanding of landscape from initial attempts to give meaning to 
the trees, hills, rocks and streams they found in their localities. 
Laski reports that someone in an ecstatic state experiences close 
identification with the object of contemplation which may pass into a 
mystical identification with the cosmos as a whole; with gods or the 
God. 34 The earliest English cultural inheritance possibly gave its 
members an ability to construe landscape as a collection of deities or 
the home of deities or the Deity, and prescribed the manner in which 
these could be worshipped and consulted through the agency of the 
shaman. 
Religion probably dominated all the systems used for coming to terms 
with landscape and this is likely to have applied also to Neolithic 
society which, at sometime during the fourth millenium BC, began to 
invade England from Europe. The people settled on the lighter soils 
where they carried out shifting cultivation and stock-keeping. To 
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what extent they assimilated the religious knowledge gained by the 
resident hunter-gatherers is impossible to guess, but much of that 
knowledge may have been irrelevant in the new farming communities. 
Burl has imagined that: 
35 
"To the first agriculturalists in the British Isles, searching 
the strange wild countryside for trees like the wych elm that 
would indicate the presence of highly fertile soils, the need for 
propitiating the dangers of nature was great: lightening could 
start forest fires; continual rain could make rivers impassable 
... the badger, the boar, the bear, the wolf, the snake, were 
masters of the land ... The wheat had to ripen and be harvested, 
and drought or heavy storm could destory crops and then, more 
lingeringly, the people .... Every bird, every tree, every 
thunderstorm had a life of its own and had to be communicated 
with personally, appeased and forestalled. " 
There is a considerable amount of archaeological evidence of Neolithic 
religious practices, but the substance of their belief is unknown. 
Early in the period, people dug pits in the ground which they filled 
with charcoal, bones, pottery and hazel nuts, apparently as offerings 
to the deities of the land to ensure fertility. Later, mainly between 
2,500 and 1,600 BC, the stone circles (apparently a British 
innovation) were built by Neolothic cultures and may also have been 
associated with fertility cults. 
36 In addition, the dead were 
occasionally buried in grave mounds in some of which have been found 
carvings that possibly represent the Earth Mother. 
37 It is generally 
thought that the equation of a goddess with the earth, or rather 
goddesses with the land of particular localities, existed in England 
at a very early date. 
38 
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After the bronze making cultures, which also constructed grave mounds, 
the next invasion was by the iron-using Celts who came in successive 
waves between the fifth and first centuries BC. There is little 
archaelogical evidence of their religion, but since they were in 
contact with the literate Roman world and later with Christian monks 
in Ireland, some written evidence is available although, having been 
produced by outsiders, it must be treated with caution. Seemingly, for 
the Celts, 
39 the land was inhabited by a vast collection of rustic 
godlings each connected to a certain place and each having a name, 
also the place name, which evoked some explanatory legend. A vast 
body of this 'lore of prominent places' grew up, providing a 
legendary guide to the landscape in which a certain degree of 
coherence is discernable in the veneration of the earth, water and 
trees. A female deity generally stood both for a certain piece of 
land and for the spirit of the people living there, for soil and human 
fertility. The goddess Brigantia, for example, was intimately 
connected to the tribe and tribal area of the Brigantes. Water in the 
landscape was also linked with fertility and with the underworld. 
Springs, wells, rivers and pools were among the focal point of rituals 
which involved the deposition of coins and jewellery as offerings to 
the spirits who lived in them. Thus the goddess Deva was associated 
with the River Dee, Brigantia with the Brent and Sabrina with the 
Severn, the Severn estuary probably being of special importance given 
the remains of many small shrines. The cult of trees was widespread, 
each tribe having a sacred tree which stood at the symbolic centre of 
their area. Like water, trees were not only venerated for themselves 
but as reflecting the powers of the gods. The god at Colchester, for 
example, might have been represented by 'coil', that is, hazel. 
Certain groves of trees were also sacred and natural clearings deep in 
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the forest that still covered the landscape, were consecrated and used 
as centres of worship. It is here that the small priestly caste, the 
Druids, are thought to have practiced their obscure rites which 
perhaps involved the oak and the mistletoe. 
With the coming of the Romans the Druids were rapidly stamped out, 
mainly because they provided a core of national resistance, but 
otherwise Celtic pantheism continued much as before, the Romans 
incorporating many native deities into their own religion with 
soldiers seeking to placate the god or goddess of the area they had 
conquered. But with the collapse of the Empire in the fourth century 
AD, a somewhat different set of beliefs was introduced by the Angles 
and Saxons40 who had no prominent goddess of fertility, rather Thor 
took care of the land while also being god of thunder and weather in 
general. The oak tree was especially sacred to him, representing his 
strength and endurance, and his cult was vigorous as shown in place- 
names like Thundersley (Essex) meaning 'grove of the Thunderer'. 
However, Davidson41 suggests that for most ordinary people the high 
gods, of which Thor was one, were probably less significant than the 
local land spirits which probably had much in common with their Celtic 
forebears. There is written evidence from the period that these 
included dragons, elves and fairies in the old burial mounds and 
giants living in caves in the hills. It has been suggested that tales 
of the former, at least, originated in the Neolithic and bronze ages 
as a means of preventing theft of grave goods from the burial mounds. 
42 
Towards the end of the sixth century AD a challenge to all religious 
notions previously held about the landscape in England was presented 
by the arrival of Christian missionaries. They preached of the one 
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God who was quite separate from, and outside of, the landscape He had 
created, and was not to be placated by worshipping features like 
springs or trees. Their influence spread rapidly and by the time 
Bede was writing in 731 AD most of the population were at least 
nominal Christian converts. Pagan conceptions of the landscape were 
on the point of submergence when the Viking raids began in the ninth 
century AD. The capture of northern and eastern England by the Vikings 
revived all the old cults of Thor and so on, so that only in the 
eleventh century did Christianity fully gain hold in these areas. It 
would be quite untrue, however, to say that the missionaries managed 
to banish pantheism altogether since, although they were strictly 
instructed by the Council of Arles in 452 AD, to prevent infidels 
venerating trees, fountains and stones, this was found to be extremely 
difficult. Instead, St. Augustine of Canterbury (d. 605) was told by 
the Pope in 601 AD not to destroy the sacred pagan places but to 
cleanse them with holy water and convert them to the worship of the 
one, true God. 
43 Thus, the people were able to continue their 
religious practices at the old springs and clearings under the 
auspices of Christianity, while probably knowing full well that they 
were following the traditions of their pagan ancestors. The spirits of 
the wells were transformed into Christian saints, such as Ann and 
Margaret, who bore a remarkable resemblence in character to the 
originals, while the legends attached to sacred places like 
Glastonbury took on a Christian gloss. Christianised pagan practices 
were long fostered by the Church, for example ceremonies were held at 
stone circles well into the sixteenth century, 
44 
and throughout the 
time of Langland and Chaucer there was a strong pagan element in songs 
and poetry, with tales of the lord of the greenwood, magical plants 
and birds, and the fertile potency of Spring. 
45 
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Still, over the centuries, Christianity on the whole prevailed 
(contributing to other means of coming to terms with landscape to be 
discussed later), and the old beliefs slowly descended into fairy 
stories told by parents, who no longer subscribed to them, to amuse 
their children. Perhaps all but a trace of the pagan landscape would 
have been lost from English culture, but for an odd revival that 
occurred in the eighteenth century. 
46 At this time, the romantic idea 
of the Noble Savage, living in harmony with Nature and uncorrupted by 
civilisation, gained currency among a certain section of the 
community, and was confirmed for them by the discovery of the American 
Indians and the peoples of the South Pacific. A nostalgia developed 
for a time when England was in the same happy primitive state - the 
noble Ancient British with their virtuous sages, the Druids. This 
bout of, what Piggot has called, Celtomania was fuelled by the 
publication of a book by William Stukeley (1687-1765)47 arguing that 
the stone circles had been built and used for ritual by the Druids. * 
Other authors mistranslated, or even fabricated, ancient texts to add 
substance to Druidical mysteries. Classical sources such as Pliny, 
who spoke of the Druids cutting mistletoe from oak trees with golden 
sickles, were taken not as dubious references to what, for classical 
writers, was a barbaric society they did not understand, but as the 
foundation of a whole new cult. Pseudo-Druidical groups were formed 
for whom places like Stonehenge became sacred and where they still 
worship, while many of the romantic notions about Druids passed into 
popular folklore. It should be noted that at about the same period 
fashionable persons were paying more attention to the religious 
* Archaeology finds the circles Neolithic not Celtic creations and 
there is no evidence to connect them with the Druids. 
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beliefs of the ancient Greeks and Romans as well. Gods such as Pan 
and minor spirits like water nymphs began to haunt the English 
landscape; the connoisseur sometimes being encouraged to think along 
these lines by the placing of a suitable classical text at a 
viewpoint. 
This, however, was more of a conscious intellectual amusement than a 
serious return to pantheism, and was of quite a different order from 
the deeper vein explored by some of the late Romantics in the 
nineteenth century. 
48 Literary figures especially, like William 
Wordsworth (1770-1850) and Richard Jefferies (1848-1887), experienced 
nature ecstasies and arrived at a kind of pantheism which owed little 
to speculations about the exact format of the Celtic or Greek 
cosmology. In opposition to the prevailing dogmatic Christianity, 
they tended to conceive of God as the divine principle, the sun-life, 
in Nature with which humanity, when cleansed of modern 
sophistications, could commune and obtain spiritual sustenance. The 
inanimate landscape had mysterious powers, plants might experience 
emotions, Nature could speak to those who approached her with suitable 
piety, and it was possible to make direct contact with the force that 
gave life to the whole universe. In this respect, Drabble49 quotes 
the lines given at the beginning of this passage and suggests that: 
"... one of the reasons why Wordsworth struck so deep a response 
is that he was drawing on deep sources of collective memory, on a 
primitive animistic view of the world, certainly present in 
earlier times, but powerfully suppressed by the scientific 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries .... Wordsworth was able ... 
to restore an essential contact with the primitive, to divine its 
workings, and to restore an earlier vision. " 
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In their own time, of course, the pantheistic poets and the Celtomanes 
received ridicule for their continuance of the pagan tradition, and it 
has continued to be overshadowed by scientific and other 
understandings of landscape until the present day. But even now, 
elements of paganism still. figure within the English cultural 
inheritance. For example, much effort has been made to record customs 
and folktales attached to old oak trees, ancient woods, springs, 
pools, stone circles, grave mounds and early churches. These are 
repeated in popular guides, 
50 
often together with references to 
Stukeley's work. Although there are few complete believers today, 
considerable attention is paid to at least registering pagan 
associations, and obtaining a mild thrill at 'spookiness', 'weirdness' 
and 'the occult'. On the other hand, certain modern poets, notably 
Robert Graves, 51 have perpetuated the concept of the Earth Mother, and 
there are small groups that worship her seriously, according to their 
interpretation of Celtic tradition; 
52 
the goddess taking different 
personalities in different places. 
Finally, another branch has almost eliminated personality in an 
interaction between pagan beliefs and science which has brought about 
the definition and exploration of ley lines . 
53 This was initially 
inspired by Alfred Watkins' book: 'The Old Straight Track', published 
in 1925, but was followed most enthusiastically in the late 1960s. 
Ley hunters look for straight lines of earth energy marked by the 
prehistoric and early Christian sites designed to tap it, and to which 
significant folk tales are attached. Efforts are being made to 
measure the energy in electro-magnetic terms. 
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Ley hunting and goddess worship may be among the least respected modes 
of conceptualising landscape today, but they can both lay claims to 
manifesting one of the longest traditions within English culture. 
The useful landscape 
*** 
"There wouldn't be no landscape if it wasn't for farmers. It 
would be one bloody great mess. "* 
*** 
"I call it a very fine country ... the woods seem full of fine 
timber, the valley looks comfortable and snug - with rich meadows 
and several neat farm houses here and there. It exactly answers 
my idea of a fine country, because it unites beauty with utility 
"54 
** 
An aspect of English culture which has antecedents nearly as distant 
as the pagan one must be that of finding meaning in landscape through 
its ability to supply human needs and activities. Obtaining food is 
the most basic of needs, and discussion of the utilitarian here will 
he confined to it. 
* Extracted from replies of farmers recorded verbatim to the 
question: 
"As you know there has been a lot of interest in the effects of 
farming changes on the landscape and wild life. In general, what 
are your views on this? " 
posed as part of a survey conducted for the Countryside Commission 
in 1979 (hereinafter referred to as Farmers Survey 1979). These 
replies were very kindly made available to me by Howard Newby of the 
University if Essex and are not available for further publication. 
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Again, evidence is lacking, but utilitarian concepts must go back to 
Paleolithic and Mesolithic times when they were probably closely 
allied to a religious understanding of the land. Nevertheless, 
Appleton55 has imagined clearly the probable modes of perception that 
would then have facilitated hunting for food, including the location 
of features offering concealment from, but a good view of, the prey. 
This tradition may be traced through elaborations and transformations 
to that associated with field sports today. 
56 But, from Neolithic 
times onwards, agriculture has been the main means of obtaining food 
in England and, under these circumstances, the useful landscape has 
been equated commonly with cultivation and stock keeping. The 
following discussion picks out a number of categories and meanings 
evident in this utilitarian understanding of landscape. They are: 
fruitfulness and abundance; wealth and ownership; neatness and 
efficiency. 
For the long period during which agriculture had only a precarious 
hold in England, the productiveness and promise of plenty of a farmed 
landscape was appealing in a society where many lived close to 
subsistence level. The country was predominantly forest, heath, marsh 
or moor within which there were small farmed enclaves requiring 
unremitting work to make them cultivable and to keep the surrounding 
wilderness at bay. This was seen as simply wasteland, often to be 
hated for being outside human control and therefore chaotic. In 
contrast, the domesticated areas offered freedom from hunger. The 
earth could be fruitful when subdued by agriculture, and appreciation 
of the abundance that could come from it could be expressed, firstly, 
as an attribute of fertility goddesses, and then later in classical 
and Christian terminology. The reading of Ancient Greek and Roman 
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authors reinforced awareness of the yields of the 
farmed landscape. 
Virgil's eclogues, for example, extolled the simple country 
life 
sustained by the fruitful earth. 
57 In addition, Christian teaching, 
58 
based on arguments originating in classical philosophy, held that to 
make the earth yield abundantly was to fulfil God's plan of creation; 
God having left the final stage for humanity to complete. It was felt 
that Paradise might be brought to earth in this way - Paradise being 
seen as an enormous garden, strongly protected from the wild chaos 
outside, and within which, careful tending of the soil produced all 
the necessaries of life. Thus: 
59 
"Early eighteenth century travellers contemplating scenery were 
predisposed towards undulating country where complete 
humanisation of nature had imported to the landscape many of the 
virtues conventionally ascribed to the garden. Such landscapes, 
especially where bordered by distant hills offering a contrast, 
were praised for their variety and for their suggestion of 
prosperous well-being, order and harmony, recalling to mind the 
pastoral eclogue which was the main literary tradition of the 
time. " 
Over a prolonged period, then, many English people looked for signs of 
utility and plenty in a landscape. It is well known, for example, 
that Daniel Defoe (1660-1731) found the unproductive Lake District 
'barren and frightful' while he felt comfortable in the 'rich, 
populous, fruitful' area around Preston. 
60 The same concern for 
fertility and abundance is shown in the paintings of Samuel Palmer 
(1805-1881) over a century later which are filled with contented 
sheep, fat sheaves of corn and trees weighed down by fruit. 
61 But 
somewhere between Defoe and Palmer, the utilitarian view lost its 
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primacy of place in English culture as the aesthetic movement, to be 
mentioned next, came to the fore. Even so, the tradition of the 
useful landscape continued as productive farming landscapes 
strengthened their connections with the possession of wealth and 
power. 
Before the Dissolution, the large intensively cultivated holdings of 
the monasteries had represented profit and high position, and their 
place was assumed by aristocratic landowners. Poets began to 
catalogue the visible wealth of their patrons, and it became 
fahionable in the eighteenth century for the gentry to have their 
holdings depicted in paint too - portraits of power and glory. 
62 
Thomas Gainsborough's (1727-1788) famous painting of Mr and 
Mrs Andrews is one such, celebrating their complacent ownership of 
rich cornfields, sheep flocks and fine timber. At the same time, 
English artists visiting Scotland ignored the mountains and moors and 
concentrated upon depicting the cultivated beauties of the great 
estates in the hope of obtaining commissions from the owners. 
63 
A third element in understanding the useful landscape is the 
significance attached to the adoption of agricultural innovation. 
Implementing the latest advances in husbandry has gone hand in hand 
with increasing the fruitfulness of the soil and adding to the wealth 
accruing from ownership. There is evidence of this amongst certain 
Tudor gentry who engaged in farming experiments and brought in new 
technology and practices from abroad. 
64 This tide of innovation 
eventually swept into the Agricultural Revolution of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries which reinforced the long extant 
concept of the best landscapes being those most successfully exploited 
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by plough and stock. Especially for the smaller gentleman farmers, 
for tenant farmers and the rural professional class of surveyors and 
land agents engaged by the aristocracy to carry out the minutiae of 
agricultural development, the areas that had been improved by 
enclosure, new crop varieties, new breeds of stock, new technology and 
new management practices were eminently acceptable because they were 
prosperous and profitable as never before. 
65 Agricultural writers, 
like Arthur Young (1741-1820) who published accounts of his tours of 
England, extolled the virtues of landscape created by the modern 
farming methods and condemned areas where traditional practices were 
still followed. Practical farmers often travelled the country to see 
if the latest agricultural experiments had proved worthwhile, and 
there was considerable interest in the grander technological 
achievements such as the draining of the Fens. 
66 
What was modern in land use two or three hundred years ago 
subsequently became the traditional English farming landscape. The 
system of hedges, scattered trees and woods, squarish fields on which 
crops and stock were rotated, was the ultimate in agricultural 
efficiency until well into the twentieth century when the replacement 
of horse power by tractor power began to mean that the traditional 
landscape could no longer be admired as a profitable, useful 
landscape: 
"... there's too much of this conservation of landscape ... to 
try and leave the countryside as it was hundreds of years ago ... 
You can't farm under those conditions in these days ... You're 
living in a modern age which is mechanised, looking through the 
eyes if you were doing it with old fashioned horses ... You've 
got to have big fields. You've got to tidy things up. "67 
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Interestingly, the Scott Committee, set up by the government in 1941 
to investigate the condition of agriculture, displays the hiatus in 
the utilitarian appreciation of the now old and the now new. The 
majority report in places could well have been written by Arthur Young: 
68 
"The landscape of England and Wales is a striking example of the 
interdependence between the satisfaction of man's material wants 
and the creation of beauty. If the land were left uncultivated 
... the countryside would gradually but eventually return to its 
former natural condition of forest in the valleys and on the 
lower slopes, and a scrub of brambles, thorn bushes and bracken 
on the higher levels .... The beauty and pattern of the 
countryside are the direct result of cultivation of the soil and 
there is no antagonism between use and beauty. " 
It was the pattern of mixed farming in enclosed fields that they took 
for granted throughout their report, and they assumed that this was 
the only healthy form that agriculture could take. There was no 
suspicion that the traditional system was soon to lose its economic 
viability to a prosperous, productive but highly mechanised 
agriculture with more single enterprise farms, larger fields, 
particularly in the arable sector, and altogether much less need of 
the trees and hedges which had once been such an important feature of 
the farming landscape. With hindsight, it is possible to see that 
SR Dennison, in his minority report, was a far more successful 
prophet of the coming way in which the landscape would he appreciated 
for its usefulness. 
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argued that features like hedgerows and small 
plantations could be a nuisance to farming and gave the landscape an 
overcrowded and fidgity aspect, while a modern healthy agriculture 
might create a new, no less beautiful, landscape of simpler and wider 
sweep . 
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Today, the farming community has strong market orientations and takes 
farming to be primarily a food producing business, it continues to 
adhere to the concept of utility, as did its predecessors at the time 
of the Agricultural Revolution. For this community the system those 
predecessors set up is now. defunct, it has lost its profit making 
capabilities and can only be regarded with distaste. The hedges no 
longer have a function and keep strips of expensive land out of 
production while being costly and a bother to maintain, 
70 
and trees 
are often not a pretty sight: 
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"You see, you've got a thirty acre field and you've got four or 
five bloody trees in it, stuck in the middle. You go there with 
a combine and a plough, you've got to pull out every time to get 
round the tree ... for which you've got roots that can catch your 
plough with, it can cost you anything up to £100 if you happen to 
hit it hard. " 
From a utilitarian standpoint, then, Dennison's forecast may be 
confirmed. The uncluttered, fully functional, mechanised farming 
landscape reflecting progressive agricultural practices and run with 
modern efficiency for maximum profit, is now the epitome of utility 
and is highly favoured as such by many farmers. 
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"First of all the countryside has got to be put to economic use, 
first and foremost ... " 
"The area ... has always been a fairly wooded and treed sort of 
land with an excess of hedgerows so I think some removal of 
hedgerows has been essential so they could get fields of 
reasonable working size for today's machinery. By and large, I 
think this immediate area has been improved by farmers and 
landlords ... "73 
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Whatever the significance of the useful landscape with respect to 
survival, theology, proprietorship and economics, and whatever the 
pattern of use involved - open, enclosed or open again - there is one 
ingredient that has always been vital: the land must be kept neat and 
tidy. '. Thus, Celia Fiennes, (1662-1741) who travelled around Britain 
between 1685 and 1705, and always appreciated the land in terms of 
utility, gave her highest praise to the 'neat', 
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while a hundred and 
fifty years later, William Cobbett (1763-1835) could write that his 
home area of Farnham was: "the neatest [place] in England, and, I 
believe, in the whole world. "75 This focus on tidiness continues 
today. An immaculate landscape from which all rough patches that 
could harbour weeds (ie wild plants) and vermin (ie wild animals) have 
been eliminated; where the crops are planted in perfect lines and with 
the pastures kept completely clean (ie free from weeds); where the 
hedges are closely trimmed so as not to overshadow the fields; where 
the ditches are kept clear and provide adequate drainage for the 
whole; and where the fences and the buildings are in good repair - 
such a landscape is obviously at the peak of its usefulness, 
fulfilling God's plan for order in the world, providing an abundance 
of food and being highly profitable. But there is more to it than 
that. A farmer whose land is in a clean and neat condition has to be 
paying meticulous attention to the details of agricultural practice, 
and must therefore be good at the job. Agriculture is a highly 
visible profession and reputations within the farming community can 
depend upon the appearance of the land -a good farmer is a tidy 
farmer76 - and sometimes there is considerable pressure to conform to 
the standards of the group: for example, on putting up a fence: 77 
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"... its got to look a nice looking fence because, you know, 
people are going to tell how you run your farm by the fencing you 
put up and the way you keep your farm. " 
and: 
78 
"I get complaints from people who expect me to cut my hedges. I 
like them to see them grown up and that's how I leave them. " 
An event that seems to have reinforced the importance of cleanliness 
and neatness in the landscape was the agricultural depression of the 
1930's79 which drove many farms almost completely out of production. 
It was a shock to find that the wilderness, thought to be completely 
conquered by the now dominant agriculture, could so rapidly reassert 
itself as the drains filled in, the hedges spread upwards and outwards 
and bushes and thistles filled the fields: 
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"Experience has shown how quickly the land can revert to an 
unkept wild and ragged condition, even where it is neglected and 
not wholly abandoned. " 
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There was great relief when the onset of the Second World War brought 
about an agricultural revival: 
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"... the countryside is taking on an air of activity. Apart from 
large drainage and reclamation works, hedges are being trimmed; 
ditches cleared; urgent drainage work carried out; buildings, 
gates, fences and roads repaired. From an atmosphere of neglect 
the countryside has assumed an air of busy thriving prosperity, 
it has put aside the bedraggled condition which in many parts 
cloaked its beauty and the landscape has largely resumed its 
former well-kept appearance. " 
and a strong determination that such 'farming slums' would never be 
seen again. 
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Not only the farmers, but also their employees, have an interest in 
the handiwork displayed in the fields. Howard Newby tells of a coach 
trip he made with farm workers who commented on the ploughing they 
were passing, 
83 but little has been written on the subject apart from 
the material furnished by George Ewart Evans84 who found evidence of 
the specialised manner in which ploughing teams regarded the landscape 
before the First World War: 85 
"One of the skills that had the highest acclaim in the East 
Anglian countryside under the old farm economy was the ability to 
'draw' or plough a straight furrow and lay a level stretch (a 
section of ploughed land) so that it looked like a well made 
length of corduroy. The skill, too, that could drill a field so 
that no mark was visible on the seed bed except the marks of the 
drill-coulters themselves, won equal esteem. So great was the 
interest in ploughing a well-finished stretch with mathematically 
straight furrows, or in the faultless drilling of a seed bed and 
so keen was the rivalry between various horsemen that, even after 
they had spent most of the autumn day ploughing an acre or so in 
the field, they would spend the rest of it ploughing the land 
over once again in the cosiness of the inn bar. And on a Sunday 
morning they walked round the parish inspecting their neighbours' 
week of ploughing to see if it measured up to the high claims 
that had been made for it during the detailed preliminary 
examination at the four-ale bar ... James Seely (born 1894), a 
Norfolk farmer who had started his career as a horseman, told me: 
"The old teamseen would walk miles round the countryside to look 
at other people's work - well outside their own parish sometimes. 
At the time I'm speaking of, before 1914 ... if you'd travelled 
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three miles you could have a drink in a pub at any time on a 
Sunday. So the teamsmen used to walk their three miles out of 
the village to get a drink, looking at the ploughing as they went 
... Some of them made a real outing of it, looking at the land 
and saying, perhaps: "they've got a real good 'un here. Look at 
his work. " 
This may be set against Clark's assertion that, because the fields 
mean nothing but hard work to them: 
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"... today agricultural labourers are almost the only class of 
the community who are not enthusiastic about natural beauty. " 
It depends, of course, how natural beauty is interpreted. Now less 
than 3% of the English population is involved directly with 
agriculture, it is mostly among them that the old categories of 
abundant yields, landed wealth and neatness of practice still have 
currency. But these utilitarian terms were specifically and firmly 
excluded from the definition of natural beauty when it was consciously 
reformulated by a few influential theorists associated with the 
aristocratic social strata during the eighteenth century. A path in 
their treatment of utility and beauty may be traced from acceptance to 
rejection. David Hume (1711-1776), in his 'Treatise on Human Nature' 
of 1740, argued that utility was one of the modes of natural beauty. 
Thus, even if the observer did not directly benefit from a field by 
being the owner, they would be in sympathy with the pleasure of the 
person whose property it was. 
87 By 1795, Humphrey Repton (1752-1818) 
in his 'Sketches and Hints on Landscape Gardening' was maintaining 
that it was not aesthetically acceptable to gain pleasure from 
landscape because of the monetary wealth it represented. 
88 He did 
include some concept of utility, but only in terms of the comfort and 
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convenience provided for the aesthetic observer, for example, the 
presence of gravel walks for easy strolling. Afterwards, usefulness 
became almost forgotten by aestheticians, except for a condemnatory 
sentence or two. 
89 
Why did the utilitarian. strand in_English culture,. that had been so 
prevalent possibly since the Neolithic period, begin a gradual decline 
around the eighteenth century? Part of the explanation must be that 
in England by this time much of the population had long been freed at 
least from the immediate threat of starvation. And the upper realms 
of the class structure were occupied hardly at all with finding the 
basic needs of survival. Moreover, as the nineteenth century 
proceeded, industry began to supplant agriculture as the main national 
source of wealth, so the land began to lose its direct usefulness to 
an ever-increasing section of society. This has not necessarily 
precluded them from entering imaginately into the utilitarian 
framework. Only about ten years ago, Nan Fairbrotber was suggesting 
that the modern farming landscape should be more widely appreciated 
for its fertile abundance: 
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"And in this landscape empty of trees and people - of everything 
but crops - we are close to the actual process of farming. The 
soil itself has a satisfying good-earth quality, and we need not 
be farmers to appreciate a well-ploughed expanse of furrowed 
earth of a well-harrowed field like a garden seed-bed. The crops 
too are prosperous as never before, thriving and exuberantly 
healthy: thousands of acres of cereals, lavish prairies of 
untrodden grass grown lush and green with nitrogen. " 
This has a somewhat hollow ring in the early 1980's when even farming 
circles are beginning to question the usefulness of continually 
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raising yeilds. 
91 A major redirection of the utilitarian strand may 
be coming in the late twentieth century which is regretfully beyond 
this thesis's capability. 
The aesthetic landscape 
*** 
"There have been two or three fine old trees cut down that-grew 
too near the house, and it opens the prospect amazingly, which 
makes me think that Repton, or any body of that sort, would 
certainly have the avenue at Sotherton down. "92 
*** 
"His Royal Highness Prince Albert, who has occasionally displayed 
a knowledge and much liking for the Fine Arts, some time since 
expressed an intimation to display his ability in sketching 
landscape from nature. The Royal Academicians immediately ... 
offered, or rather thrust forward, their services to arrange the 
landscape according to the established rules of art ... the 
Academicians were in active service at an early hour on the 
appointed day: some busied themselves in making foreground 
obiects, by pulling down trees and heaping stones together from 
the neighbouring macadamized stores; others were most fancifully 
spotting the trees with whitewash and other mixtures, in 
imitation of moss and lichens ... The most rabidly-engaged 
gentleman was Turner, who, despite the remonstrances of his 
colleagues upon the expense attendant upon his whimsical notions, 
would persist in making the grass more natural by emptying large 
buckets of treacle and mustard about the ground. In the 
meantime, to their utter disappointment, however, His Royal 
Highness quietly strolled with his sketchbook into another 
quarter. "93 
*** 
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The aesthetic understanding of landscape is the most purely academic 
aspect of the English cultural inheritance since it derives from 
philosophy and the criticism of pictorial art. Through the centuries, 
these disciplines have enabled individuals with the time, income and 
intellectual inclination to face directly the question of why rural 
landscapes can be beautiful. The word 'beautiful' is used here 
purposely because-, as already mentioned, aestheticism has made it its 
own. In a sense, the present thesis follows the aesthetic tradition, 
but the ensuing discussion explores a narrower definition of 
aesthetics, focussing on the exclusively visual categories the 
tradition has developed for explaining the qualitative properties of 
landscape. 
Over time, explanation has been framed in four basic terms: form, 
line, space and colour. Thinkers have concentrated upon the 
relationships between the shape of objects, the lines that delineate 
them, the space that encloses them, their colour; and sometimes also 
their visual texture. While united in terminology, the field has 
always been a controversial one, embracing differing complex 
constructions which have faced each other along the lines drawn from 
the 'subject-object' problem by the wider realms of philosophy. Are 
the basic aesthetic terms inherent to the landscape 'out there', or do 
they belong to the structure of the eye or mind? Are the terms 
sufficient in themselves to explain landscape beauty; can they be 
abstracted from associated meanings and emotions? This thesis has its 
own way of tackling such questions, but the aesthetic tradition has 
supplied other answers. And these have had a reciprocal effect, that 
is, the terms evolved for explanatory purposes became adopted, by 
certain groups, as a mode of understanding landscape in its own right. 
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It was amongst the English that this aesthetic aspect of culture was 
brought to the height of refinement around the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. There had grown an especially fertile interaction 
between the study of neo-classical philosophy and a taste for 
seventeenth century Italian landscape painting, from which substantial 
reformulations became possible whose influence went beyond philosophy 
and art criticism to literature and gardening. Subsequently, however; 
the controversies among aestheticians became so petty and sterile that 
this strand was submerged by concepts evolved by members of the romantic 
movement. Nevertheless, the aesthetic approach is present today within 
a relatively small academic community and, most notably, within the 
profession of landscape architecture which traces its ancestry through 
the eighteenth century landscape gardeners. 
To begin as far back as possible: the first two aesthetic terms - form 
and line - were identified by the earliest Greek philosophers. To 
them, the wonderful mathematical regularities that they had discovered 
in two and three dimensional geometric figures had metaphysical 
significance, and were taken to reveal the ultimate truth about the 
universe. 
94 It is not surprising then, that in attempting to explain 
the beautiful, the leading thinkers of the day fell back upon the 
geometrical terms with which they themselves were obsessed, the 
perfectly straight line, the perfect circle, square or sphere, or 
whatever, being the most beautiful things they could imagine. 
Pythagoras (6th century BC) and Plato (428/7-348/7 BC) held that 
certain geometric ratios and proportions were intrinsically beautiful, 
95 
expressing universal harmony and, since it was obvious that these 
rarely occurred naturally on earth, Plato was able to argue that the 
natural world was but a crude copy of the perfect world of pure and 
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ideal forms, which could never physically exist or be apprehended by 
the human senses. Plato did not develop a coherent aesthetic 
theory: 96 sometimes, he implied that ideal forms were simply 
geometrical shapes, like the dodecahedron, 
97 while elsewhere, he said 
that each class of objects - for example tables, human bodies and 
presumably trees and mountains too - had a supersensible ideal form of 
perfect geometrical proportions. 98 Both of these propositions had 
enormous influence on subsequent aesthetic thinking, in particular as 
they were developed by Aristotle (384/3-322/1 BC), who argued that 
although ideal forms could not actually be manifest, everything in 
nature was involved in a struggle towards the ideal, and that humanity 
could assist in the constant striving to realise ultimate perfection 
in form and proportion-99 
To the theologians of the early medieval period, this Aristotelian 
concept was a god-send in their efforts to adapt pagan classical 
knowledge to the tenets of Christianity. St. Augustine of Hippo 
(d 430 AD) made a significant contribution to neo-classical aesthetics 
by equating the world of ideal forms with the perfectly rational mind 
of God. 
100 Everything on earth was working to reach God's ideals and, 
since humanity acted as the divine agent, landscapes over which they 
had control - where the forms and proportions were more regular, the 
lines straighter, the angles sharper and the curves nearer to the 
circle - were necessarily more beautiful than the wild, untouched, 
wholly irregular regions. Thus, a theologically respectable, 
aesthetic justification was found for the widespread appreciation felt 
in medieval times for the cultivated landscape-101 It prevailed among 
the minority of the English who were aesthetically minded until the 
eighteenth century at least, and appeared most obviously in their 
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gardens. Gardens, when not intended for food production, have 
generally been the only areas of cultivated land in which economic and 
other utilitarian considerations have been allowed to take a secondary 
role so that aesthetic principles might be more fully expressed. 
Between medieval and Stuart times, such gardens in England usually 
displayed a much greater degree of geometrical regularity than the 
rest of the domesticated landscape. This reached an apogee in the 
adoption by the English of the formal garden which had been brought to 
its highest stage of development in seventeenth century France-102 
The very adjective 'formal' is an indication of the aestheticism of 
the garden's designers and owners, as were the symmetrical 
arrangements of forms and lines, the straight paths and avenues, the 
geometrical flowerbeds, and the carefully pruned bushes and trees of 
which such gardens consisted. 
Perversely, it was not until just before the reaction against perfect 
geometrical regularity began in England that the neo-classical 
aesthetic grounds for disapproving of the wilderness were fully worked 
out. This was achieved by Bishop Thomas Burnet (1635-1715), whose 
hook: "The Sacred Theory of the Earth" went through many editions 
after its first publication in 1681. In her brilliant exposition of 
Burnet, Majorie Hope Nicolson103 argues that the chaos of natural form 
in the Alps, seen on his Grand Tour in 1671 and the like of which he 
had not encountered in flat, domesticated Cambridgeshire where he 
lived, so offended all Burnet's neo-classical aesthetic expectations 
of form and proportion, that he felt such mountains could not possibly 
have been made by God, and he determined to save theology and the 
classics. Burnet proposed that the Earth had originally been the 
perfect creation of the Divine mind -a round, smooth, regular sphere 
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- but the sins committed by humanity had brought on the Flood. Fluids 
in the interior had erupted through the Earth's crust, breaking it up 
and heaving the pieces into ruinous heaps, and violating the circle of 
perfection forever. The Earth would never regain its ideal form and 
mountains, especially, were the frightful reminders of this 
catastrophic and disgraceful event. Burnet's theory gained 
considerable popularity in the fashionable world of his day, and many 
of his readers proceeded to exaggerate English hills, like the 
Mendips, into his disgusting "warts and superfluous execrescences". 
But in so doing, of course, their attention was drawn to the wilder, 
irregular areas of landscape which had had little previous aesthetic 
significance. 
With the institution of this disapproving scheme for understanding 
uplands, gentlemen on their Grand Tour now began to actually mention 
the Alps in their letters home, whereas their predecessors had 
completed the Alpine section of their journey with the carriage 
curtains closed. Nicolson suggests that once Burnet himself had been 
able to categorise and give meaning to mountain regions he felt the 
stirrings of an appreciation of their chaotic form, but consciously 
resisted their appeal to the end of his life. In this way, he 
foreshadowed, and contributed to, the transformation that was soon to 
occur in aesthetic thinking, which involved the setting up of more 
irregular forms and lines as the ideal. Nicolson makes two further 
points about Burnet's effect upon contemporary thought. Firstly, he 
succeeded in making God a much more remote figure than had previously 
been the case in neo-classical aesthetics. God had become the 
Cartesian mechanic who, having once set the world in motion, had drawn 
quite apart. from it. Biblical sources henceforth became progressively 
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less important for aestheticians, this being in line with the general 
loss of theocentrism in post-Renaissance philosophy. Secondly, 
Burnet's ideas were influential quite outside the field of aesthetics 
in that they provoked so much controversy that his opponents were 
forced to closely study mountains and hills for the first-time since 
the classical period, so preparing the ground for modern geological 
science. 
Before going on to consider the opposing notion of irregularity of 
form as ideal, it would be as well to comment upon the subsequent path 
taken in the search for regular geometrical form. As Ruth Saw and 
Harold Osborne104 remark, the theory that beauty consists of certain 
mathematical proportions was apt to seem trivial once it had been 
disassociated from the metaphysical and religious background in which 
it had evolved. It became difficult for an increasing number of 
people, especially those given to philosophy, to believe in God, yet 
alone a God who took a keen interest in geometry. However, in the 
early twentieth century intellectual climate which owed much to 
positivistic science with its reductionist tendencies, mathematically 
regular forms regained their hold over some aestheticians, this time 
with a scientific justification. They drew upon Gestalt psychology 
which conceived the visual process as the apprehension of shapes pre- 
programmed in the brain. 
105 Added momentum came from the simultaneous 
development, in the early twentieth century, of abstract landscape 
art. Certain painters on the Continent strove to depict the inner 
structural harmonies of landscape, ordinarily imperceptible but now 
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revealed by modern science-106 The result was paintings remarkable 
for their similarity in character to the world of pure geometrical 
form once postulated by Plato, 
'°7 
and English art critics, such as 
Bell and Fry, argued that abstract painting had finally demonstrated 
the reality behind landscape-108 However, neither abstract art nor 
., 
Gestalt psychology joined the. aesthetic mainstream in-England. 
Fry, like others, had identified Paul Cz anne (1839-1906) as the 
father of modern abstract aestheticism on the basis of a famous 
statement the painter had made in a letter to the effect that: 
"Everything in nature is modelled on the sphere, the cone and the 
cylinder. "109 This seems, on the surface, to be an aesthetic principle 
in fine Platonic tradition, but, as Clark110 has shown, when taken in 
context, it only appears as an instruction in painting technique, 
since Ckanne's next sentence reads: "One must teach oneself to base 
one's painting on these simple forms... " C&anne's method of splitting 
up planes into facets, and building his composition out of a number of 
simplified shapes was his means of achieving the difficult task of 
depicting the landscape he saw before him in paint on canvas, and, in 
fact, the drawing of spheres, cones and cylinders had long been part 
of the training given to art students with no expectation that their 
finished paintings would be geometrically abstract. Chzanne saw 
geometry as a means to an end, not, as later abstract painters and 
some aestheticians believed, an end in itself. However, Fry's attempt 
to turn a particular painting technique employed by a great master 
into a general aesthetic concept was in complete accord with another 
long established aesthetic tradition which, paradoxically, had earlier 
contributed towards the appreciation of far less geometrically regular 
forms - namely, the respect given to landscape painters. 
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To return, for a moment, to Plato's argument that ideal forms could 
not materially exist, it must have created something of an impasse for 
all but the most elevated of philosophers because it left little way 
of knowing what the ideal of any particular class of objects, 
including landscape, was really like. Moreover, he was quite 
derogatory in "The Republic" about art which, he said, was doubly 
debased because a painting was only an imperfect copy of nature that 
in turn was only an imperfect copy of the ideal. Perhaps this was a 
piece of defence on the philosopher's part against artists who were 
practically rather than academically involved in finding the 
attractive and the beautiful. They had the advantage, in one sense, 
in that the products of their work could actually be seen, instead of 
existing only in the philosopher's mind, while they were concerned, as 
part of their techniques of portrayal, with form and line which Plato, 
himself, had established as central aesthetic categories. It is to 
the eternal credit of the aesthetically-minded English of the 
eighteenth century that they succeeded in identifying the Platonic 
ideals of landscape with the techniques employed by landscape artists, 
and in particular with certain accomplished painters who had appeared 
in Italy and Holland roughly a century earlier. 
Of course, the germ of the idea of uniting landcape art and landscape 
appreciation had been isolated before. The Younger Pliny (c61-113 AD), 
for example, had written a letter about the mountains, woods and 
meadows of his estate in Tuscany which contained the following 
statement: lll 
"You would be charmed by taking a view of the country from one of 
the neighbouring mountains. You would fancy you were looking on 
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the imaginary landscape of a first-class artist, such an 
harmonious variety of beautiful objects meets the eye wherever it 
turns. "; 
Three points may be made about this. Firstly, Pliny was often cited 
as an authority by eighteenth century writers when proposing a 
conjunction between landscape aesthetics and art. The need for such 
an authority was one sign of what Allen112 has called, the 
intellectual tyranny of the classics. Thus, the artistic rejuvination 
of landscape aesthetics took place firmly within a neo-classical 
context. Secondly, then, the English retained a version of the world 
of ideal forms held to exist in the mind of God. As the Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713)113 proposed in: "The Moralists" of 1709, and 
contradicting Burnet, God could be considered as the supreme artist, 
and the world in its current form as a work of art created by Him. It 
was still not quite perfect, however, but moving towards God's ideals 
in Aristotelian fashion. The argument could then be made that human 
artists were capable of divining the mind of God by closely observing 
the general tendencies of His creation, and in their paintings correct 
the superficial accidents of nature revealing the perfectly irregular 
forms that constituted the ideal natural landscape. Shaftesbury 
thereby reinforced a belief, which had been held since Pliny's time, 
that a landscape painting was properly the imaginative representation 
of the ideal, not an accurate account of a particular place, which 
explains why topographical painting was denigrated in aesthetic 
quarters for some time. The third observation to be made about 
Pliny's statement is that it displays a feature that became the 
hallmark of the aesthetic appreciation of landscape as soon as any 
dependency upon painting developed, that is, the overwhelming 
emphasis placed upon vision-114 Indeed 'landscape' itself is a term 
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derived from art115 and is thereby inextricably bound up with visual 
considerations - the look of things - while from the eighteenth 
century onwards 'aesthetic' and 'visual' have often been used inter- 
changeably, providing the grounds for the long controversy over 
whether the other senses have anything to contribute towards the 
perception of landscape quality. 
The aesthetic obsession with vision is derived from circumstances 
surrounding the painting of a picture of landscape. The painter's 
purpose is to create something that appeals initially through the 
sense of sight which, in itself, imposes conditions. One of most basic 
considerations is that to the visual sense the landscape appears in 
three dimensions and for most of the history of landscape painting, 
with the exception of some abstract art, it has been the painter's 
purpose to render these into the two dimensions of paper or canvas. 
Similarly, painters have to try to reconstruct in coloured pigments 
the visual outline and shape of objects, their colour not only being 
important in itself, but as it alters with the shadows created by the 
direction of light and variations in form. Technique had to be 
developed that enabled the achievement of artistic aims, which 
instructed the painter in exactly what visual elements to look for, 
and how to represent them. Gombrich116 has clearly explained that such 
techniques cannot be instantly invented in a cultural vacuum. The 
tricks of creating visual representations of landscape are learnt 
from other painters, both past and present, even if only from pictures 
seen. In addition, if a painting is to be appreciated as representing 
landscape by a wider audience, some of the tricks of the trade have to 
be understood by people who do not belong to the immediate artistic 
community. But in the very process of such people coming to terms 
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with the vocabulary of representation, conventions are established and 
may be extended beyond the art objects to the subjects they depict-117 
Of course, painting techniques have rarely remained exactly the same 
for long. Artists seeking to achieve their own ends, whatever these 
be, modify conventional usages or reject them in favour of new 
methods. It takes time for artistic innovations to become part of a 
more general aesthetic vision, and be conventionalised in their turn. 
For example, Gombrich118 shows that John Constable's pictures were the 
result of a masterly technique developed from long study of Italian, 
Dutch and English painting, together with personal experiments in 
method. During his lifetime, Constable was frequently criticised for 
'lack of finish', that is, failure to fulfill the established ideals 
of landscape, and for his odd use of colour - too much green compared 
to the mellow brown tones then used to convey distance, and too much 
white to convey light, instead of soft pinkish tinges. It was only 
after more people came to understand his aims and mode of expression 
that Constable's pictures became popular. 
The bond between the practices of landscape painting and the aesthetic 
appreciation of landscape was probably sealed with the discovery of 
the principles of perspective in fifteenth century Renaissance Italy. 
Prior to this, painters had encountered severe difficulties in 
representing distance. Examples of their rather clumsy ways of doing 
so may be seen in the first few pages of most books on landscape 
painting, and they could have been one of the reasons why the 
landscape painter cut such a poor figure in the art world and why 
landscape was usually only sketched in as a background behind human 
forms. But once the precise rules of perspective had been worked out 
- the convergence of parallel lines, the proportional decreases in 
185 
size etc - artists were provided with a code which allowed a reliable 
translation of the receeding landscape into two dimensions, a code 
which their audience rapidly came to understand as the study of 
perspective was accorded considerable esteem. 119 Moreover, a 
knowledge of perspective made the Italians first, and then the rest of 
Europe, more conscious of space. In both Italy and England, the 
fortified dwellings of the rich had traditionally been built at 
vantage points to give adequate sighting of attackers and, under these 
circumstances, distance could only have been regarded as an inhibition 
to clear seeing. 120 However, as times became more settled, the 
scientific and artistic exploitation of perspective gave those who 
knew about it another reason for looking at the views their houses 
afforded, and encouraged a pleasurable interest in the effects of 
distance. New houses were designed to give good prospect for 
aesthetic rather than defence purposes, while the walls or vegetation 
that had once completely enclosed the formal garden, were opened in 
places to provide vistas of the countryside beyond. 
The English aristocratic craze for landscape painting, and the effects 
it had upon their appreciation of scenery, is the best documented and 
the most analysed event in the history of landscape perception, both by 
contemporary philosophers, literati, poets, painters and gardeners, and 
by later historians of the arts. * To cope with the subtleties of 
comment and dissection within a paragraph or two is quite impossible, so 
a few points will simply be made about the painter who perhaps dominated 
the entire episode. Claude Lorraine (1600-1682) was French, but spent 
*a selection of reference on the subject is supplied in Appendix 1 
and it is upon these that the ensuing discussion relies. 
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his adult life in Italy where, by 1640, at least partially due to his 
efforts, landscape became established as a separate and important branch 
of painting. His primary contribution was to refine the representation 
of perspective by replacing the original Renaissance method of gradually 
diminishing the size of things. Instead, Claude used a series of abrupt 
leaps into distance depicted as a succession of horizontal bands which 
appeared to receed from the viewer who, to achieve the effect, had to be 
positioned at a high viewpoint. Claude used such devices as bridges, 
rivers and cattle fording streams to make the link from one plane to the 
next and so lead the overlooking eye out into the distance, while the 
trees and buildings within each plane had to be so composed as to 
differentiate the bands from one another. Therefore, his compositions 
while superficially made up of a certain degree of irregularity of form, 
such as the undulating ground surface, were underlain by a strict 
geometrical framework so as to represent space. Claude's use of light 
and colour were designed to achieve the same end. Fifteenth century 
Flemish painters had already discovered that, in a certain light, 
colours had tonal values which changed with distance. Claude chose to 
depict landscapes under the flat golden-pinkish light that he could 
observe during the Italian sunrise and sunset. In this light, he was 
able to paint gradations in tone from warm brown in the foremost plane 
to a pale silvery blue in the most distant one, which, even when the 
bands that his pictures consisted of were quite parallel, produced the 
effect of recession. This was further enhanced by the disposition of 
the shadows cast by objects in each plane. Claude had no intention of 
painting actual places, but used his scheme to create idealised 
compositions of the Italian campagna, with the smooth curving lines of 
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idealised Italian trees and a gentle land form that often piled up 
into far away mountains. The subjects of his pictures usually had 
reference to some incident in classical literature and the atmosphere 
of the whole harked back to Virgilian pastoral tranquility. 
121 
The way the English upper class came to be so enamoured of Claude 
within fifty years of his death is one of those comfortingly oft-told 
stories. To the English gentleman whose education had been almost 
entirely classical, Italy was tremendously attractive; an attraction 
enhanced by it being the seat of the Renaissance revival in classical 
learning. Unfortunately, for most of the seventeenth century, wars in 
Europe and the appalling road conditions made the Journey to Italy too 
gruelling an experience to contemplate for all but a hardy few. 
However, with peace signed* and travel facilities improved, 122 the 
Grand. Tour rapidly became the required manner in which. to complete a 
proper education. As the Ogdens have shown, 
123 
some of those taking 
the Grand Tour already had an interest in landscape painting and 
probably possessed pictures of their own estates. Once in Italy, they 
came across Claude whom they found immediately accessible because of 
his nostalgic references to the classical literature they knew so 
well. His paintings were thus the perfect souveniers of all that the 
English gentleman had experienced in the land of classicism and neo- 
classicism, and so numerous Claudes were brought home to add to 
private art collections. The next generation of Grand Tourists went 
to Italy fully intending to find more Claudes, and by the 1740's there 
was a thriving trade in the originals as well as in copies and 
* some commentators mention the Peace of Ryswick 1697, and others 
the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 
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imitations. 124 It was not long before Claude was established in 
England as the master of the ideal landscape. A training in the 
connoisseurship of art, based largely on his principles, became 
essential for every person of fashion and it seems, almost 
simultaneously, efforts were made to apply these principles to the 
physical landscape too. Hussey finds that in the accounts of Grand 
Tours between 1640 and 1730 mention of the pictoral view of landscape 
is rare, but each case that does occur can be traced to a solourn in 
Rome where paintings by Claude could be seen. 
125 
By dint of very careful selection, organisation and an enormous amount 
of recomposition, native artists were able to depict English scenes 
according to Claudean ideals. James Thompson (1700-1748), for 
example, in his poem "The Seasons" which was widely read when it came 
out in the 1730's used a strict Claudean structure to create word 
pictures of the various country seats that he eulogised. 
126 His 
method helped to set up the ensuing poetic tradition of describing 
landscape, which involved looking out from a high viewpoint while 
working from foreground to background. Painters, like Richard Wilson 
(1714-1782), 127 also adopted Claude's technique wholesale. Even in 
pictures that had English place-names as titles, the trees were of an 
Italian form, and the tones were mellow brown, although as Constable 
later established the fatter rarely occur under northern skies. 
Gentlemen who had returned from their Grand Tour, but who yearned to 
see again the Italianate ideal they had found through Claude admired 
such poems and pictures and also proceeded to observe the English 
countryside with a Claude glass. This was a circular, convex, tinted 
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mirror which was directed over the back of the viewer so that a tiny, 
framed picture of the landscape behind, with the colours deadened into 
Claudean tones, appeared in the glass. The contraption was moved 
about until the viewer Judged that perfection had been attained, but 
both this and artists' attempts to find the Italianate ideal in 
England rarely produced complete satisfaction because English scenery 
hardly ever supplied the form and line required by the then aesthetic 
standard. The wide stretches of open fields were not easily fitted 
into the terms of Claude's perspective, while the hedges of the 
enclosure and the formal gardens were an offence against the softer 
lines characteristic of Claude. So the landed upper class began to 
have part of their estates turned into little artistic Italies. The 
old gardens with their straight paths and avenues were redesigned 
together with the larger areas of wooded parkland, that had once been 
used for hunting, so as to realise the ideals towards which nature was 
striving, and which were exemplified by Claude: 
128 
"... since nature in the raw state was imperfect, and since in 
the canvases of painters her blemishes had been eliminated and 
her charms had been culled and combined so as to form a synthesis 
of her most exquisite beauties, it was the business of the 
gardener to study pictorial. methods of design, adapt them to his 
medium, create his foreground, middle distances and background, 
and arrange for a varied play of light and shade. " 
It must be remembered that this was what was meant by the word 
'natural' as applied by the aesthetically-minded to landscape 
throughout the eighteenth century, a usage at odds with modern 
understanding of the term, and that in their early stages these 
'naturalistic' landscape gardens retained a considerable amount of 
geometrical regularity. 
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The greatest designer of the English landscape garden, for so the 
initial Italianate ideal became, and the person who brought it to the 
highest stage of aesthetic development, was Lancelot (Capability) 
Brown (1716-1783) whose total of 211 works were distributed over every 
English county except Cornwall and Leicestershire. 
129 It is often said 
that Brown, who never. made the Grand Tour, created literary rather 
than painterly compositions as his management of form and line bore a 
close resemblence to analyses of the now conventional aesthetic ideals 
by Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and William Hogarth (1697-1764). 
130 Burke, 
whose influential book "A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful" was published in 1757, 
proposed that the Beautiful, as demonstrated by Claude, consisted of 
smooth undulating forms, which Brown expressed in rolling lawns and 
strategically disposed rounded clumps of trees, usually placed on 
gently rising ground. Hogarth in "The Analysis of Beauty" published 
in 1753, had derived a vocabulary of representation for the painter 
which dictated that the serpentine line was the best of all, 
131 
and 
Brown put this into his winding paths and driveways, and the curved 
edges of his lakes. The landscape garden thus had a regularity of its 
own, a defined order of composition. But, to people whose 
aestheticism had been previously pervaded with the strict geometirical 
regularity of the classics and the formal garden, as described earlier 
it displayed complete and perfect irregularity of form and line: 
132 
'I he straight and the curved lines were symbolic of the periods 
in which they had the greatest aesthetic authority: the former 
connoted simplicity, uniformity, reserve, stability and the 
absence of the unexpected; the latter connoted complexity, 
191 
multiplicity, energy, and the expressiveness of a resurgent 
vitality. " 
This seems to have been one among many considerations reinforcing the 
contemporary popularity of the landscape garden, besides the point 
that it was usually cheaper to create and maintain than the formal 
garden, therefore salving to the English Puritan conscience-133 The 
aesthetically-minded had simply become bored with the predictability 
of regular geometrical forms, and found more to interest and enjoy in 
less measured designs. The case has also been made, based on a remark 
by Horace Walpole (1717-1797)134, for the English. taking the 
emancipation from the strict geometry of the French formal garden as 
symbolic of the politically liberal nature of their society, in 
comparison with autocratic European regimes, and of which they were 
immensely proud. 
135 
Once admiration of the vast acres of aesthetically designed landscape 
gardens had become habitual, it was but a short step to develop an 
aesthetic approval of the native landscape as a whole, especially as 
attention had long been drawn to selected prospects extending beyond 
the garden while landowners were never averse to viewing the rest of 
their property. Patriotic pride probably also played a part in 
strengthening such a movement, which occurred, as far as one can be 
definite about such things, towards the latter part of the eighteenth 
century. At the time, Britain was becoming one of the most powerful 
nations in the world, so inspiring the upper classes with the 
confidence to reject any dependency upon obviously foreign ideals and 
to apply English ones, which actually owed much to Italy in the first 
place, to their worthy native country. 
136 
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The aesthetic contemplation of English scenery was, however, no simple 
or direct matter. It had to be done in the right way by following a 
special procedure which involved consciously recognising the stretch 
of land under the eye as a composition of trees, hills and fields in 
which each object bore a specific and analysable relationship to the 
others: 
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"The recognition of the formal structure of a landscape was not a 
purely passive activity -a considerable amount of jockeying for 
position, of screwing up the eyes, of moving back and forth, or 
rearranging objects in the imagination had to be gone through 
before a view came right. This is William Gilpin describing how 
he looked at a landscape: 'The whole view was pleasing from 
various stands but to make it particularly picturesque by gaining 
a good foreground, we were obliged to change our station backward 
and forward, till we had obtained a good one. Two large plane 
trees, which we met with, were of great assistance to us'. " 
William Gilpin (1724-1804), who did not make the Grand Tour, was the 
person who confirmed, reinforced and elaborated upon the trend towards 
finding native scenery a source of aesthetic satisfaction, despite it 
not looking like Italy. He provided his large readership with a set 
of specifications of the Picturesque, and plenty of examples of their 
application to English landscape. Some confusion was caused by his 
illustrations of these examples because they were still cast in the 
ideal mode, that is, his pictures did not purport to represent actual 
Places with any accuracy, but to show how these places would look if 
they were allowed to reach Picturesque perfection. Gilpin's terms of 
reference were, as aesthetic tradition now dictated, firmly based on 
techniques of artistic representation. . 
For example, he put an 
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emphasis upon colour as found in the English landscape, helping people 
to see the tints of autumn which they seem not to have noticed 
aesthetically before; and he instituted a simplification of Claude's 
perspective, encouraging the viewer to divide the scenery into 
foreground, mid-ground and background. 
However, Gilpin's most innovative contribution was to give clear 
aesthetic reasons for preferring rough and rugged upland scenery. It 
has already been shown that Burnet had drawn aesthetic attention to 
mountains by giving meaning to their chaotic non-geometrical form, 138 
and that Claude had portrayed mountains as a minor element in his 
paintings. 139 According to Gombrich, 140 the painting profession had long 
possessed the technical means for dealing with 'steep isolated rocks' 
and were therefore capable of visually appreciating them. Moreover, 
the Italian painter Salvator Rosa (1615-1673), who had for some time 
been Claude's closest rival in popularity among the Fnglish had made a 
speciality of depicting grotesque mountain forms. Given such 
preliminary circumstances, Gilpin was able to maintain that shaggy, 
jagged, broken and otherwise violently irregular forms, mostly found 
in certain hilly areas, were aesthetically ideal because, together 
with the dramatic effects of light and colour which they tended to 
produce, they could be used to create the best pictures. This was in 
obvious contrast to the very gently irregular forms and smooth 
gradations in tone portrayed by Claude, but it may also have had 
something to do with Gilpin's own abilities as a painter: 
141 
"(His] love of the shaggy stems partly from the encouragement a 
rough subject gives to a sketchy facility of execution. " 
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Be that as it may, towards the close of the eighteenth century, 
numerous professional artists adopted his system and: 
142 
' ... with critical faculties sharpened on these new theories and 
with an attitude to nature which saw her as little more than a 
. scribbling-pad 
for their sketches, the Reverend William Gilpin 
unleashed a fresh stream of ardent tourists upon the English 
countryside. " 
Among a certain section of the English then, Gilpin's delineation of 
the Picturesque was taken to mark the culmination of the long search 
for the aesthetic landcape, however, a number of writers on aesthetics 
at the time were highly critical of Gilpin's theoretical stance, 
finding it quite inadequate. This was because he completely failed to 
deal with the question of the extent to which the workings of the 
human eye and mind played a part in the appreciation of landscape, a 
point that some aestheticians felt impelled to discuss extensively. 
Since the preceeding account has also ignored this aspect of 
eighteenth century landscape aesthetics, it will likewise be found 
deficient by anyone acquainted with the literature on the subject, but 
the omission has been a deliberate one due to the fact that a new 
kind of philosophical thinking was involved whose intricacies were 
obviously not understood by Gilpin nor, probably by most of his 
readership in his lifetime. For them, the simple concept of the God- 
given landscape ideal which could he revealed by painters was still in 
common currency, 
143 but it was unacceptable to those influenced by the 
vigorous school of British empiricism that had appeared in the 
seventeenth century as a reaction against the immaterial and spiritual 
nature of such neo-classicism. 
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An interesting thesis could be written on the way certain eighteenth 
century thinkers applied empirical philosophy to the contemporary 
craze for the aesthetic landscape, but here there has only been 
sufficient time and space to note a few important features. The 
empiricists made God an even more remote figure than Burnet had done. 
The new philosophy turned decisively away from theology towards 
humanitarianism leaving God, if mentioned at all, as the peripheral 
Cartesian mechanic. The tremendous impression made by the advances of 
seventeenth century scientists, particularly Isaac Newton (1642-1727), 
had left the empiricists with a mechanistic conception of the world, 
including the working of the human senses and mind: 
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"Among the British philosophers we find a marked interest in 
psychological questions. The leading empiricists, Locke, Berkley 
and Hume, all deal with problems about knowledge, and they tend to 
treat these problems from a psychological rather than from a 
strictly epistemological point of view. That is to say, they 
tend to concentrate their attention on the question, how do our 
ideas arise? And this is obviously a psychological question. 
Again in English empiricism we can see the growth of the 
associationist psychology. Further, in his introduction to the 
'Treatise of Human Nature' Hume speaks explicitly of the need for 
developing the science of man on an empirical basis. Natural 
philosophy, he says, has already been established on an empirical 
basis; but philosophers, have only just begun to put the science 
of man on a life. footing. " 
Against this philosophical background, some aestheticians identified 
the technical aspects of artistic construction, which now had an 
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established role in aestheticism, with deeper, universal, 
psychological properties. Richard Payne Knight (1750-1824), in his 
"Analytical Enquiry into the Principles of Taste" published in 1805, 
perhaps presented the best developed argument along these lines with 
respect to landscape-145 Whereas Gilpin had simply said the 
Picturesque was that which looked well in a picture, Knight defined it 
as that which appealed to the sense of sight, this being the dominant 
sense, while colour, light, distance and magnitude were primary 
aspects of the objective world. To see the visual qualities 
impartially, the mind had to adopt a mode of apprehension akin to that 
of a painter, who excluded what were thought to be secondary 
considerations in the process of creating a picture. So, for example, 
the primary qualities of a meadow would be its square shape, sloping 
ground surface, and green and yellow tones with which the artist had 
to be concerned, 
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while its grazing potential, species composition 
or significance for local courting couples would only be secondary 
associated qualities. Knight, then had arrived at what later came to 
be known as 'the aesthetic attitude', 
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whose main characteristic was 
to separate the observer from any personal involvement with the scene 
observed, and is epitomised, in Barrell's opinion, 
148 by the selection 
of high viewpoint, once necessary for Claude's painting technique, to 
reinforce physically the observer's mental divorce from the landscape. 
149 
"Those who held this attitude to landscape, in short, were able 
to do so because they were not involved in the landscapes they 
met with: their eye 'loomed over' them, and manipulated the 
objects in them, simply according to the rules and structures 
sanctioned by a pure and abstract vision, and without any 
reference to what the function of those objects might be, what 
their use might be to the people who lived among them" 
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In the extreme, the aesthetic attitude excluded everything except 
form, line, space and colour: it was anti-utilitarian, anti- 
familiarity, anti-emotion and, according to Hussey, 150 anti-knowledge - 
seeing abstractly, with as few pre-conceived ideas as possible - 
although, as Gombrichl5l demonstrates, abstract vision is a pre- 
conceived idea in itself. More pragmatically, it seems to have been 
fostered by the Turnpike Acts which not only meant that travellers 
were no longer too engrossed in their discomforts to give more than a 
disparaging glance to the view, 
152 but that the upper classes became 
used to seeing landscape with which they had no personal connection 
and were therefore capable of appreciation in an abstract aesthetic 
manne . 
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There must, however, he some debate as to whether many people actually 
achieved the prescribed rational state, apart possibly from those who 
gave the prescription, because throughout the eighteenth century the 
chorus of a conscious emotional involvement with the landscape was 
heard, increasing in volume until. it quite drowned what abstract 
aestheticism there was. This was the Romantic movement and one of its 
facets was linked to aestheticism, in that it arose from the two main 
elements of which the aesthetic view of landscape is composed, namely, 
art and philosophy. To take art first: it was obvious, perhaps to all 
but the occasional theoretician, that landscape paintings were not 
just pure expressions of an artistic technique, they were generally 
about something, they had a subject of one kind or another to he 
communicated to the viewer. Native painters, especially provincial 
ones, were often, of course, concerned with the productivity and 
profitability of the landed estates, 
154but 
pride in such things was 
seemingly unacceptable to a taste refined on Italian landscape art. 
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It may be significant that Thomas Gainsborough who as a young man 
painted that detailed account of Mr and Mrs Andrews' possessions near 
his home town of Sudbury in Suffolk, later declared, when he was an 
established portrait painter in London, that there was no landscape 
worth painting outside Italy. 155 There, the subjects that the master, 
Claude, had found most suitable to the scenery were those drawn from 
classical literature, and, for a time, before Capability Brown 
appeared on the scene, landscape gardeners constantly made literary 
allusions in their re-creation of Claude's Italy in England. 
156 A 
famous example was the garden of Leasowes, near Birmingham, designed 
by its owner, the minor poet, William Shenstone (1714-1763). Views, 
composed in a style reminiscent of Claude, were to he seen from 
certain fixed points at which there would be a seat and a motto from 
the classics, or poem by Shenstone in classical genre. These were 
intended to evoke an appropriate feeling for the scene set out before 
the viewer, Tust as Claude's paintings themselves conveyed the 
tranquility, peace and security of the fixed, ancient order of the 
classical world. Probably the very calmness of Claude allowed viewers 
to see through his subject matter to the sophisticated technique of 
representation that he employed, but his rival in popularity, Salvator 
Rosa, produced paintings of such dramatic content that they positively 
invited an emotional interpretation in association with a technical 
157 
one. 
It has already been pointed out that following, Burnet, the Alps 
inspired disgust and horror. Rosa's pictures of sinister banditti 
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lurking among deep gorges, stupendous rock formations and blasted 
trees were a major contribution to the translation of this fearfulness 
into a pleasurable experience. As Horace Walpole described his Alpine 
impressions in a letter written on his Grand Tour in 1739: 
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"Precipices, mountains, torrents, wolves, rumblings, Salvator 
Rosa - the pomp of our park and- the meekness of our palace! Here 
we are, the lonely lords of glorious desolate prospects. " 
The general tendency to impute sentiments expressed by a painter to 
English scenery was exhibited forty years later in Thomas West's 
guidebook to the Lake District of 1778, in which he spoke of going: 
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"... from the delicate touches of Claude, verified in Coniston 
Lake, to the noble scenes of Poussin, exhibited at Windemere 
water, and from there to the stupendous romantic ideas of 
Salvator Rosa, realised in the Lake of Derwent. " 
But what of philosophy? Under the old scheme of God-given ideals, 
there was no clear way of categorising the emotional qualities of 
paintings that some of the English were now transferring to gardens 
and mountainous scenery, but the associationist psychology of British 
empiriciam could deal with such considerations more easily. The 
father of this philosophical school. is said to be John Locke (1632- 
1704) who, in his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" published in 
1690, argued that all knowledge originated from sense perception. 
Stimuli, especially visual stimuli, gave rise to simple ideas that 
were combined by mental introspection into more complex ones - an 
early formulation of the concept of the association of ideas. 
160 
As was previously remarked, a few aestheticians, like Knight, 
concluded that mental associations made on the basis of primary visual 
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properties were of almost negligible aesthetic account, but the figure 
who dominated landscape aesthetics in the eighteenth century, Edmund 
Burke took a slightly less reductive stance. In "A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful", he was the first published aesthetician to introduce 
emotion, albeit of a specific and limited kind, as a proper and 
explicit element in landscape appreciation, 
161 
this being one of the 
contingencies of his other, greater first which was to integrate the 
empirical mode of thought with the aestheticism of landscape. That he 
began his book at the age of nineteen is depressing enough for the 
Ph. D student, especially as it proved to be one of those works that 
everyone writing in the field afterwards either imitated, borrowed, or 
felt necessary to refute. 
162 Even the wider aesthetically-minded 
public picked up his division between the Sublime and the Beautiful, 
which they found were admirably illustrated on the one hand by Rosa 
and on the other by Claude, although at the time of publication they 
probably did not follow the reasoning behind the distinction, and 
thought in terms of the ideally Sublime and the ideally Beautiful. 
Actually, Burke was proposing that form, line, space and colour in the 
landscape acted mechanically through the eye upon the mind, producing 
certain instinctive emotional reactions-163 When line was violently 
irregular, when form and space reached vast proportions, when there 
were sharp contrasts of colour, and patches of startling brightness 
together with areas of deepest gloom and obscurity, ideas were 
inspired of the immense forces required to execute such greatness, 
forces that could threaten the passion for self-preservation and so 
made the nerves tense. This could be unpleasantly painful, unless 
the observer was assured that life and limb were not in jeopardy, then 
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the nerves were only moderately stretched which toned up the body and 
was therefore delightful. This kind of landscape and its associated 
ideas were labelled 'Sublime', a word once used in the field of 
literary criticism to denote an impressive, rhetorical style, but 
applied by Shaftesbury at the beginning of the century to natural 
phenomenon terrifyingly beyond human comprehension. Burke, however, 
changed the whole face of aestheticism by taking the fearful in itself 
as a source of aesthetic satisfaction. Moreover, he was responsible 
for giving Beautiful its capital B, defining it in such a narrow way 
that no aesthetician after him could imagine that they were only 
concerned with Beauty. Burke thus succeeded in finally establishing 
beauty as an almost exclusively aesthetic term in the more popular 
mind while convincing aestheticians that it was no longer their only 
focus of interest. 
164 Beauty for Burke occurred when lines were 
smooth, forms and space were small, and colours only showed gradual 
variation. The delicacy and elegance of such a scene relaxed the 
bodily fibres, giving an inward sense of melting and langour that 
belonged to the social passion of love. This description looked back 
towards the composition and atmosphere of Claude's paintings, and 
forward to the calm and serenity that Capability Brown sought to evoke 
in the gardens he designed followed Burke's tenets of the Beautiful. 
165 
Burke' neat classification of landscape and landscape experience into 
two categories was accepted by most contemporary writers on the 
suhiect, but, as might he expected, his enumeration of the 
constituents of Sublimity and Beauty, and his philosophical/ 
psychological rationalisations, were much criticised. There was 
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argument, for example, over whether Smallness had to be a 
characteristic of Beauty, and whether the Sublime and the Beautiful 
belonged to two distinct orders, as Burke believed, or were opposite 
poles of the same aesthetic continuum. But the arguments became even 
more involved when Gilpin blithely introduced a third category - the 
Picturesque - in the 1770s and 1780s. Gilpin, as noted previously, 
operated within a neo-classical framework, that was quite outmoded for 
those who followed the latest developments in British philosophy, and 
he therefore gave little attention to the logical nicities that lay 
behind Burke's separation of Sublimity from Beauty. So, although 
Gilpin mentioned those terms he confused them to the extent of 
defining the Picturesque as a kind of beauty, not for any 
psychological reason but because it looked well in a picture, while 
giving it such sublime properties as grandeur, violent irregularity of 
form, and dramatic colouring and lighting. Quite probably, the more 
philosophically 'advanced' aestheticians would have dismissed Gilpin's 
scheme outright, if the Picturesque had not become so popular among 
the gentry, but since there was no avoiding it, efforts were made to 
incorporate it into the kind of scheme set up originally by Burke. 
One of the first to make a coherent attempt to bring Burke and Gilpin 
together was Uvedale Price'66(1747-1829) who, in his "Essay on the 
Picturesque" first published in 1794, proposed that the Picturesque 
was intermediate between Sublimity and Beauty. According to Price, 
Burke had said tht Sublimity stretched the nervous fibres beyond their 
normal condition, while Beauty relaxed the same to below their usual 
tone. The Picturesque, then, was a property in its own right, which 
fell between the two extremes and so kept the fibres at their full and 
natural tone, correcting the tensions of Sublimity and the langour of 
203 
Beauty. In addition, Price gave much importance to the association of 
ideas: for example, youth was connected to Beauty because smoothness 
of line and fresh delicate colouring belonged to both, while the 
rugged lines and more dramatic colouring of the Picturesque denoted 
age and decay. In contrast, Price's main opponent, Richard Payne 
Knight, gave such associations a minor role, and in seeking to 
reconcile the Picturesque with. empirical thought, arrived at the 
abstract solution already described. For Knight, the Picturesque was 
not a separate category but a sub-species of the Beautiful which 
covered all the properties of landscape having the ability to give 
sensual pleasure to the organs of sight. He was not sure, in 
physiological terms why this pleasure should arise, but thought that 
it might be because the Picturesque irritated the eye to just the 
right degree. 
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Price and Knight engaged in a public debate over these and other 
related points, 
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which proved to be so complicated and pedantic that 
it began to give the aestheticism of landscape a rather unfortunate 
reputation both among the upper classes in general and within the 
developing philosophical discipline of aesthetics. This was not 
helped by certain patent absurdities which emerged from the 
ratiocinations of the two protagonists. Price managed to reach the 
conclusion that the Beautiful was ugly by arguing that Beauty, with 
its smooth, gentle, undramatic characteristics, produced excessive 
langour when unmitigated by Picturesque elements, and was therefore 
ultimately boring and insipid. On these grounds, Price castigated 
the designs of Capability Brown, who had consciously sought to realise 
the Beautiful, and Humphrey Repton (1752-1818), in leaping to Brown's 
defence, was drawn into the fray-169 
That Repton, first and foremost 
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a gardener, was unconcerned with philosophical/psychological questions, 
took little account of the tenets of landscape painting except as he 
had inherited them through the now established profession of landscape 
gardening, and denigrated the very idea of the Picturesque, further 
added to the confusion. 
So, by the begining of the nineteenth century, writings on the 
aesthetics of landscape had degenerated into such a state of wrangling 
that they appeared increasingly ridiculous to the reading public, and 
probably consituted yet one more factor encouraging public rejection 
of the dryness and reductionism of aestheticism in favour of the 
richness and elaboration associated with the Romantic movement. 
As well as provoking something of a backlash against the pure 
aesthetics of landscape among a wider audience, and perhaps partially 
as a result of this backlash, the Repton-Price-Knight controversies 
seemed to have the effect of persuading those inside the discipline of 
aesthetics that landscape was no longer a sufficiently respectable 
subject for their concern. Apart from several historical analyses of 
eighteenth century thought, no one who might be described as an 
orthodox aesthetician, trained in the concepts of art and philosophy, 
has devoted an entire book to, or produced an influential new theory 
of, the aesthetics of landscape since Richard Payne Knight in 1805. 
In the following 175 years, the discipline of aesthetics as a whole, 
attaining levels of theoretical complexity far beyond Price or Knight, 
has concentrated almost exclusively upon understanding the value of 
paintings, poetry, music and other objects created for some specific 
artistic purpose, while almost completely ignoring landscape. 
170 So, 
for example, between its first issue in 1960 up to 1978, landscape in 
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the British Journal of Aesthetics, as far as has been ascertained, 
despite being occasionally brought in by authors to illustrate some 
point about artistic value, 
171 has only merited three full articles: 
two of which are entirely historical, 
172 
while the other reiects the 
aesthetic concept of form and speaks instead of cultural heritage, 
social values and public attitudes. 
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There have, of course, been one or two exceptions to the general 
avoidance of landscape within the discipline of aesthetics since 
Knight, the subject being given a chapter, or dealt with in passing, 
as part of some larger dissertation. The most prominent figure in 
this line is John Ruskin (1819-1900), whose five volume opus "Modern 
Painters", first published in the 1840s, was concerned with the proper 
appeciation of landscape painting. But, in the course of the 
discussion many hints were given as to how to view the landscape 
itself aeshetically. These were never presented systematically, 
174 
but the thrust of Ruskin's argument appears to have been an amalgam of 
neo-classical idealism with a natural. scientific empiricism plus a 
strong dose of religious romanticism. Natural science had long been a 
theme in English culture, and, in the nineteenth century was a 
prominant force in landscape perception. It can only be observed 
here, however, that by the nineteenth century the meticulous 
observation of geological, botanical and zoological aspects of the 
landscape was well developed, and had even become an acceptable 
pursuit among the gentry, perhaps owing something to the empirical 
mode of thought propogated by the British school of philosophy. From 
this natural scientific standpoint, Ruskin proceeded to venemously 
attack the old landscape masters - Claude, Rosa and Poussin - for 
their botanical and geological inaccuracy, stating that the forms 
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represented in seventeenth century Italian landscape art bore little 
resemblence to the organic structure of natural phenomena. 
But Ruskin did not reject the ideal landscape outright, he simply made 
a substitution by proposing that Joseph Mallord Turner (1775-1851) was 
the only perfect landscape painter the world had ever known, because 
Turner had mastered the technique of representing the smallest details 
of botanical and geological form and colour with precision, and was 
able to correct any deficiencies due to accident or disease so as to 
realise a kind of natural scientific ideal that was the province of 
God; and to come to this ideal was to be lifted to a higher moral 
plane. 
175 What is interesting about Ruskin is that he did not reach 
the heights of influence gained previously by Claude or Gilpin. He 
was respected in the art world, where he developed a relationship with 
the pre-Raphaeltie movement, one of whose aims was also to depict 
landscape with scientific accuracy, and he did much to establish an 
acceptance among the lay audience for a painstaking adherence to 
biological and geological forms and colours in landscape paintings. 
But Ruskin did not succeed in making Turner the master of nineteenth 
century aesthetic landscape. As has been seen, the cultural climate 
around aestheticism had changed dramatically over the years, and 
Ruskin was not helped by an atrocious writing style, nor by the fact 
that there was no longer a single, or at least limited number, of 
conventions among professional landscape painters. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, Turner could be compared successively with 
Constable, "Millais, Landseer, not to mention Renoir, Monet, Cbzanne 
and Van Gogh, all of whom had perfected their own techniques and 
subject matter, and all of whom, had their supporters and detractors. 
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It was no longer possible, then, to take one painter's or one 
school's, interpretation of landscape as a general aesthetic standard, 
and it became even more impossible in the twentieth century when 
landscape painting became so divided that few art historians have 
attempted any sort of overall analysis, and some, faced with 
abstractionism, surrealism and other peculiarities pronounced the end 
of landscape painting as an art altogether-176 
Given this situation and, of course, the many intricate modern 
philosophical developments, it is possible to understand why those few 
aestheticians who, in recent years, have touched upon landscape have 
paradoxically felt it necessary to downgrade the aesthetic terms of 
form, line, space and colour. Newton, 
177 in his three chapters in which 
landscape is mentioned, declares that all the senses, not just the 
eyes, are involved and that natural objects are only beautiful in so 
far as they fulfill their function -a view presumably from natural 
science. An oak tree, for example, should be appreciated for its 
efficiency in producing acorns and so on, but when depicted by an 
artist it is transformed into an arrangement of masses and colours 
that can be appreciated aesthetically; thus, the painting is of quite 
a different order to the object it represents. 
178 Hepburn, 179 too, 
makes the point that landscape cannot be judged according to the 
principles of art and that, since natural scientific knowledge, for 
instance of the geomorphology of an area, affects the manner of 
appreciation, pure aestheticism does not cover all landscape 
experience. Hepburn does not, however, offer any clear explanation of 
this experience, and at one point confusingly refers, in a way that is 
similar to Price's approach, to emotional associations aroused by 
forms and lines, although he does say that these are subject to 
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endless variation. A tree growing on a steep slope and bent over by 
the winds may appear tenacious and grim, but from a greater distance, 
when the view includes many trees like it, the stippled pattern on the 
slope may inspire a sensation of cheerfulness. 
Where, then, if those who might be called aestheticians are not much 
interested in it, is the aesthetic landscape today? How widespread in 
English society is the tendency to see the countryside as a picture? 
Howard Newby180 suggests that for many John Constable's paintings depict 
the ideal English scenery. Is it significant that on a warm, sunny 
Saturday in July last year, eleven people took one or more photographs 
from a position opposite Flatford Mill in the space of fifteen minutes? 
Why do tourists want to take photographs of 'beauty spots' and what are 
they looking at when they stop at 'viewpoints'? Is it true, as 
Nan Fairbrother argues, 
181 that travelling by car fosters an almost 
entirely visual appreciation of landscape? To what extent is 
attention generally given to form, line and colour? Who consciously 
connects them with feelings like tenacity, grimness or cheerfulness? 
Of course, painters continue to ply their trade and, in a fashion that 
harks back to the heyday of Claude and Gilpin, they are occasionally 
cited as the custodians of landscape quality. Nowadays, seemingly 
without regard for the diversity of modern landscape art and the 
theoretical difficulties previously encountered by aestheticians, this 
idea is expressed most often from the specialist quarters of geography 
and landscape architecture. Peter Howard, 
182 
who was trained in the 
former discipline, states that the professional artist is a visual 
expert who is capable of indicating the kind of scenery that the rest 
of society will prefer in the future, while Michael Laurie, in a 
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textbook for landscape architects, says that: 
183 
"... dramatic scenic landscape or the picturesque combination of 
settlement and physiography are themselves potential resources 
that may be evaluated according to their uniqueness and the 
principles of the artist. " 
Curiously enough, it has been geographers, not aestheticians or art 
historians, who have produced new analyses of the aesthetic landscape 
in the twentieth century. Their training gives them a sensitivity for 
cartographic space and geological/geomorphological land form - the 
dome of the Lake District, the Thames basin, lines of communication, 
settlement patterns - which are easy to translate into aesthetic 
terminology. Perhaps this was the starting point for Vaughn Cornish 
and Jay Appleton. 
Whereas only a few geographers seem to have taken an overt aesthetic 
path, the whole field of landscape architecture is steeped in 
aestheticism. The discipline tends to trace its roots back to the 
eighteenth century landscape gardeners, but only a very cursory 
mention can be made here of the aesthetic side of modern landscape 
architecture, there being plenty of others, including the technical 
aspects of design implementation and ecological considerations. Still 
even a glance at the literature produced by landscape architects 
reveals the emphasis they put upon the aesthetic landscape. That they 
are concerned with the eye, 
184 
visual quality or appearance, 
185 
visual 
character, 
186 
visual analysis187 is quite taken for granted, and the 
constituents of this kind of landscape are, as ever, shape: 
188 
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"Landscapes have characteristic topographical shapes, based on 
their underlying geology. The shapes may be smooth and flowing, 
as in the agricultural areas of Devon. In West Scotland the 
strong-angled strata contrasts with the rounded drumlins. " 
line: 189 
"The basic land form should also be a determinant in the 
detailing of rural landscapes, the rule in nearly all cases being 
to work with rather that against it. Thus, roads should be 
fitted into the landscape by alignment with the general direction 
of the major land forms, ie with not against the contours. Field 
boundaries, however, should be with and also against the contours 
if they are to be visually acceptable, instead of diagonally 
across them... " 
space: 
190 
"Land and vegetation are the two main materials of natural 
landscape. Each, in a different way, contributes to those solid 
masses and open voids which made up any composition. In the case 
of the land itself, hills, mountains and convex forms make up the 
'masses', while the valleys, plains and water surfaces form the 
obverse spaces or 'voids' of the composition .... Vegetation 
provides the 'masses' in the form of groups of trees and shrubs 
larger than man, and 'voids' of turf, low plants and farm crops 
which his eye can dominate. " 
and colour: 
191 
"In the soft light of the British countryside the more subdued 
colours seen against a background of restful greens are most 
appropriate. " 
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Years of training are required to perfect this way of seeing and to 
learn the many principles of composition stemming from it, so for the 
outsider the tenets of landscape architecture can be incomprehensible. 
Despite a short course in the subject, I personally cannot understand 
'space', 'texture' or 'harmony', and this points to a problem inherent 
in the modern aesthetic view, given its historical antecedents, which 
has loomed particularly large as a result of recent attempts to 
evaluate landscape. The neo-classicist, Gilpin, who originally 
developed the idea that it was possible to compare different types of 
scenery systematically, was quite happy to accept that a sensitivity 
to aesthetic qualities only came with long and diligent study, and 
that the ignorant were simply ignorant. Now, in the more egalitarian 
political climate surrounding rural planning, which cannot therefore 
appear too elitist, the empiricist stance on aestheticism, that had 
been superimposed on the older philosophical foundation, would make 
things far easier if it could be substantiated. If everyone, however, 
uneducated, was psychologically conditioned to give their primary 
attention to form, line, space and colour, and perhaps make similar 
automatic emotional associations on that basis, the English landscape 
could soon be satisfactorily classified according to its aesthetic 
value. Unfortunately, so the argument goes in the report of the 
Landscape Evaluation Research Project, 
192the 
general public are 
inarticulate about visual qualities and tend to become involved in 
secondary considerations. Landscape architects, on the other hand, 
have been enabled by their training to see through such 
superficialities to the aesthetic landscape the general public really 
sees, and they have the aesthetic vocabulary to describe 
it. They 
can, therefore, together with landscape painters and perhaps certain 
geographically trained planners, make representative 
judgements when 
212 
comparing landscapes. Aesthetic experts, then are no longer above the 
common herd, instead they speak for it, but do they? If this thesis 
is aimed at any target, it is at the claims of generality made by 
those who adhere to aestheticism. The common herd seem to have other 
ideas about landscape, which they do not always reduce to form, line, 
space, and colour. 
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VI THE INDIVIDUAL INHERITOR* 
Individuality and particularity 
Up to this point, amidst the effort to find some generality in 
understanding rural landscape quality, the role of the individual has 
been underplayed. There has been a 'quite unintentional implication 
that, for the purposes of discussion, the perception of landscape can 
be separated from the people who actually carry it out. This seems to 
be the inevitable outcome of any attempt at a general theory of some 
human characteristic because the field of enquiry is set so broadly 
that the individual will not come clearly into focus. 
Unfortunately, but obviously, with regard to landscape perception at 
least, the contribution made by individuals, each at their particular 
time and place, cannot be passed over. They alone are responsible for 
the completion of the perceptual process, arriving at the particular 
landscapes 'in here'. They embody the genetic inheritance which gives 
form to the process, and they have created the cultural inheritance 
which supplies much of its content. In addition to these are such 
personal features as their dispositions, age, special interests, and 
so on. 
Usually, whatever sympathy is expressed towards the fine detail of 
individualism, a move away from it is quickly sought as, for instance 
in this useful summary of the model of perception being used in this 
thesis: 
l 
"Perceiving the environment through all his [sic] senses, man, is 
required to interpret the various components (colours, movement, 
[shape] etc) which appear in the perceptual field. Hypotheses 
* References p233-234 above 220 
are formulated concerning each component and these are accepted 
or rejected on the basis of experience and intuition. Demanding 
order, man arranged the components or percepts into frameworks 
which are consistent with categories that exist or are acceptable 
to the individual. Although the framework will differ from 
person to person, many of its struts are derived from the group 
and culture to which the individual belongs. " 
X 
And this analysis then concentrates upon some of the struts that 
individual frames of reference share. 
This is a reasonable approach because if the individual and the 
particular are not immediately subsumed in a general argument only two 
courses remain open, both equally unsatisfactory. Either a series of 
all-embracing statements are made which then may be supported by a 
wide variety of illustrations. 
2 Or lists of individual differences 
are provided which defy coherent discussion. 
3 The few investigations 
that have been done into the effects of age and personality on 
landscape perception tend to suffer from one or other of these 
problems, and little that is conclusive has emerged. There is still 
disagreement over whether people's age after childhood influences the 
way they appreciate landscape, 
4 
while, as yet, there are no widely 
accepted definitions of personality types on which to base analysis of 
their relationship to landscape perception. 
5 It is very likely tht `, 
such features cannot be examined in isolation from the whole 
particular and detailed context within which a person perceives 
landscape, and sufficient material is lacking for further 
consideration of the impact of adult age groups and personal 
temprament within a general framework. 
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Indeed, the rest of this chapter noticeably falls into the first of the 
traps mentioned in the last paragraph, that is, into making overall 
comments about points that are important to the individual, but which 
are devoid of substance. They will be kept, therefore, to a minimum. 
One of the intentions held during the preparation of this thesis was to 
deal with the individual as with culture - that the details of some 
personal biographies would be supplied to substantiate general points 
made in the same way that details of certain aspects of English culture 
have been elaborated. However, time has not been found to carry out 
this exercise, despite the fact that it is eminently feasible. The many 
letters of John Constable6, for instance, could be used in this way, and 
a new biography of William Gilpin, exploring the development of his 
personal view of landscape and the way he promulgated it, is long 
overdue. There is no reason, of course, why such 'landscape 
biographies' need be confined to the famous and influential. Most 
people, when queried, are able to trace their particular preferences to 
a childhood experience, intellectual passion, or whatever. 
Personal development 
Everyone is born with the genetic complement that sets up the workings 
of the senses and the brain as well as preparing them to make use of 
experience gained by other members of their society. But newborn 
individuals do not come into their genetic and cultural inheritance 
immediately. Full sensory and intellectual abilities are not 
automatically present at birth, and nor can the communal knowledge 
required in the exercise of these abilities be absorbed 
instantaneously. Throughout life, but especially in growing from 
infant to adulthood, each individual must work constructively to 
develop perceptual skills. 
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A great deal of research has been done, inspired primarily by Jean 
Piaget, 7 into the development of the ability to perceive. Much of 
this work has been of a general and abstract nature, focussing on the 
growth of the conceptualisation of shape and space. However, some 
environmental psychologists, such as Gary Moore, 
8 do recognise the 
influence of personal factors making for detailed variations in the 
development of individuals' modes of understanding. Developmental 
psychology is yet another discipline whose findings have implications 
for an understanding of rural landscape quality but which has not been 
explored with any depth in preparing this thesis. One vital point, 
however, must be noted. The majority of writers on the subject 
continually stress the need for interaction between the growing 
individual and their physical and social surroundings in the 
development of perceptual skills. 
From very early on in life, each person becomes involved in a complex 
of interchanges between: their developing sensory and intellectual 
abilities; the natural and socially created features of the places 
where they spend their lives; and the realms of knowledge and social 
organisation belonging to the culture in which they live. These 
interactions allow the individual to actively construct a whole 
collection of conceptual schemes. Since some part of this collection 
must be employed if the individual is to perceive at all, its growth 
as a totality is equivalent to the growth of a world -a personal 
world. 
9 
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One person's world, however, cannot be portrayed as being entirely 
unified under a dominant conceptual scheme or set of completely 
consistent schemes. As an example, Seymour Wapner and his 
colleagueslO have suggested that a man trained as a botanist might 
bring into play different aspects of his world in perceiving landscape 
when he is on a field trip and when on a picnic with his family. 
Thus, if culture is inherently pluralistic, so are each of the 
personal worlds that together comprise a culture. This diversity of 
frames of reference embraced by a single personal world owes a great 
deal to the diversity of material used in its construction. The 
particular physical and social surroundings individuals encounter 
during their lives present them with a varied mixture of experience to 
be assimilated into their developing collection of concepts. 
Furthermore, out of all the combinations made possible by the scale of 
variation existing at the level of concrete detail in the physical and 
social environment, it is unlikely that the specific mix of 
experience gained in any one individual's lifetime is ever exactly 
repeated in someone else's. The pattern of life itself is 
selective, 
" being limited by the timing of birth and death; by 
restrictions on the path a body can trace in a lifetime; by 
restrictions on events that can be encompassed in one life; on the 
range of interests that any one person can follow in a lifetime; and 
so on. Therefore, the particular selection of experience upon which 
each personal world is built not only contributes to that world's 
internal diversity but to its uniqueness. Added to this, individuals 
occasionally make especially original constructions on the basis of 
their own pattern of experience which sets personal worlds even 
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farther apart from one another, unless the new construction is 
transmitted to others. 
But, although considered as totalities they are unique, personal 
worlds are not mutually exclusive because the conditions of their 
development ensure that there will be overlaps between them-12 As 
already indicated, a conceptual scheme derived by one person may be 
communicated to others, assimilated by them and subsequently pass into 
the cultural inheritance. To take a simple example, this is what has 
happened to the botanical system of classification produced by Carolus 
Linnaeus (1707-1778). 13 Thus, parts of each person's world are shared 
with various sections of the community while the whole personal world 
would seem to remain unique. 
There are two factors operating at the level of the individual and 
particular which are often recognised as making great contributions to 
the development of individual concepts about landscape. 
Paradoxically, they may be seen to serve as promoting both the 
overlapping and the differentiation of personal worlds. Firstly, 
there is the sense of place, and secondly, the special interests to 
which people adhere. 
Familiar places 
It is an obvious fact of life that everyone starts from some particular 
locality or localities which they know extremely well from having 
been 
brought up there, or from residing there, or from regularly visiting 
there. This is true even now that members of some societies tend to 
be more geographically mobile and it becomes increasingly unusual 
for 
them to be born and spend most of their lives in the same 
district. 
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Mobility does not so much destroy a sense of place as to bring about 
other versions of something that is an inescapable part of the pattern 
of life. 
14 This is why almost every approach to rural landscape 
quality eventually comes up against the often intense feelings that 
people have towards those places they have experienced at first-hand. 
Traditionally academics, at least, have often reacted to this 
encounter either by denying that familiarity with particular 
localities has anything to do with the appreciation of landscape, 15 or 
by putting a somewhat nostalgic interpretation of the sense of place 
on a pedestal. 
16 Some attempt should be made to find a balance 
between these two, but, again, such a balance is probably obtainable 
only when some actual, detailed case is being considered. 
Even so there does seem to be a common tendency for individuals to 
take the particular landscapes with which they are closely acquainted 
as archetypes, as reference points against which other places are 
compared. People interact with the physical and social surroundings 
of their own localities, and in doing so construct certain modes of 
understanding for use in perceiving landscape which will have at least 
some influence when taking in different places. To mention one 
probably extreme example: Ronald Paulson'7 has observed that 
John Constable attempted to impose the landscape where he grew up on 
other landscapes he encountered later. This might partially explain 
his failure to portray the Lake District adequately since the area was 
quite unsuited to the techniques he had developed in painting his 
native Stour Valley. That such deep impressions may be made by places 
which become familiar only in adult life must not be denied. Vincent 
van Gogh (1853-1890), after all, grew up far from Provence. But 
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places known in childhood, whether at home or on holiday, seem to be 
especially liable to transformation into personal archetypes. 
Depending, of course, upon the circumstances of their upbringing, 
young children would seem to experience all the excitement and 
apprehension, rewards and disappointment of exploring new ground from 
a secure home-base as they construct their first collection of 
symbolic schemes for bringing order into the landscape 'out there'. 
The initial development of a personal world is closely akin to the 
discovery of the world itself, and it tends to have a peculiarly vivid 
and firm quality which ensures that vestiges of constructs made in 
childhood often remain with individuals throughout life. They become 
part of the individual's personal identity, an identity that to some 
extent will remain associated with the familiar places where it 
emerged. 
18 Such places provide for personal development in at least 
three ways: 
19 they offer direct experience of particular physical 
surroundings; they offer pre-existing means of understanding those 
surroundings to be learnt from family, friends and neighbours; and 
they offer the particular social surroundings that these other people 
engender. Not that the child will separate the human from the non- 
human attributes of a place. Knowledge of its physical details gained 
in play20 intermingles with knowledge supplied by adults, for example, 
on the names of flowers or of streets, on who lives where, and on 
events in local and family history. The location of communal 
activities in which the child takes part will, in addition, reflect 
the organsation of their society. All work together so that the 
individual grows in detailed knowledge of that particular place, while 
the place has detailed knowledge of them. 
21 Edmund Relph22 uses the 
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key phrase: 'knowing and being known here', to express the closeness 
of the familiar place with personal identity. It may be observed, 
too, that children and members of subsistence societies seem to share 
in a recognition of some anthropomorphous spirit even in the non-human 
features of their locality; 
23 
a spirit which is capable of knowing, 
and perhaps responding to, them. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that, because childhood 
experiences have an important influence upon the content of each 
personal world, this content henceforth remains completely static. 
Adults will naturally structure, restructure and reject the various 
schemes in their collection which they first assembled as children. 
Their personal worlds will evolve in a particular way guided by such 
factors as the special interests they have developed. This applies to 
the sense of place as well. Over the centuries, certain members of 
subsistence societies have helped to create complex religious systems 
from a basic recognition of a spirit of place, while in modern English 
culture, for example, the feeling for place has been cultivated most 
assiduously by novelists, poets, literary critics, and lately by human 
geographers taking an interest in literature. The genius of childhood 
only persists into adult life in a specialised condition. 
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Special interests 
The cultural inheritance made available to each individual growing up 
in society consists of a vast and variegated mixture of major and 
minor specialised constructs. Even in the simplest of societies, no 
one person could possibly become a specialist in every aspect of their 
culture. Individuals must select which strands of knowledge they 
are to pursue - which of their conceptual schemes will become the most 
elaborated during their lives. Everyone, then, becomes an expert in 
some things, whether these are recognised in society as having 
academic, professional, or another type of standing. 
Considerable work in recent years has been done on the differences in 
outlook between acknowledged experts and 'lay' people within one 
culture, 
24 
as well as between individual experts in the same field. 
25 
Disagreements have been found common in both instances. To take one 
example: 
26 in the southern states of America, certain forests are 
suffering attacks from the Southern Pine Beetle which initially cause 
the trees to turn orange-brown in colour. To foresters this presents 
an unpleasant appearance because they see it as a sympton of insect 
damage. But those people who do not realise the cause may actually 
prefer the discolouration, equating it with autumnal tinting. Of 
course, autumn leaves were not usually admired themselves until the 
Picturesque movement gained sway. 
27 
That each person developes specialist interests is an observable fact, 
and, given an appropriate lens, the resulting diversity of landscape 
appreciation may also be observed. But why does the individual choose 
to follow one strand rather than another within the web of culture 
that surrounds them? Four interacting factors can be mentioned in 
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answer, although other factors should not be excluded. A much more 
substantial treatment of these four points would be possible if a 
particular biography - 'life history' - was being studied. 
First, there is the contribution that place can make in an 
individual's choice of speciality. John Constable's remark on the 
Stour Valley: "these scenes made me a painter, " is often quoted. 
Presumably this includes reference to love of the area itself - every 
stump and stone - but might be extended also to the character of light 
in the Stour Valley which artists still find unusual, and which gives 
a peculiar clarity to textures and colours. * Then there is the 
contribution made by people with whom the individual has contact who 
communicate enthusiasm for the personal interest. Some owe the choice 
of speciality, for example, to a parent or lively teacher. At East 
Bergholt, the young Constable became great friends with the local 
plumber and glazier whose hobby was painting, and they would go on 
expeditions together. Moreover, there has been a professional painter 
in every subsequent Constable generation. 
Thirdly, there is the important factor of the social class to which 
the individual belongs. This not so much governs choice as affects 
the availability of choices, and the way a speciality is developed 
once selected. Berger and Luckmann28 provide a more than competent 
analysis of this factor. As illustration: Constable was a miller's 
son. He was given adequate education, for the time, at local schools, 
* The lower Stour Valley, Dedham Vale, has attracted painters since 
the late nineteenth century, and several residents were 
interviewed during a short period of field work in 1979. 
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and the family business was able to support him, though not in luxury 
for some years until his paintings yielded sufficient income. 
Finally, the individual may discover a certain aptitude, if not 
outright gift, for a particular line, which they may then make their 
work or hobby. It is not for this thesis to delve into the sources of 
talent, but, if of a creative sort, talent further distinguishes 
individuals from one another. Constable's paintings are unique, 
however well the skills he developed are copied. Even the very 
similar paintings of his son, Lionel, are now being identified more 
accurately. 
Creativity 
Creativity on the part of individuals is the source of all cultural 
change, whether the innovators go down in the annals of history or 
remain forever nameless. The originality comes in effecting some 
revolution, large or small, within existing conceptual frameworks, 
although the revolution can appear in various guises. Some arise from 
necessity in adapting to alterations in the physical or social 
environment - perhaps a drought or economic recession. Some spring 
from a rejection of established concepts; others crystallise aspects 
drawn from strands not previously brought together; while a very few 
seem to be brought by a genius from nowhere. 
By nature, each individual is continually seeking innovation, to a 
greater or lesser degree, but whether the innovation works, let alone 
is passed on and incorporated into others' personal worlds, 
depends on 
whether it is made at the right time, in the right place, and in the 
right culture. 
29 Experience in the field of landscape perception alone 
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suggests true novelties are few and far between. There is nothing new 
under the sun, 
30 but many conceptions are lost at the time of their 
first formulation for lack of applicability. Even if one individual 
is capable of questioning what they take for granted and trying 
something different, other people may not be prepared for the 
disturbance and loss of assurity entailed in challenging concepts on 
which they have depended, often for many years. 
There is a constant tension, noticed by nearly all writers on 
landscape perception, between the desire to venture into the unknown 
and the desire to remain safe and certain; between 'prospect' and 
'refuge', between intimations of disorder and the order of the 
accepted. 
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EPILOGUE 
The instant of perception 
Seaside Golf 
How straight it flew, how long it flew, 
It clear'd the rutty track 
And soaring, disappeared from view 
Beyond the bunker's back - 
A glorious, sailing, bounding drive 
That made me glad I was alive. 
And down the fairway, far along 
It glowed a lonely white; 
I played an iron sure and strong 
And Clipp'd it out of sight, 
And spite of grassy banks between 
I knew I'd find it on the green. 
And so I did. It lay content 
Two paces from the pin; 
A steady putt and then it went 
Oh, most securely in. 
The very turf rejoiced to see 
That quite unprecedented three. 
Ah! seaweed smells from sandy caves 
And thyme and mist in whiffs, 
In-coming tide, Atlantic waves 
Slapping the sunny cliffs, 
Lark song and sea sounds in the air 
And splendour, splendour everywhere. 
John Betjeman 1980 Collected Poems. (Murray, London) p206 
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